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The Caribbean and Global Capitalism

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by

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ABSTRACT

The Caribbean and Global Capitalism

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As a new epoch in the history of world capitalism, global capitalism is shaping every region of the planet. One of these regions is the Caribbean, among the first outside of Europe to be integrated into world capitalism through colonialism five centuries ago. In recent decades, as the Caribbean’s population has become entwined with global networks of production and finance in extremely unequal ways, scholars have begun to document shifting social patterns. While Caribbean societies throughout their history have exhibited many differences and continuities, the sweeping changes characteristic of globalization compel us to examine the region’s changing political economy.

With much of the Caribbean’s population based in the Greater Antilles island chain (containing Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico), this geographic area will be referred to most often in my research. As many studies have been done on contemporary Puerto Rico (as an associated part of the U.S.) and on socialist Cuba, the case studies of this dissertation will focus on Jamaica, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. In looking at these three countries, case studies will examine how their national economies have fragmented and become penetrated by global chains of accumulations. I will look at this specifically through the context of major global economic sectors (cruise
ship tourism, mining, export processing, and the role of migration and reverse flow of remittances).

My introductory chapter reviews, synthesizes, and interprets existing sources and accounts on the development of capitalism in the Caribbean. Especially useful are a number of scholarly studies on the shifting modes of production in the Caribbean, from slave labor to wage labor and from European colonial mercantilism up to industrializing monopoly capitalism and into capitalist globalization albeit with the U.S. as the major hegemonic power in the region. Such studies are useful in helping to understand the history of social formation in the region.

I also have read reports and data gathered by key political and economic forums active in the Caribbean and specifically with regard to some of the major global industries. This information is central for gaining a detailed understanding of the shifting material and social relations taking place in the region. In addition to the archival research, this dissertation’s research is backed up by a multi-sited case study of the Caribbean region through ethnographic observations and interviews. This dissertation has aimed more precisely to synthesis my theoretical approach with my research findings. Rather than be chained to a rigid social experiment, I have moved back and forth between the questions I formulate and the data I collect. The methods I’ve outlined are not necessarily carried out in sequence, but rather according to the needs of the project. This flexibility has been necessary for a project of this scope.
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Chapter I

Introduction to the Caribbean and Global Capitalism

As a new epoch in the history of world capitalism, global capitalism is shaping every region of the planet. One of these regions is the Caribbean, among the first outside of Europe to be integrated into world capitalism through colonialism five centuries ago (Mann, 2011). In recent decades, as the Caribbean’s population has become entwined with global networks of production and finance in extremely unequal ways (Klak, 1997; Watson, 1985), scholars have begun to document shifting social patterns (Gowicharn, 2006; Knight & Martinez-Vergne, 2005). While Caribbean societies throughout their history have exhibited many differences and continuities (Mintz, 1989), the sweeping changes characteristic of globalization compel us to examine the region’s changing political economy.

We need analytical tools to make sense of the changes taking place through globalization. In this dissertation, I use the term “transnational processes” to describe a diverse array of structural, institutional, and organizational phenomena that link regions and nations more organically with global society and economy. Transnational processes should not be confused with national and international processes. Whereas national processes occur within the frontiers of the nation-state, international processes transpire across borders. Transnational processes, in addition to occurring across borders, take place through cross-border functional integration. Functional integration refers to how amalgamations of different components (or agents) are constituted through their joint operation. Here, I want to draw our attention to the nature of this integration as something completely new in the history of our species. Processes that take place across frontiers in this functionally
integrated manner alter the very ways in which space and geography are implicated in material and social production. We can identify this distinction between international and transnational processes in relation to the world economy: “Internationalization involves the simple extension of economic activities across national boundaries and is essentially a quantitative process that leads to a more extensive geographical pattern of economic activity,” whereas “transnationalization differs qualitatively from internationalization processes, involving not merely the geographical extension of economic activity across national boundaries but also the functional integration of such internationally dispersed activities” (Robinson, 2004, p. 14).

This dissertation focuses on the nature of this new era of world capitalism and the sweeping transformations that it has ushered in. It investigates the changing political economy in the context of the Caribbean basin. I have sought to understand how changes in material (economic) relations are connected with social changes, such as the relationships among capitalists, labor, middle strata, and social groups such as state policymakers. I argue that structural changes associated with the emergence of global capitalism are rooted in new formations and fractioning among social groups and classes. By this, I mean that certain new social classes, class fractions, and social groups have come into existence, rooted in the novel processes of global capitalism and transnational social integration. In some instances, earlier classes and social groups have been reconstituted or reconfigured, even while maintaining many of their previous dynamics and appearances. In other cases, a class fraction or social group might be objectively rooted in globalized chains of accumulation, but subjectively they may remain more locally or nationally oriented. The following chapters are made up of comparative case studies that specifically show how traditional
exports and nationally or internationally-oriented economic sectors have shifted toward
global competitiveness and transnational integration and how these processes are
undergirded by changing social and class relations, as well as a reorientation of the state
apparatus.

In chapter one, I provide an explanation of the “global capitalism school” approach
and suggest a route for understanding the Caribbean’s political economy in the global era. I
close with a brief historical overview of the region in light of the different phases of world
capitalism. Chapter two looks at the formation and evolving role of export processing
development and export processing zones (EPZs), showcasing the increasing integration of
Caribbean manufacturing with transnational capital and the great lengths to which state
policymakers have gone to promote export processing. Chapter three examines the
globalization of the cruise ship industry in the region, elaborating upon how Caribbean
nations have become globally competitive nodes for the industry. It shows how the industry
and labor operating through it have undergone a major restructuring over recent decades,
coming under the consolidation of transnational capital. Chapter four looks at the
exportation of Caribbean labor, the reverse flow of remittances, as well as the formation of a
global remittance industry. By exploiting migrant labor, transnational capitalists have come
to not only profit tremendously by appropriating the surplus value of super-exploitable
migrant workers, but also through its appropriation of portions of the redistributed value (in
the form of remittances) that emigrant laborers send abroad primarily to family members.
Chapter five looks at mining in the Caribbean, specifically in regard to the transition from an
international mining industry, with heavy state involvement, to a transnationally-oriented
and privatized mining industry. The dissertation will close with some theoretical reflection
on the broader implications of economic restructuring and the transformation of class relations in the region and with suggestions for future research on the Caribbean and global capitalism.

Global Capitalism: A New Phase in the History of World Capitalism

How do we account for the massive changes washing over the shores of the Caribbean and the world as a whole? Around us are advancements unique in our species’ history: new technologies, bursting flows of information, and global economic integration. Yet these occur alongside unprecedented inequality (Holt-Gimenez & Patel, 2009; Kloby, 2003), shifting forms of coercive and consensual domination (Harvey, 1991; Robinson, 1996, 2014), and ecological and climactic crisis that imperil life on our planet (Klein, 2014; Chew, 2006; Kolbert, 2014; World Bank, 2012). The structures of human society have been altered dramatically over recent decades. Many changes have occurred at a faster tempo and in a more all-encompassing manner when compared to earlier phases of world capitalism (Harvey, 1991).

Various concepts and theories have been used to make sense of the ways in which human social formation has developed historically. Marx’s concept of “modes of production” helps us to conceptualize the varied ways through which human beings have together produced their subsistence in order to survive. By mode of production, Marx referred to the combination of (1) productive forces, all those forces which are applied by people in the production process (body and brain, tools and techniques, materials, resources and equipment) and (2) relations of production, the sum total of social relationships that people must enter into, in order to survive, to produce and reproduce their means of life
(Marx, 1992). The totality of these relationships constitutes a relatively stable and long-lasting structure. So how can we understand “globalization” in regards to the mode of production? To demarcate the historical process, I suggest that the era of globalization is best understood as the latest phase in the history of world capitalism (and therein the latest phase in the capitalist mode of production).

The capitalist mode of production, as Marx conceptualized, was qualitatively and structurally divergent from the pre-capitalist modes of production, as it is based on systems of production and distribution organized around private ownership and wage labor (Donaldson, 2012). Capitalism has gone through different phases, through which we can identify particular changes among productive forces and changes to people’s social relations (Hobsbawm, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d). In examining these changes, we can point to four major phases in the history of world capitalism, generally identified as: (1) the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe and the initial colonial and chattel slave production phase that occurred from the 1500s through the 1800s, (2) the industrial capitalism phase that emerged in the late-1700s, with the first industrial revolution, and continued on until the latter part of that 1800s, (3) the international monopoly capitalism phase that developed in the mid- to late 1800s and continued into around the 1970’s, and most recently (4) the global capitalism phase which emerged in the later decades of the 20th century and has continued into the 21st century.

The novelty of global capitalism, as a new phase in the history of world capitalism, has been shown in a number of recent works (Dicken, 2007; Harris, 2006; Robinson, 2004; Sklair, 2002; Sprague, 2015). Sklair observes how transnational practices have emerged in recent decades, operating across the global system interconnected with regional, national,
and local constituencies in economic, political, and culture-ideological ways. As global networks of production and finance that pushed through TNCs and other institutions redefine the scale of the world economy (Dicken, 2011), it has been argued that transnational social relations form within and between class fractions and social groups. Scholars have examined therein the role of transnational social integration and the rise of new social and class relations (Harris, 2006; McMichael, 1996; Robinson, 2004; 2014; Rodriguez, 2010; Sassen, 1991; Sklair, 2001, 2002; Van der Pijl, 1998), but have also raised questions for further research and substantiation (Embong, 2000). Sklair argues that operating outside of the global system, “is becoming increasingly more difficult as capitalist globalization penetrates ever more widely and deeply” (2009, p. 528).

By looking at the Caribbean in relation to the different phases of capitalism, we get a deeper understanding of shifting structural patterns and how combinations of various circumstances (or conjunctural dynamics) lay beneath the changes taking place in the region. The Caribbean, the earliest region of the “New World” to be conquered by the late-Feudal absolutist states of Western Europe (Wolf, 2010; Anderson, 1974), has passed through all of the different phases of capitalism. Capitalism has flowed and congealed through Caribbean societies (as structures). Human beings (as agents of production, or carriers of productive relations) do “make their own history” (Marx, 1994), creating and constructing new and possibly emancipatory endeavors. Yet they operate under broader circumstances not chosen by them, under circumstances coiled back through the past and up to the present, through the collection of activities of the lives of previous and current generations.

As many scholars have described, while Caribbean societies became centers of agricultural and extractivist production, they suffered from underdevelopment as peripheral
areas of the world market. Capitalist development took on particular forms in the region, which for centuries was largely dictated by the region’s frontier status in the world system. Capitalist accumulation in the region initially was largely based around plantation agriculture. As a source of exportation to the more advanced “core” capitalist markets in Western Europe (and, eventually, North America), such industries led to highly unequal class systems. Exported and refined agrarian products, such as sugar and coffee, harvested in its original form by slaves and poor peasant populations in the Caribbean, became in turn stimulants for new industrial proletariat work forces in places such as France and the British Isles (Richardson, 1992, p. 54). While Caribbean colonial and post-colonial societies (during the earlier phases of capitalism) became integrated with chains of accumulation in world capitalism, the nature of this integration was qualitatively distinct and different from the nature of today’s integration of the Caribbean with global capital.

This is because in the earlier phases of capitalism, the mode of production was largely “articulated” within the production relations of various nation-states, colonies, empires and the inter-state frameworks that existed. What has changed is that with the rise of capitalist globalization, processes of material and social production within these territorially confined units have broken down. The national and international circuits of accumulation running through these areas have now begun to be functionally integrated into global circuits. As Robinson (2003, p. 16) writes: “there has been a progressive dismantling of autonomous or ‘autocentric’ national production systems and their reactivation as constituent elements of an integral world production system.” As part of this process, the world has experienced a qualitative change in mobility and time-space compression (Harvey, 1991).
The unfolding of different phases of the capitalist mode of production in the region can be seen not just in the new technologies and productive forces, but also through changing labor-capital relations. A case in point is the shift from chattel slave labor to private peasant production and ultimately to waged labor. Elites in the region have also faced changing circumstances. Colonial elites in different instances were either displaced by national elites or overthrown by revolutionary movements, or in other circumstances they themselves helped facilitate transitions to political independence for their colonial subjects. Whereas the colonial systems had often privileged metropole-based enterprises, the decline of colonialism occurred alongside the rise of industrial capital and international monopoly capital. The objective social and class conditions that formed we can thus understand as rooted in the capitalist mode of production and its altered phases and historical particularities. An aim of my dissertation is to understand how the latest transition took place in the Caribbean: from the international to the global phase of capitalism.

In addition to the work of the “global capitalism school,” I have also been inspired by earlier critical works on Caribbean political economy, many of which have been authored by Caribbean scholars. While there have been many past critical and radical studies on the political economy of the region and many of its nations, there has yet to be a study of the Caribbean from the perspective of the “global capitalism school”, emphasizing the novel and contradictory nature of the transnational processes that have developed over the last decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century. Similarly, while there have been many “globalization” era studies of the Caribbean region, there have been too few that radically examine the region’s structural features. As emphasized throughout my case studies, this dissertation focuses on (1) the underlying socio-economic structure of the Caribbean, and (2)
how, through globalization, many nationally and internationally oriented social and material processes in the region have become transnationalized. Next, I want to explain more clearly the theoretical approach that I take up in this dissertation and how my focus is largely driven by a structural analysis.

**THEORIZING SOCIAL CARTOGRAPHY & GLOBAL CAPITALISM**

To demystify the character of capitalist accumulation and capital-labor relations, we need to have a theoretical understanding that illuminates their structural features. From the naked eye, global markets appear to take on a life of their own, as a fetishized relation with mesmerizing flows of finance, production, and trade. In order to get beyond the view of capitalism as an “immense collection of commodities” (Marx, 1994, p. 125), we need to engage in a more in-depth analysis and get at its intrinsic characteristics. How are services and commodities produced and utilized? Rather than understand the production and consumption of goods and services as the normal function of a faceless market, we need to comprehend how human beings operate through economic structures. Through this operation, labor and capital take on specific and peculiar social characters. So how has this operation taken on a novel form in the global era? Here we need to understand the social cartography of global capitalism, what Robinson describes as the emergent “single and increasingly undifferentiated field of world capitalism” as it “integrates the various polities, cultures, and institutions of national societies into an emergent transnational or global society” (Robinson, 2003, p. 13).

In considering the social cartography of globalization in the Caribbean, ethnic and class dimensions are particularly salient. Scholars have pointed to the social construction of race, where various and often amorphous ethnic groupings have been placed into
concretized racialized structures and hierarchies. An ethnic group, as segments of people whom at one time may have lived in a particular geographic area, is not a concrete fixed category (Reed, 2000). Through the early period of capitalism, depending on the circumstances, ethnic groups and various populations came to be socially constructed so as to appear as part of monolithic and biologically configured “races”.

This idea of distinctly separate racial categories appears to have initially become widespread during the rise of early capitalist labor relations, which was a period that also exhibited some late-feudalistic relations. As Cox (1948) argues, new socially constructed racial hierarchies had their roots in chattel slavery, as European colonialists needed to legitimate their brute objectification and subjugation of African labor. Slave labor served as the most accessible and profitable means through which to operate the new colonial system, with its intensive forms of plantation production (Williams, 1944). In order to effectively exploit and repress African slave labor, European elites needed to distinguish Africans from other laborers. They needed to create the illusion of Africans as subhuman.

Through historical processes, racialized relations came about justifying a brutally exploitive social relation (Federici, 2004; Horne, 2014; also see: Szymanski, 1983, p. 355-432). Racism as a structure is a material relation prior to an ideological justification: after an objective relationship of domination exists, ideological justifications were created (Cox, 1948). In the colonial Caribbean, consensus formation around these ideological constructs thus worked to solidify the rule of members of the dominant class within the dominant ethnic group over laborers supplanted from another part of the world. In the Caribbean this took on the particular form of a dominant “white” planter class ruling over a much larger enslaved “black” population, with various “creole” or “mixed” intermediary strata. The
racialized orders thus came often to appear as one in the same with the class system. Yet, as Kenan Malik (1996) argues compellingly, it is the capitalist organization of society into classes that led to the racial classification of humanity. The racialized forms of the class structures that came about through capitalism by way of European colonialism have been reconfigured over the years. However, the early colonial projects set into place a sort of bedrock, forming racialized class relations that remain deeply entrenched (and reproduced), passed down generations and into the current global phase of capitalism.

Racialized class formation has occurred differently in particular locations and historical periods (Cox, 1948; Solomos, 1986). In the context of the Caribbean, it initially took shape through past imperial systems and has continued on through the phases of capitalism, including through the qualitative shift to capitalist globalization (Marable & Agard-Jones, 2008). Whereas indigenous people on the Caribbean islands were almost completely wiped out during the initial period of colonialism, racialized colonial hierarchies between “black”, “white”, and various “mestizaje” populations (people of “mixed race”) were constructed and reproduced over time (Smith, 1965, p. 9). These racialized structures were further complicated through new immigrants (such as those originating in China and India), compelled, like others, into identifying themselves through socially constructed lens of race. Racialized class formations have taken on different shapes in various parts of the world, with such dynamics in the Caribbean context having been heavily studied and debated (to cite just a small number of these, see for example: de la Fuente, 2001; Dupuy, 1996; Meeks, 2007; Mills, 2010; Reyes-Santos, 2015). Yet racial formation is not monolithic, a fact that is clearly on display when looking at other parts of the world, such as in East Asia, where completely different racialized dynamics have formed in distinction to
societies (such as in the Caribbean) where through genocide, slavery, and forms of waged labor distinct racialized class systems formed.

Scholars have written on the ways racialized and cultural norms are identified differently and through changing formats (& du Gay, 1996). How different “racial” categories are defined and understood varies, melds, or persists, impacted by particular histories, structures and cultural practices. In the Caribbean context, reverberations remain of the racialized class relations formed through European colonialism, slavery, and the initial phase of capitalism. In this manner racialized class relations have been reproduced overtime, yet they are not static. Rather as a social relation they have undergone changes and different iterations. For instance, we can see the reproduction of racialized class relations in the Caribbean where peoples with lighter skin, or with higher degrees of non-African ancestry, often make up the majority of the dominant social classes in the region, while lower income populations remain often largely made up of those with darker hues of skin color (more heavily representative of the descendants of the original African born slave populations). Yet at the same time it is true a growing number of economic and political leaders and new middle strata of Caribbean society exhibit darker skin pigmentations (and with lineages that trace back to slave ancestors). So whereas the historically persistent structure of racialized inequality and repression remain embedded within class relations (Gafar, 1998), we can also see some changes as having occurred. As alluded to earlier, racialized structures have become part and parcel of class relations in capitalism, continuing to have a real and deleterious impact on so many in global society (Allahar, 2005). Just as authors have linked rising levels of un- and under-employment and precarious labor to policing operations seeking to contain racialized surplus populations (Gilmore, 2007; Hall,
et al, 2013), this is a reality heavily present in today’s Caribbean. In this manner, racialized class relations have been reproduced in the global era (Marable and Agard-Jones, 2008), as is clear among the urban and rural working and popular classes that dot the region’s landscape.

In connection to the social construction of our lived reality and the ways in which this plays out in our world, we must understand how inequality and social class have developed historically and contemporaneously. Whereas Homo sapiens have existed for more than 200,000 years, inequality only began around 12,000 years ago (Harman, 2008), yet whereas gendered inequality and the sexual division of labor is believed to have existed even earlier (Ibid). Levels of inequality do exist in non-capitalist modes of production but at much lower levels, as scholars have observed (Ibid). The development of capitalism introduced the capital-labor class structure, in which a part of society came to own the means of production while another was compelled to sell its labor “on pain of extinction” (as Marx puts it). While merchant capital had already existed for many centuries, the labor-capitalist relation and the associated relations of production ultimately developed in part as a response to the crisis of feudalism (Watson, 2015, p. 384). The structural features of this phenomena initially congealed in the late feudal formations of western Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, as a process of primitive accumulation began which “divorc[ed] the producer from the means of production” and removed small non-capitalist producers from their lands and inserted them into relations of waged labor (Marx, 1994, p. 875). As communal small farmer and familial land holdings subsided, and monetized property relations spread, a heightened distinction between possessors and non-possessors occurred (Wood, 1998).
Interconnected to the transformations in Europe, racialized chattel slavery began in the colonial Caribbean, producing significant surplus for European planter elites and merchant capital (Galeano, 1997; McAuley, 2001). These changes occurring through capitalism also led to a new subjugation of women, both through the brutality of slavery for enslaved African women, and through the “patriarchy of the wage” for others. As women’s work in the early phases of capitalism was largely confined to unwaged labor, women faced a qualitatively new level of subordination within the family and society (Federici, 2004; Mies, 1986), relations that continue to be reproduced though having undergone changes as well. Capitalist and laboring classes, different ethnicities, women and men have all thus come to participate in racialized and gendered class systems. Divisions and forms of repression have in turn generated fierce resistance and emancipatory movements.

For the purposes of this dissertation, which focuses on political economy, it is important here to elaborate upon the structural features of the class systems that emerged. By class systems I refer to the division of society into social classes made of people that are related in different ways to the production and distribution of wealth. Szymanski (1983, pp. 84-119) describes, for example, the capitalist class (who own the means of production), the working and popular classes (who must sell their labor), the intermediate positions in class structure (“middle class positions”), and a variety of others groups such as the unemployed and the structurally excluded. During historical eras prior to capitalism and in the initial periods of capitalism, we can identify other classes; such as chattel slaves who made up a large portion of the Caribbean population and who in many parts of the Caribbean came to far outnumber the European planters and colonialists (Horne, 2014). Importantly, social classes do not appear in isolation or as something permanent; rather they are a product of
social relations in which human beings seek (or are compelled) to produce and reproduce the material requirements of life. In regions such as the Caribbean, colonial expansion carried with it the early social relations of the capitalist mode of production. Yet carried within these new exploitive social relations grew seeds of resistance and liberation, as human beings by their nature will seek out freedom (James, 1980, 1989). For this reason, the new plantation and extractive industries of the Caribbean became cauldrons of class struggle and slave rebellion (Linebaugh & Rediker, 2013).

Before continuing on, it is useful to briefly outline some concrete ways to understand class relations. How a class is formed depends upon a variety of subjective and objective factors. Here it is useful to differentiate between a “class for itself” and a “class in itself”. A “class for itself” (or a “class fraction for itself”) is class conscious: its individuals are aware of their shared interests and consider themselves as a unit that acts upon the basis of a common feeling in pursuing their class interests. A “class in itself” (or a “class fraction in itself”) by contrast, while sharing a common position in relation to production, is not class conscious as it neither understands its group interests, nor does it think of itself collectively or as a class (or class fraction). A variety of structural features have been described through a class analysis, such as class fractions, social groups, and strata. Whereas (1) a “class fraction” is a segment or portion of the whole class—who are “grouped around different forms of economic activity or around the place occupied within these activities” (Wright, 1980, p. 335, quoting Freedman), (2) a “social group” is a group of people who come together based on some common interest but may or may not be made-up of individuals from the same social class, and (3) “strata” refers to a layer of society with internally consistent characteristics that distinguish it from other layers. By identifying such structural
features in the case studies of this dissertation I seek to better elaborate the objective class and social conditions. Next I will briefly look at some of the important ways in which other works on Caribbean political economy have examined class relations.

Class Analysis and the Caribbean

During the mid- to late-20th century, prior to the end of the Cold War and before the flood of literature on globalization, a number of well-known scholars published radical class analyses, and historical materialist-influenced studies that focused on the Caribbean region or on specific countries in the region. The “Third Worldist” Monthly Review Press became one location where many such works were published. Eric Williams, for example, pointed out how many internal divisions existed between the ruling classes of Europe and its Caribbean colonies, with short sightedness among many dominant groups often occurring, and eventually creating major problems for them (Williams, 1944, p. 210). In another study, Louis A Pérez (2003) pays special attention to how much of Cuba’s local bourgeoisie during the 19th century did not make up a nationalist bourgeoisie, but rather advocated for continued Spanish rule or U.S. annexation. Also utilizing a class analysis, Mintz (inspired by Marx’s historical materialism as well as U.S. cultural anthropology) emphasizes the historically distinctive development of the Caribbean region in relation to the intense class conflicts that occurred. Mintz argued that in certain instances peasant and rural populations in the region served as protagonists of social conflict, but during other periods they were heavily beaten down or marginalized. In a different Marxian influenced work, Gordon K. Lewis (2004) places special significance on the continuity and hereditary nature of the class system, specifically in regard to Puerto Rico, explaining that while deep changes had
occurred during the first half of the 20th century, the same social groups have managed to maintain dominant positions locally throughout major political and economic changes in the country. He furthermore emphasizes how the massive level of U.S. investment into the island and increasing migration patterns helped to meld the island with the U.S., crushing hopes of independence. In fact, Puerto Rico during the mid-20th century (along with Ireland) would become an early laboratory for the export-processing model, which restructured the local economy to produce non-traditional exports for the international market (Ayala and Bernabe, 2007).

In his study of class conflict in 1930s Jamaica, Ken Post (1978) points toward forms of consciousness and action in determining class. He argues that the “process of the determination of forms of class consciousness and action” occur on two levels: (1) “the generation of social actions (most importantly, but not exclusively, that of classes), necessarily involving some level of consciousness,” and (2) “the shaping of such action into particular forms of certain points in time, what have been termed . . . instances of practices” (Post, 1978, p. 51). Post suggests a useful way to understand class subjectivity as becoming more pronounced at certain times, and then receding during other periods. This is interesting to think about in regards to how Clive Thomas argued that class structure in the periphery is more fluid, with social changes occurring at times very rapidly (Thomas, 1984, pp. 62-63). Important for considering the Caribbean, scholars have also observed how particular subjective dynamics develop in colonial and slave societies, as one is a colonial subject or human property of a planter elite. Contradictory sets of ideas thus developed through the consciousness of people going through specific historical circumstances (Bakan, 1990, p. 15-17).
Considering class relations in relation to world capitalism, Clive Thomas argued that class structures in countries of the “periphery” were more complex and fragile than in the “core” (Thomas, 1984, p. 56). He argued that the working class in these regions, such as the Caribbean, was larger and more underdeveloped due to its lack of production, manufacturing, and assembly of consumer goods for urban and high-income markets. Writing in the early 1980s, he found that although the service sector employed a larger part of the labor force, most businesses were small, except for some government enterprises. Female labor was often relegated to households and tax haven export zones. With most businesses operating through only small-scale employment, working class-unionized action was underdeveloped.

In regard to world capitalism and class relations, much of the oligarchy in the Caribbean “developed out of foreign penetration and settlement” (Thomas, 1984, p. 58). Thomas explained how two main fractions of the capitalist class existed across most of the region: “The traditional landed oligarchy, representing ‘feudalism in the countryside,’ and the emergent industrial bourgeoisie, representing ‘capitalist relations in the cities.’” Not concretely demarcated, he argued that social and class relations “may overlap in one person or in one family, creating a complex intertwining of feudal, other precapitalist, and capitalist property relations” (1984, p. 58).

Like Lewis, Thomas also places emphasis on how local dominant groups have reproduced their class power through the state apparatuses (especially during the post-colonial era), a vital component for maintaining their hegemony. Without fostering an industrial working force, Thomas argued that during the post-colonial era in many underdeveloped countries the state seizure of property could easily pervert the ability for
capitalistic production to expand. He viewed as an important quality of capitalism the emergence of a productive bourgeoisie and a working class (See Fatton, 2002). Through its positions within state apparatuses, Thomas argues, the petty bourgeoisie in many developing countries have reproduced themselves. He explains, “The emergence of this sector of the petty bourgeoisie constitutes the most important postcolonial development in the class structure of the peripheral capitalist societies. It has been variously described as the “state petty bourgeoisie,” the “state bourgeoisie,” or the “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (1984, p. 60). One negative side effect of nationalizations and the creation of more state property, Thomas argued, is that with a segment of the bourgeoisie in control of the state, the new state enterprises (rather than used for the social good) have become an “essential element in the process of creating an economic base for the reproduction of the ruling class” (1984, p. 59).

He identified how petty bourgeoisie fractions utilized the state for their own interests but were split between a politico-administration element and an economic-technocratic element (1984, p. 61). The term “petty bourgeoisie” has often been used in Marxian and political economy studies to describe the strata of society consisting of small-scale merchants, professionals, and upwardly mobile workers. Forming a sort of intermediary group between capitalists and workers, and some with a nationally oriented outlook, sectors of this petty bourgeoisie might merge (or conflate) their own interests with the interests of the state as a whole; this then gives them a tendency to promote types of welfarism and mixed economy yet without any interest in challenging larger capitalist tendencies. Even so, at certain historical junctures, faced with reaction and violence (Hallward, 2008), reformist political tendencies involving sectors of the “petty bourgeoisie” may mount the only achievable alternative. Yet, increasingly so in the global era, these upwardly mobile parts of society
have no interest in so called “national development” but rather have turned their attention toward the global economy.

Since the end of the Cold War and the defeat, marginalization, implosion, or co-optation of many popular movements and parties of the left in the region, radical studies of the contemporary Caribbean have waned, with few such treatises published in recent decades. A small number of torchbearers over recent decades have continued to produce studies that critically examine capitalism in the region, with the work of Watson (2013) of particular importance because of his focus on the novel nature of the class system at the root of the region’s integration with the global economy. In my view many scholarly and media reports on the region have come to focus almost exclusively on surface level economic or cultural dimensions, or on simplistic geopolitical analyses. While not wanting to ignore these factors, I have sought in this dissertation to consider the changes taking place at a deeper level through a political economy and class analysis lens, but one that takes into consideration the fundamental changes coming about as a result of globalization. Next, I will discuss further the role of class and social relations in the epoch of globalization.

The Challenge of Understanding Social Formation in the Global Era

Traditionally, the interstate system, with its nation-state competition as the core organizing principle of the world economy, has been conceptualized as the institutional framework in which global social forces operate (such as nationally and internationally oriented social classes, class fractions, and social groups). This approach is more or less present, for example, in the classical theories of political economy (Marx, 1994; Smith, 2003), the historical materialist theories of international monopoly capitalism (Hilferding,
2006; Lenin, 1969), and the more recent New Imperialism approaches (Harvey, 2005; Wood, 2005). A nation’s class system, as commonly understood from these perspectives, is made up of nationally rooted capitalists and laborers (i.e., the American, Chinese, Mexican, or Jamaican capitalist class and working class). As structural features of these different class systems there can exist different class fractions (i.e., a financial fraction of a country’s capitalist class or a lumpenproleteriat fraction of a country’s working class), reflecting particular historic circumstances and the alignment of social forces. From this approach, some have argued that a fraction of a nation’s capitalist class might at times operate internationally and alongside an international division of labor, though remaining essentially rooted in the nation (Hymer, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1979; Panitch & Gindin, 2013).

This approach of examining class systems as solidifying through the framework of the interstate system and nation-state competition is also taken up by dependency theorists or the similar “plantation school” of thought, which is well known in Anglo-Caribbean academia (Beckford, 1999; Best, 1968; Best, Levitt, & Grivan, 2009; Thomas, 1968). These scholars essentially sought to look at the problems of underdevelopment within colonial and post-colonial states. Down this route, but emphasizing the context of world capitalism, scholars such as Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, and Samir Amin broke with the Marxian focus on development among the core states of the capitalist system by instead focusing on underdevelopment in the periphery (Brewer, 1990, p. 161). These theories argue that resources from the people or countries of the “periphery” and colonial or post colonial areas (regions primarily in the “global south”) flow to dominant groups or countries of the metropole or core—specifically the nations of Western Europe,
North America, and Japan—enriching the latter at the expense of the former (Arrighi, 1994; Wallerstein, 1979).

While recognizing the importance of these earlier theories, especially in elaborating upon earlier historical phases of capitalism, I argue that these earlier approaches by understanding political economy through the scope of the nation state do not account for the fundamental changes occurring through globalization of recent decades. They do not help us understand the deep structural changes that capitalism has undergone. Yet many these earlier approaches do remain important and have influenced the approach that I have taken up in this dissertation from a “global capitalism school” and global political economy perspective. While critically appropriating ideas from many earlier perspectives, I argue we need to recalibrate our understanding of social formation in order to understand the global era.

Alongside the growing transnationality of material (economic) relations, there is an emerging transnationality of many social and class relations (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2004, 2013; Sklair, 2001).

In recent decades, a functional integration of many production networks and financial systems has spanned multiple frontiers. Propelling this restructuring of the world economy is the emerging transnational capitalist class (TCC). This class, with its different fractions, has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that owns the leading worldwide means of production embodied in TNCs and the most powerful financial institutions. As global networks of production and finance that pushed through TNCs and other institutions redefine the scale of the world economy through new functionally integrated circuits of accumulation (Dicken, 2011), transnational relations form within and between various class fractions and social groups. Transnational capitalists now seek out
profits globally and hail from around the world, not just from the “global north” (Robinson, 2014).

Middle strata (such as professionals and small-scale working entrepreneurs) and other working and popular class fractions around the world have undergone major changes associated with globalization, as labor power itself has been reconfigured and incorporated into transnational value chains (Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009). New pools of middle strata, with higher patterns of consumption, have appeared in regions such as the Caribbean. Labor, meanwhile, has come to fit more and more into globally competitive relations and new more exploitive working regimes.

On the other hand, this does not mean that previous forms of class relations have disappeared or are no longer relevant. What it suggests is that new transnationally oriented social relations are beginning to entwine with, and in many circumstances dominate and impact, earlier forms. These new social dynamics and the integrative processes of the global economy are bound up with contradictions. Many differences remain, as new transnational processes intersect and clash with regional, international, national, and local processes. The uneven and combined developments that occurred during earlier phases of capitalism persist but have become altered through new transnational processes. Even as transnational processes occur, long-term historic relationships and the influence of geography still play a role in impacting how societies develop. We can see important instances of transnational material and social formation occurring through the Caribbean.

For instance, take a TNC with a wide presence in the Caribbean region, the mobile telephone network provider Digicel. Founded in 2001, the company is headquartered in Jamaica but incorporated in Bermuda. Digicel has institutional investors from a growing
array of companies. These range from private equity houses, such as the London-based CDC Capital Partners, to government firms. Facilitating its operations in Haiti, the World Bank has also invested in Digicel operations. A number of Caribbean-based capitalists have also provided launching costs for new Digicel operations in the region, such as in Barbados (Telecompaper, 2003). Deepening the company’s integration with global finance, in 2007 Digicel sold $1.4 billion (1.06 billion Euros) of high-yielding junk bonds (Beesley, 2007).

While not yet publicly traded on the stock market, the company is majority owned by a transnational capitalist, Denis O’Brien. O’Brien, who is Irish by birth, officially resides in Malta (a country which charges no tax on worldwide assets or income brought in by permanent residents, and only requires a “permanent resident” to visit Malta once a year). With investments in a variety of businesses and stocks around the world, O’Brien is said to be worth close to $5 billion. After initially entering the telecom business by promoting its liberalization in the early 1990s in Ireland, his company Digicel now focuses on marketing mobile services in small countries in the developing world such as in the Caribbean, Central America and Oceania. Digicel has expanded rapidly by purchasing mobile licensing contracts from governments liberalizing their communications sector. The company’s growth strategy has relied upon the ramping up of neoliberal austerity and privatization policies undertaken by state elites in recent decades. Powerful state apparatuses, such as those of the U.S., the E.U., and supranational agencies, such as the IMF and World Bank, have been some of the strongest proponents of privatization of public telephone companies, policies that have benefited TNCs like Digicel.

Digicel’s board of directors (including Denis O’Brien) is made up of individuals from Irish and British backgrounds. Through the lens of earlier “nation state centric”
theoretical scopes, O’Brien and the other executives of Digicel would therein be viewed as part of an Irish or British Isles capitalist class, possibly part of an internationally active fraction. Yet O’Brien’s orientation, objectively and subjectively, is transnational: from his investments to his role as a capitalist. He has no interest in repatriating money to Ireland, or economically developing the British Isles. Rather, his businesses and investments are based on the functional integration of capital across borders and taking advantage of the uneven globally competitive environment, by exercising his company’s economy of scale and harnessing the technological and organizational advancements of recent decades. The cellular and mobile systems industry through which O’Brien profits so handsomely is just one example of the rapid changes that have occurred through globalization. The company has benefited from technology that only emerged during the latter part of the 20th century. Furthermore, Digicel’s growth has been tied to the formation of a global consumer base of cell phone users. In the early 1990s, there were only a few hundred thousand subscribers to mobile systems worldwide, yet little more than a decade later there were approximately 1.5 billion (Dicken, 2007, p. 89).vi Earlier theories of nation state capitalist classes and imperialist rivalry are too simplistic to explain the complexity of transnational capital formation and the novel relations it exhibits.

**Transnational Corporations & Transnational Chains of Accumulation**

The concept of multinational corporations has long been connected to Marxian class theory. Economist Stephen Hymer (1978), in a series of articles in the 1970s, pointed to the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI) and theorized that an internationalization of the division of labor was the product of the internal division of labor reproduced within
expanding multinational corporations (MNCs). Following this analysis, others such as Grazia Ietto-Gillies, have suggested that expanding MNCs have taken on a “transnationality of operations and globality of decisions” (1992, p. 181). In recent decades, political economists have differentiated between MNCs and TNCs; whereas MNCs have extensive international operations, they are clearly identified with a home base, the TNC business model is based on functional cross-border diversity in market capitalization, ownership, administration, production and so on. It is also widely seen as far less identifiable with one home country. In recent decades, the TNC model has clearly emerged as the standard form of top corporate organizations.

Transnational flows of capital appear more and more as a capillary system, with large arteries and organs entwined with other arteries and smaller bodies. Helping us to consider the growing transnationality of economic relations, Dicken (2007, p. 13) points out the need for understanding the economy through “multiple scales,” describing as problematic the aggregation into “national boxes” of most “statistical data on production, trade, investment and the like.” To escape these boxes, we can think “in terms of production circuits and networks” that “cut through, and across, all geographical scales, including the bounded territory of the state” (Dicken, 2007, p. 13). Might we also envision social relations as transforming through globalization? In theorizing globalization, many scholars have chosen to emphasize the geographic rather than the social basis of change (Harvey, 2005). However, it is my argument that we understand our world best by emphasizing the role of social production as more determinant (of causal priority) and then, while also important, the role of uneven geographic development. Understanding globalization in this way presents a
challenge for social scientists that have long grouped social classes into separate national boxes according to the frontiers in which these classes were primarily affixed.

**Transnational Class Formation**

As global networks of production and finance pushed through TNCs and other institutions redefine the scale of the world economy (Dicken, 2007), it has been argued that widespread sociological changes are occurring as a result. A number of scholars have begun to look at ethnicity (Patterson, 2013), migration (Robinson & Santos, 2014), and gender (Coles & Fechter, 2007; Desai, 2009) in relation to globalization and transnationalism. We must also look at how social classes, rooted in material (economic) production processes, are being reconstituted in the global era. One of these new classes, the TCC, is tied together as a conscious class, a class in and for itself whose material basis is in TNCs and the accumulation of global capital (Sklair, 2001; Robinson, 2004). However, such a class is not monolithic. As Harris (2015) has pointed out for instance, different fractions exist within this class. Theoretical approaches for understanding the TCC have differed. The TCC, as Robinson (2004), Harris (2006), Watson (2013), and Liodakis (2010) argue, is the dominant social class in this new era, an age of global capitalism. Conceptually, they utilize a historical materialist understanding of the division of labor into social classes on the basis of property ownership. They understand individual members of the TCC as those directly involved in global capital accumulation, while others involved in its promotion but not accumulation are described as transnationally oriented elites or functionaries.

By comparison, Sklair constructs a TCC model that not only includes people directly involved in global capital accumulation, but also those who promote it as well, such as
media and state functionaries. He presents a TCC structure that includes four classifications. These are: (1) those who own and/or control the major TNCs and their local affiliates (corporate fraction), (2) globalizing bureaucrats and politicians (state fraction), (3) globalizing professionals (technical fraction), and (4) globalizing merchants and media (consumerist fraction). Sklair furthermore outlines four major propositions in regard to the TCC. First, it is a class that benefits from its relation to TNCs, emerging “more or less in control of the processes of globalization” (Sklair, 2001, p. 5). Second, it acts as a “transnational dominant class in some spheres.” Third, a “profit-driven culture-ideology of consumerism” exists as a mechanism of persuasion, solidifying the participation of populations in global capitalist chains of consumption. And finally, the TCC is faced with two global crises: class polarization and ecological crisis (Sklair, 2001, p. 6).

The existence of transnational class relations does not mean that these class relations are not riven by contradictions and conflicts, impacted as they are by historic differences (both local and national.) For instance, specific fractions of capital hold closer ties with some state power blocs compared to others. As Ietto-Gillies explains, transnational oriented capitalists with interests across various countries “use their economic position and clout to strengthen their ties and claims . . . [with] specific countr(ies) and exercise influence to secure special treatment” (Sprague & Ietto Gillies, 2014, p. 44). We can see many examples of intense rivalry and competition among transnational capitalist conglomerates. Whereas state policies may benefit transnational capital over more locally or nationally oriented capitalists, this does not mean that certain state policies benefit all transnational capitalist groups fractions equally. Rather, state policies may most benefit certain TCC fractions and TNC conglomerates over others.
Some scholars have begun to theorize how transnational class relations are also emerging among the working and popular classes, with different static, diaspora and dynamic global proletarian fractions coming into existence, for example (Lin, 2015; Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009). In addition, as some class fractions become increasingly transnationally oriented, others remain more nationally oriented or have not developed into a conscious class fraction even as they become objectively interconnected with the global economy. In recent decades we can also observe the growth and marginalization of lower income urban zones (Davis, 2007), as segments of the world population are structurally underemployed and propelled into the new precarious labor conditions of the global economy. As will be discussed in this dissertation, labor faces unique and particularly difficult challenges in organizing against transnational capital and unresponsive political authorities.

**Transnationally Oriented Policymakers and the State Apparatus**

How can we conceptualize the role of the state—and those operating through the state—in the era of global capitalism? Rather than looking at the state as a monolithic or a static edifice, I emphasize the state as a social relation, an apparatus operated by different social groups. In capitalist society, as Marxian political economists have shown (Poulantzas, 1978), the state takes on a vital managerial role for stabilizing and reproducing capitalism especially when dominant groups are unable to coordinate successfully among themselves. State apparatuses thus serve as structures through which the powers of class relations congeal and operate. As Poulantzas observed, rather than individuals of the capitalist class serving directly in the state, governing political groups normally carry out this task. As
“relatively autonomous,” these political groups and state elites seek to maintain legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, even as they overwhelmingly operate in the “collective” interests of capital (Poulantzas, 1978). In turn, to stabilize and reproduce themselves in power, state policymakers must gain the consent of the oppressed (Gramsci, 1971), and often work to cement cross-class alliances to solidify the dominant order. A number of dynamics condition the state as a social relation, such as the prevailing socioeconomic circumstances, the balance and struggle of social forces, and the position or character of the state apparatus.

Alongside the changes occurring through globalization in recent decades, I argue, as have others (Harris, 2006; Jayasuriya, 2005; Robinson, 2004, 2014), that many state elites and policymakers have become transnationally oriented. While it is true that many political conflicts (especially for instance electorally) take on national peculiarities and play out through local frameworks, as Sklair, Robinson, and others observe: within a variety of national political settings and states there has arisen groups that are transnationally oriented (Robinson, 2003; 2014). Many state policymakers have increasingly come to depend upon transnational capital for their own social reproduction. They need access to capital, and capital is in the hands of the TCC. However, state elites must still appeal to their home audiences. They must still interact with a variety of less mobile and less privileged social groups and classes, from the middle strata and working class to the unemployed and working poor. Because of this, even as ties between state policymakers and the TCC deepen, national rhetoric and state policies at times are in apparent contradiction with TCC interests. In this way, political leaders attempt to maintain national political legitimacy even while deepening practices of a transnational nature. Here they must navigate a crisis of legitimacy
as they abandon earlier nationally oriented forms of development. As these state elites become entangled with—and dependent upon—processes of global capital accumulation, they help spur a transition from national or international processes to transnational processes. The state itself is not disappearing, rather it is transforming in ways peculiar to the age of globalism; transforming into a proactive instrument for promoting the interests of transnational capital.

My approach in this dissertation is influenced by (1) Robinson’s “transnationally oriented elite” argument regarding how groups of state functionaries are promoting a parallel political project connected to the TCC’s class power, and (2) the “global system” approach of Sklair, which argues that contemporary states face ongoing struggles between nationally and transnationally oriented elite fractions. While Sklair describes the transnationally oriented elite faction of globalizing bureaucrats and politicians as part of the TCC, I do not concur (Sprague, 2009). Rather, I describe them as transnationally oriented policymakers, functionaries, and state elites who are not necessarily a part of the TCC. I argue, as echoing Robinson (2004), that certain social groups, classes and their power blocs operating through state apparatuses have shifted from those with interests in national accumulation to those with an interest in transnational accumulation. This does not mean that transnationally oriented elites operate in the interests of all transnational capitalists. As Robinson (2015, p. 264) explains “There is intense competition and rivalry among transnational capitalist conglomerates so that state policies may benefit some conglomerates over others.”

Here, similar with other scholars of the ‘global capitalism school’, I seek to make a break from the “Imperialism” and “New Imperialism” schools of thought that focus on the
U.S. as the driving force of globalization as its elites pursue their own imperial interests. Instead, I aim to emphasize the integrative, expansive, and unequal nature of global capitalism and how social and political forces have come to entwine with these changes in regions such as the Caribbean in contradictory and crisis-prone ways. Although it remains true that the U.S. state is the dominant world and regional power, we need to consider this in light of the changes and shifting structural features occurring through globalization (Sprague, 2014). In addressing the role of the state in facilitating the Caribbean’s heightened integration with the global economy, this dissertation emphasizes not just the role of the most influential state in the region, the U.S., but also the role of states across the region. While policymakers operating through the U.S. state and its various apparatuses play a central role in the region, they also increasingly have come to promote conditions beneficial for circuits of global capital accumulation and in the interests of the TCC, not just domestically domiciled capitalists.

Next, I will turn toward looking at shifting political dynamics in the Caribbean during the era of globalization. While this is not the central theme of the proceeding case study chapters, it is a reoccurring thread through the transitory period that is studied herein. It helps lay the basis for understanding the rise and role of transnationally oriented state elites, groups that play such an important role in facilitating the shift toward transnational integration and global competitiveness.

**Polyarchy and Political Contestation in the Global Era**

Within Caribbean nations, we can also observe how political restructuring has occurred alongside economic transformations in the global era. As Ankie Hoogvelt observed
at the start of the 21st century, dominant groups in many countries were in the process of “abandoning national programs of economic development and social solidarity in favour of international competitiveness and transnational engagement” (2001, p. 162). Together, leading political and economic elites have reshaped political contestation in the region, working to transition away from what during earlier periods were often much more divisive and ideologically heated electoral arenas and strong armed political struggles (with struggles often occurring between various nationally and internationally oriented social forces). As Robinson (1996) argues: polyarchic political arrangements have been promoted in many parts of the world during the latter decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century, concomitant with the formation of the modern global economy. Transnationally oriented segments of local and foreign dominant groups have pushed for tightly managed electoral systems in which citizens are confined to choosing between palatable competing groups of elites, while seeking to marginalize alternatives.

Here it is important to understand the shift away from more coercive measures toward more consensus measures of hegemony by dominant groups. Through the lens of hegemony we can see how both coercion and consent are utilized at different times, as in Gramsci’s discussion on their shifting roles historically (Gramsci, 1971). In the global era more advanced models of hegemonic consent have been developed and have been used for the most part, except for in those cases in which consent, for different reasons, has proven too difficult or incapable of being achieved.

As a new emphasis on democracy spread around the world in the latter decades of the 20th century (Frezzo, 2015), U.S. policymakers and, in time, elites operating through other powerful state apparatuses, sought to retool their strategies toward the Americas as
well as other parts of the developing world (Robinson, 1996). They sought to transition from overt support for authoritarian regimes to backing constitutionally elected governments. This would help create less embarrassing conditions, while also maintaining more stability and responsiveness for transnational capital. Transnationally oriented elites, with contingents operating in and outside of developing nations, have worked to facilitate favorable political transitions (Robinson, 1996). Throughout the Caribbean and Latin America, U.S. and other policymakers have a well-documented role in “promoting democracy” and “democratic transitions,” which are actually subterfuges for sponsoring local transnationally oriented elites (who are often similarly aligned) through electoral frameworks (Herman & Brodhead, 1984). The electoral systems of recent decades in the Caribbean have been deeply influenced by policymakers who rely on powerful moneyed interests, with many nations’ political systems influenced by the “donor” and “aid” agencies of powerful states and supranational agencies (Robinson, 1996). New political conflicts have been sparked as transnational elites, facing crises of legitimacy, have sought to insert their national states and institutions into global circuits of accumulation (Dominguez, 1996; Robinson, 2012).

These transnationally oriented state elites have thus pushed economic restructuring, seeking deeper integration with a global economy based on the transnationalization of production (Dicken, 2007) and finance (CARICOM, 2005; Körner & Trautwein, 2014; Watson, 1985). This has benefited transnational capital, allowing it to operate with fewer restrictions, and through new globally competitive conditions. At various points in the dissertation I will refer to the rise and role of transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats in the Caribbean. I will give examples as to how these groups have sought to eschew locally driven state initiatives in favor of policies promoting global competitiveness,
integration with transnational capital, and heightened coordination with other transnationally oriented elites. Many states in the Caribbean, as Thomas (1984) observed, function as mechanisms through which sectors of the “petty bourgeoisie” secure their own interests, yet the interests of these groups have increasingly become entwined with the global economy.

Alongside changing economic and social structures, there have been important political and social struggles. Transnationally oriented elites and policymakers have often vied for dominance with locally oriented groups, nationalists, leftists, and a variety of social and labor movements. In nations in and around the Caribbean where polyarchic relations have not been solidly secured, such as in Cuba or in Venezuela, a variety of coercive measures have been employed by major powers, such as the U.S. These have ranged from shadowy intervention attempts to various economic and political destabilization strategies (Golinger, 2005; Lamrani, 2013) and forms of “soft power” (Grandin, 2007). Often a variety of coercive and consent based dynamics are at work, for example with regards to Cuba, U.S. policymakers appear to be transitioning away from the economic blockade of fifty years and toward economic engagement which they hope will be a more advanced strategy for changing the country from within. Scholars have for example discussed specifically how the new economic reforms and engagement with the global economy initiate slow shifts away from collectivist mentalities and toward individualism (Morris, 2015).

Elsewhere in the Caribbean, polyarchic systems have become more solidified, with establishment political parties steering politics in a direction that is non-threatening for elites. We can identify particular political struggles and conditions in the region: for example, polyarchic political conditions have become deeply solidified in Jamaica’s two-
party political system and in much of the Anglophone Caribbean. While many social movements and labor unions in the region continue to mobilize, some have become marginalized or less radical over recent decades, and many are also undergoing structural changes associated with capitalist globalization (Rodriguez-Garavito, 2008). In addition, a conservative backlash led by organized religion and growing evangelical communities has strengthened in parts of the region, such as in Jamaica and in Trinidad. In the Dominican Republic, while a significant number of progressive, liberation theology oriented, leftist and radical groups exist, a polyarchic political system has become relatively consolidated. Unified struggles in these countries are further held back by xenophobic and racist tendencies among some of the population that are encouraged by right-wing political forces. This leads to the scapegoating and targeting of Haitian migrants, historically the most exploited sector of the Dominican working class. In Haiti, by contrast, local and foreign elites have struggled to maintain a polyarchic system and engaged in various “emergency actions” ultimately aimed at integrating Haiti into the global economy (Sprague, 2012, 2016). The long tradition of popular mobilization, alongside underdevelopment and entrenched poverty, create conditions particularly difficult for solidifying the polyarchy model. As Caribbean workers integrate unevenly into the global economy, elites are seeking new ways to reproduce racialized class relations as well as secure the super-exploitation of migrant workers.

Market forces and state elites have also placed political and economic pressures against a range of reformist projects that have challenged to some degree the utter dominance of elites, including within nations of the Caribbean, such as with Manely’s government in Jamaica and Aristide’s government in Haiti (Stephens and Stephens, 1986;
Beeton, 2006). Political conditions in the region also of course need to be seen in light of the problems rooted in underdevelopment: with phenomena such as a lack of industrial productivity, high levels of unemployment, networks of patronage and corruption to political infighting and attempts (or failed attempts) at various kinds of endeavors. Each nation of course has its own specific political history and with distinct constitutions, governing apparatuses, and political structures. Political conditions and struggles in the region thus vary, interconnected with historic peculiarities and uneven development while also connected through combined and more general tendencies throughout their history. My argument though is that in the global era, (1) the novel material (economic) relations of globalization and (2) the new ways in which states are facilitating this, is undergirded by (3) shifting social and class structures. Next, prior to concluding this chapter, I provide a short overview of the region’s insertion into the capitalist world economy: how different political orders, economic restructuring and changing production relations in the region have reflected the shifting phases of capitalism.

**Brief historical background: Phases of world capitalism in the Caribbean**

The Crown of Castille’s conquest of the Caribbean, begun by Cristóbal Colón and his conquistadors in 1492, subjected the indigenous inhabitants—initially the Arawak and then others—to massacres, slavery, and infectious diseases (Farmer, 2005, p. 53). With the genocide of the original inhabitants of the Caribbean island chains, and the high cost and low number of European laborers willing to work in the harsh and humid environment, another source of labor was required by elites. The plantation system, which came to shape
the region’s insertion into capitalism (Curtin, 1990), could only function with a large amount of labor, this occurred through the intensive exploitation of African slave labor. It is believed that the Caribbean received approximately 47 percent of the total 10 million African slaves brought to the Americas. The new system of chattel slavery that formed was conducted in a much more intensive and extensive manner than previous slave systems such as in Ancient Rome and Greece (de Ste. Croix, 1981). By the 17th century other European powers—England, France, and the Netherlands—had inserted themselves into the Caribbean, annexing and gaining through wars and treaties lightly populated areas of Spain’s immense holdings.

Over time, planter classes came to dominate the new colonial societies, with their wealth built upon the blood and labor of the growing slave population. Yet, various social forces interacted and at times conflicted, merged, or allied with one another. As part of this particular local institutions came into being. For example, representing the interests of local colonial elites, colonialist assemblies often formed. Europeans and Africans produced progeny together, which through particular socially constructed scopes came to be known as new “creole” populations. Overtime, complex racially constructed class hierarchies would form.

Slave plantation production came to be a major structural feature of early capitalism. Slave production altered the very development of world capitalism, becoming its lifeblood. Into the 18th century the production of sugarcane was taken to new heights, exported to Europe where it greatly impacted the diet of Europeans. The high sugarcane yields, from Saint Domingue in particular, coincided with France’s rising wealth. Eric Williams explains, “Between 1715 and 1789 French imports from the colonies multiplied eleven times, French
colonial products re-exported abroad ten times” (Williams, 1944, p. 145). Meanwhile, slaves themselves resisted their brutal conditions, launching uprisings and constant escapes, which were responded to by a slew of colonial military and security apparatuses; a conflict which became more and more violent and costly to maintain. Slaves were dispersed across different plantations and facing brutal conditions, melded their own cultural practices and languages. Groups of escaped and freed slaves existed in parts of the region, forming maroon communities.

The new colonial markets developed as appendages of the European market where the vast amount of wealth was centered (Galeano, 1997, p. 29). This set into motion major inequalities between regions of the planet, and people living in those regions. As industrial and merchant capital concentrated in Europe, populations in regions such as the Caribbean were primarily exploited through labor intensive extraction of raw resources. These historical processes have had a long-term impact on underdevelopment, as only a small part of the surplus capital from these economic interactions remained in the colonies. In addition to this, within the Caribbean, the accumulation of capital was concentrated into the hands of a small elite strata, which spent much of its wealth on maintaining their enterprises or on foreign luxury goods and building up their own landed estates.

The new wealth produced in the region, though, did serve as a valuable prize for which European monarchs would deploy massive armies and fleets to battle over. At some points, white planter assemblies split with crown and church officials, creating complex conflicts and contradictions, where slaves and peasants for instance might view the crown as a benevolent despot, as compared to the harsh immediacy of the planters. Also as European powers fought one another at times this occurred alongside or even help to facilitate slave
uprisings. CLR James (1989) has explained in depth how a complex struggle between different classes and strata of society occurred within the French colony of Haiti at the close of the 18th century. The success of the Haitian slave revolution was particularly scarred into the minds of European planters and as far away as among elites in North America. In 1804 it became the first slave revolt in history to lead to the founding of an independent nation.

Differences in colonial policies also reflected the interests of the differing class interests of the European colonial powers. Whereas many of the British, French, and Dutch colonies in the region excelled at agricultural expansion and trade, the Spanish colonies poorly sustained their own efforts at sugar-and-slave plantations in the Caribbean. In part, this was because of Spain’s longer-standing mercantilist policies and absence of the early trade liberalizing policies. By contrast the independent nation of Haiti, into the 19th century, maintained a large level of small-scale peasant farming, though larger plantation farms controlled by a new local elite began to form as well.

Eventually, as maintaining the Caribbean colonies became more and more expensive, industrial and metropole capital in Europe turned against the continued subsidizing of the Caribbean colonies and its outdated slave system. Mintz explains that “the increasing tempo of slaves revolts, high interest rates, and the wastefulness of their own productive arrangements” all led to a deepening of the contradictions of the colonial plantation system, where a tiny segment of society benefited off the extreme misery and suffering of the great majority (1989, p. 86). With the economic status of the Caribbean now in decline, the very bedrock of its social structure, built on slavery, came into question: the old mercantile order soon fell into collapse. Reflecting the lessening importance of the Caribbean plantations, Britain formally abolished slavery across most of its empire in 1833.
The shift away from mercantilism and slavery also echoed the rise of major liberal philosophies at the time. Liberal ideology, as in Adam Smith’s strong critique of the system of mercantilism, took the shape of campaigns against the “British West Indian monopoly of the British sugar market” (Williams, 1984, p. 235). The second nail in the coffin of the power of the slave-owning planter class came with the rise of the sugar trade with the British colony of India (Williams, 1984, pp. 235-236). In addition to the sugar trade, commercial power in Britain had strengthened among cotton manufacturers.

Despite the abolition of slavery in some Caribbean colonies and nations, other parts of the Caribbean remained more backward. Slavery continued in Cuba, for example, until the late 19th century, even as it had been abolished throughout the region during the middle and early parts of the century. Over time, local elites had become “mindful of the constraints their social reality imposed on their ambitions,” and so stayed heavily dependent on the support from Spain to maintain the slave plantation system (Pérez, Jr., 2003, p. 30). The dependence of the island’s local elite on the long-standing slave system kept them away from advocating independence. “The specter of slave rebellion in Cuba dampened planters’ enthusiasm for an independent nation, especially one without adequate resources to suppress the dread slave uprising” (Pérez, Jr., 2003, p. 30). By contrast, in Haiti, where slaves first had won their freedom before 1800, cliques of military leaders, a new bourgeoisie in the cities, and a powerful rural land owning class solidified during the 19th century, whereas the vast majority of Haitians remained involved in small scale familial farm production. In the early 1800s, faced with constant external threats, Haitian forces liberated their slave brethren on the Spanish speaking eastern side of the island and attempted to unite the island as a single nation. Local elites, however, successfully led an insurrection and took hold of the
western part of the island, which would form the Dominican Republic. In those early years its population was much smaller in population in comparison to Haiti. By the mid-19th century, only Cuba and Puerto Rico remained holdings of Spain in the region.

Following emancipation, former slaves often tried to support themselves through private land cultivation. They did this rather than accept subordinate, but nominally free, wage labor on plantations. Their private land cultivation occurred primarily as familial farming, which included those who squatted on previously uncultivated or abandoned land—with land ownership itself becoming a class conflict. Over time their also developed particular racialized class relations in these former slave societies. For instance as Bakan (1990, p. 6) observers, the “slave origins of the modern Jamaican working class led to the development of a general correlation between class and race in the society as a while: the fairer the skin colour, the higher the individual’s social status was likely to be.” This correlation which had been sharply maintained and institutionalized through plantation slavery, continued on in the post-slavery era, though moderated to a degree by the advance of small segments of society.

Also with the abolition of slavery, many latifundios in the Caribbean began to turn to new pools of migrant labor whose desperation and instability they could exploit. European powers, such as the UK, backed the exportation of semi-slave labor, through what has been described as “coolie labor” exported from India and China to far-flung areas of the British Empire. As Williams described, “The Caribbean planter, Africa denied to him, was encouraged to turn to India and China” (1984, p. 346). Laborers from India were brought into many parts of the British Caribbean, such as Trinidad, British Guiana, Guadeloupe, Surinam, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, and Jamaica (Williams, 1984, pp. 347-360).
Chinese immigration also was encouraged, with many Chinese migrants ending up in Cuba. The same kind of tactics of playing impoverished communities off of one another continued (as with the conflicts between immigrant workers, people of African descent, and the “infinite gradations, shadings and mixtures produced by miscegenation” (Williams, 1984, p. 350)), as dominant groups searched out new ideological mechanisms to solidify their rule and sought out different bases of support.iii

During the latter half of the 19th century a new phase in world capitalism emerged, what has been described as “industrial capitalism.” Changing class dynamics reflected advancements in technology and organizational forms, quickly impacting regions across the world, including the Caribbean (Girvan, 1976, p. 13), for instance, the spread of steamships and the intensification of agrarian production. Yet at the same time Caribbean planters had become overall less important to the markets they had once monopolized during the era of slave production. The abolishment of slavery, the role of new technologies, the dropping of mercantile protections had lost the local rural elites much of the advantages that they had once enjoyed. Yet with the heightening investment of American capital toward the end of the 18th century, rural agricultural production in the Caribbean gained a new impetus. US capital and state projects would invest heavily in upgrading and solidifying rural latifundia production, such as in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. As the involvement of the traditional European powers in the Caribbean stagnated during parts of the 19th century and early 20th century, U.S. capital took on a growing role, with rising levels of U.S. trade and interventionist policies targeted Caribbean nations. Early attempts in the 1880s by France to construct the Panama Canal failed, with the U.S. completing the project in the early 1900s, and by utilizing a great number of workers from the Caribbean (Ives, 2012).
By the turn of the century the U.S. was increasingly intervening in the region, in large part to protect and expand U.S. capitalist interests. “The period between 1897 and 1930 saw the enormous concentration of latifundia in the Caribbean under the stimulus of American capital investment,” observes Williams (1984, p. 429). Yet even with the heavy investment, class relations in many parts of these nations, such as in Hispaniola, remained underdeveloped—with petty commodity relations dominating through the early decades of the 20th century (Crouch, 1981, p. 18). Over time agricultural output began to increase, yet this focused largely on traditional exports. New property rights, road systems, and monetary systems were set in place, and as many Caribbean states became more tightly connected with U.S. interests.

A consolidation of independent states in the region also occurred in the wake of the U.S. occupations and following World War II, when the region again became a site for foreign investment. Even still, in many parts of the region, the formation of local industrial working classes and productive capital remained restrained as authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes subordinated national capitalist goals to the interests of an authoritarian clique and their immediate connections (Itzigsohn, 2000, p. 40). Just as major resistance movements had opposed U.S. occupations in the region in earlier times, resistance and movements from below opposed the new military and authoritarian regimes. As persistent class resistance became embedded as an ideological pattern, major social and political struggles ensued. Major rebellions by Jamaica’s laboring classes took place in 1831, 1865, and 1938. Such revolts and protests occurred in other parts of the region as well. This eventually came to a head in Cuba in 1959 when a rebel force succeeded in overcoming the U.S. backed government’s security forces. This eventually led to Cuba’s socialist
project. In response to the Cuban revolution, the U.S. further sought to shore up allied regimes in the region. This included propping up the Duvalier dynasty in Haiti and supporting a rightist military insurrection against constitutionalist forces in the Dominican Republic. Other parts of the colonial Caribbean such as Jamaica were closely managed and monitored in their political transition toward independence.

Yet over the years, as grassroots movements continued to demand change, democratic openings eventually occurred. With elite priorities shifting, elections in many parts of the region were allowed. In some cases this led to the election of more progressive governments. Heated conflicts in some areas of the region continued, such as during the 1980s with the Sandanista and New Jewel Movement revolutions, the former in Nicaragua and the latter in Grenada. By the 1970s and 1980s, elites and U.S. policymakers sought in particular to isolate and undermine leftist projects (as well as more moderate left-of-center governments). New policies were undertaken to create conditions in which electoral politics were confined to elite power structures. While policymakers sought to allow for the illusory role of democracy, as a policy of containment it created conditions palatable to investors and with the goal of engendering less resistance as compared to previous pro-western authoritarian governments in the region.

Whereas some Caribbean states engaged in limited forms of import substitution during the 1960s and 1970s (Stephens and Stephens, 1986), new mining and tourism industries began to grow in the region with their own particular forms of exploited labor and power relations (Girvan, 1978; Gmelch, 2012; Merrill, 2009; Pattullo, 2005). By the 1980s, apparatuses of the U.S. state and powerful institutions active in the region increasingly sought to break down tariff restrictions and other barriers to capital, seeking to further
integrate the region with globalizing capital through neoliberal policies. Already by the 1970s and into the 1980s international capitalist investors had begun to expand manufacturing industries in the region, taking advantage of low labor costs and the region’s geographic proximity to North America and Europe. Into the latter part of the 20th century, a number of new neoliberal structural features came about, such as devalued local currencies that further empowered capital, downsized government that freed up state assets for privatization, and domestic economies that were further opened to globalizing chains of production and finance. This occurred alongside a transformation of capital, from an international to a transnational orientation. Such developments have occurred unevenly and have taken deep root in some nations (such as in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica), while being less successful in others, such as in Cuba (de la Fuente, 2001). Still other locations (such as in Haiti) have moved from one emergency to another, with elites seeing further integration into the global economy as the main solution. Moving into the new century, policies of global competitiveness and transnational integration have manifested in contradictory ways across the region. Transnational capital has come to compete and flow across the globe, disrupting possibilities of nationally geared development projects in the region (Robinson, 2014). As state and corporate elites worldwide seek out greater standardization of neoliberal regulatory and state practices (Dayen, 2015), elites and officials of many institutions operating in the Caribbean are moving in the same direction. How has economic restructuring and associated social changes undergirded this unfolding historical process? This dissertation focuses our attention on the shift from the earlier international phase of world capitalism to the global phase of world capitalism, suggesting how this has played out in the Caribbean.
Notes

i For example, in his analysis of class warfare in mid-19th century Paris, Marx defined fractions within the French bourgeoisie class as (1) unproductive finance capitalists and (2) productive industrial capitalists. Within the French working class, he identified an unproductive lumpenproletariat and a productive proletariat. Describing the class fractions and strata aligned against the Paris Commune of 1871, he listed the “aristocracy of finance, the industrial bourgeoisie, the middle class, the petit bourgeoisie, the army, the lumpenproletariat organized as the Mobile Guard, the intellectual lights, the clergy and the rural population” (Marx, 1994).

ii Mintz has looked, for example, at the treatment of slaves in the Caribbean colonies, arguing that how they were treated was rooted in the integral factors of the colonial slave economy and how it was linked into the world economic system; the way in which the colony was governed by its Imperial metropolis in Europe; and the intensity and manner in which labor and land was exploited through capitalism (Mintz, 1989, pp. 59-91).

iii Authors debate, for instance, the dominant role of the U.S. (Maingot & Lozano, 2004), the role of the EU (Bernal, 2013; ECLAC, 2013), “a new cold war” (Padget, 2008), Cuba’s changing relationship with the U.S. and what this means for “American” businesses (Lee, 2015), or of the spread of Chinese enclaves and the challenges this poses to the U.S. (Bernal, 2014). Also in this context, a number of mainstream studies advocate for a deepening of neoliberal policies in the region (Palmer, 2009). One recent academic study utilizing Marxian ideas to understand the region’s contemporary political economy
(Karagiannis & Polychroniou, 2015), essentially argues that capitalism can be managed by Caribbean state policymakers to develop nations in the region in a stable manner. While not only does this argument ignore the reality of power relations in the region, the authors make the mistake of believing that capitalism is organized to produce national economic development, as opposed to private capital accumulation as an end in itself. This pushes the authors away from considering any alterative or radical forms of economic organization; those that might involve greater community and worker control, and involve coordination across borders. We need here to appreciate further how global capitalism is not an assemblage of autonomous national economies, each corresponding to its territorially based sovereign state.

iv See Robinson’s (2010, 2011) critical overviews of the world systems approaches of Wallerstein and Arrighi.

v Denis O’Brien also holds major investments in commercial aircraft, oil, gas, and a number of other industries. For more see his profile on the website of Forbes magazine: http://www.forbes.com/profile/denis-obrien/.

vi In recent years the Caribbean has seen a massive increase in the number of cell phone users.

vii The Haitian invasion of Santo Domingo also raised fears among Cuban elites that Haitians would invade the country.

viii Williams (1984, p. 350) entire remark is as follows: “Only four territories in the Caribbean in the 19th century did not participate in the vast demographic revolution which was in operation in the area as a whole: independent Haiti, Spanish Santo Domingo, which
became independent in 1844, Spanish Puerto Rico, and British Barbados. Elsewhere the simple population pattern at the end of the eighteenth century - a few whites of the metropolitan country, some mulattoes, and a majority of Negroes - became a heterogeneous mixture which included Indians, Chinese, Javanese, and Portuguese, with all the infinite gradations, shadings and mixtures produced by miscegenation.”
Chapter II

The Caribbean Cruise Ship Industry and the Emergence of a Transnational Capitalist Class

... 20 years ago, it was a North American-centric industry, and now it’s a global industry. So the Caribbean has to compete in a global marketplace, and I think that’s a challenge that’s relatively new recently.

- Micky Arison, Chairman of Carnival Corporation (Britell, 2013)

Global tourism—and most notably the cruise ship sector—stand out as a leading yet under-explored example of the transnationalization and functional integration across borders of leading industries. A vital part of global tourism is the cruise ship industry. Importantly, the Caribbean region accounts for 34.4% of cruise ship deployments worldwide. More than 7.8 million passengers visited the Caribbean in 1990, whereas 20.5 million visited in 2004. The most popular destination are Cozumel on the Mexican coast, the Caymen Islands, the US Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, St Maarten, and Jamaica (Pattullo, 2005: 195). Tourism, the cruise industry, and associated commercial and financial activity have grown as a dynamic core of the Caribbean’s service sector (Daye, 2011) and a major spigot through which the region has been inserted into the globalized economy. In this chapter, I will examine the political economy and historical development of the cruise ship industry in the Caribbean, as well as the fundamental ways in which it has been transformed in the era of globalization.
Scholars need to look at tourism in the context of capitalist globalization, examining how recreational and leisure travel have become associated with industries rooted in growing cross-border integration and exploitive economic relations. One of the largest and fastest growing sectors within tourism has been the cruise ship industry (Pattuloo, 2005). Vacationers from the United States and other developed countries, as well as a growing number from privileged sectors from poorer nations, partake in cruise ship vacations. For decades, the Caribbean has been a central destination for cruise ship tourism. While a number of studies have examined the cruise ship industry (most notably: Klein, 2005, 2009) and other globalizing sectors of the tourist industry (Theobald, 2004), none yet have looked at these changing industries in relation to the formation of transnational capital (Harris, Liodakis, Robinson, Sklair). This chapter thus considers the shifting capital-labor relations of the globalizing cruise industry in the context of the Caribbean, and how these occur concomitant with material (economic) changes. Its purpose is to illuminate the contradictions and nature of the shifting material and social processes that sustain the cruise industry. Next, after a discussion on global tourism and globalization, I look at the history of the cruise industry in regard to the Caribbean and outline how novel and contradictory developments of the global era are now at the core of the cruise industry. Lastly, to provide more specific details on how the local and national connect with these novel transnational dynamics, I will look briefly at the changing contours of the industry within some of the major population centers of the region—the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica—arguing that areas of the region have essentially become globally competitive nodes for transnational capital.
Some previous studies have looked at the Caribbean cruise ship industry through the lens of “dependency theory.” For example, scholars have argued that no real deep structural change took place in the region following the Second World War, but rather that “plantation tourism” was developed in the region, along the lines of the old plantation agriculture and other exploitive economic models. With the tourist industry controlled by a coalition of expatriate and local elites, resorts and cruise ship destinations dominate the coasts as hierarchal entrenched power structures benefited inordinately (Boyce, 2003; Weaver, 2001, p. 166). While these dependency approaches remain useful, in this chapter, I emphasize the importance of the emerging transnational capitalist class (TCC) to understand the structural changes of recent years. This chapter seeks to understand the fundamental shifts to the Caribbean cruise ship industry in relation to the rise of capitalist globalization. Incontrovertible changes have occurred in recent decades in production, distribution, consumption, and finance. Through technological and networked development, new models of corporate organization have emerged. Geographer Peter Dicken (2007) and others have shown the centrality and the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global era. Through functionally integrated networks of production and finance, TNCs have been able to “cut through, and across, all geographical scales, including the bounded territory of the state” (Dicken, 2007, p. 13).

A number of scholars have begun to argue that structural changes associated with the emergence of global capitalism have influenced new fissures among social groups and classes (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2004, 2014). As transnational networks of capitalist production and finance redefine the scale of the world economy, scholars of the “global capitalism school” have argued that transnational social relations have begun to
form among different class fractions and social groups. As discussed by Harris (2006) and Robinson (2004), a TCC has emerged, bound together as a conscious class whose material basis is imbricated in TNCs and the accumulation of global capital. This class, with its different fractions, has emerged as that segment of the world bourgeoisie that owns the leading worldwide means of production embodied in TNCs and various financial institutions. The owners and major investors within the cruise ship industry make up a microcosm of the TCC.

In addition to the TCC, other social groups and classes are undergoing major changes associated with globalization. Middle strata (such as professionals and small-scale working entrepreneurs) and working class fractions have become implicated in processes of global capitalism, as labor power itself has been incorporated into transnational value chains (Struna, 2009; Robinson, 2014). Such scholarship urges us to question the social and material novelties and contradictions of the global epoch. As part of this growing body of scholarly work that has critically examined the structural and conjunctural dimensions of global capitalism (Harris, 2006; Hoogvelt, 2001; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2004, 2014; Sklair, 2001; Watson, 2013), I seek to understand the deep changes in a particular sector of the global economy—the cruise ship industry—through the shifting social and material relations that undergird it.

**Global Tourism and the Global Cruise Industry**

While a great deal of important literature has been written on leisure and tourism, in this chapter I aim to examine at a sector of the tourist industry in terms of global political economy. Rising profits and investments in tourism during the late twentieth century and
early twenty-first century have become a fundamental part of the globalizing economy. The rise of a global tourist industry has been a consequence not only of major technological and organizational transformations associated with global capitalism, but also, and most importantly, changing social and class relations. Tourism is estimated to account for approximately 9% of global GDP, or more than $6 trillion (World Travel & Tourism Council, 2012). Together, new transportation, computer, and information technologies, and global marketing techniques and expanding corporate networks have propelled the tourism industry (Lumsdon & Page, 2003; Rodrigue, 2013; Theobald, 2004). TNCs involved in transportation, hotels, and various tourism related activities have proliferated worldwide (Dowling, 2006). As in many other industries, TNCs have come to dominate tourism, with TCC owners and investors profiting from its worldwide chains of accumulation. This has been aided by well-organized lobbies of industry representatives and allies as well as transnationally oriented technocrats and elites operating through their state apparatuses. While TNCs dominate the industry, they have also formed some linkages with local upper classes and locally based businesses through subcontractor networks. As with other globalizing industries this has led to increasing transnational social integration among dominate groups, where as Robinson explains, “The globalization of the tourist industry draws in local contingents around the world in diverse ways” (2003, p. 198).

Another key factor in the global tourism industry’s phenomenal expansion has been the reconfiguration and growth of middle strata worldwide with disposable income for leisure activities (Liechty, 2003; Rohde, 2012). While inseparably linked to rising global income inequality and social polarization, a growing portion of the earth’s population takes part in mass tourism while hundreds of millions of jobs are tied to the industry (Mowforth &
Munt, 2008). According to the United Nations World Tourism Organization, more than one billion people now take part annually in tourism outside of their home country (UNWTO, 2012).

Figure One

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<tr>
<th>Overall Tourism Arrivals (millions)</th>
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<tr>
<td>World</td>
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<td>To Developed Countries</td>
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<td>To Developing Countries</td>
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<td>Caribbean</td>
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<td>*Over surface</td>
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Source: UNWTO
A sizeable part of the privileged sectors of global society engage in tourism, from upper classes worldwide to growing middle strata of the “global north” and “global south.” The Caribbean has been a major site for global tourism. In 1996, for example, $7 billion was spent on tourism in the Caribbean annually (Uebersax, 1996), and by 2013 this had risen to $28.1 billion. Meanwhile, with a growth rate above 7% annually since 1990, the global market for cruising had approximately 18.3 million customers in 2010 (Rodrigue, 2013). Various segmented and niche markets have come into being, where upper class and middle class clients are channeled into different lifestyle and income groups, featuring entertainment and various desires and experiences. By looking at the cruise industry’s past and present role in the Caribbean, we can identify novel processes that have arisen during the epoch of global capitalism.
Tourism to and within developing countries has increased massively. While all regions have experienced growth in tourism arrivals over recent decades, the share of overall arrivals to developing countries has grown faster relative to the share of arrivals to developed countries. As Figure 1 above shows, while only 83 million people visited developing economies in 1980, this reached 498 million by 2010. By 2030, furthermore, more than one billion tourists will likely visit emerging economies (UNWTO, 2011, p. 15). Also, whereas 8% of tourists in the mid-1970s were from developed countries visiting developing countries, by the mid-1980s this figure had grown to 17%, reaching 20% by the mid-1990s, and then 25% by the new century (Robinson, 2003, p. 131).

In turn, the development of the global cruise ship industry has occurred in the context of the rise of transnational production and financial systems in world economy. The industry underwent a transformation during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, as the maximization of profits and streamlining of the passenger experience occurred alongside a centralization of the industry’s capitalist interests. The industry has become heavily monopolized by Royal Caribbean and Carnival Cruise Lines, which together control 70% of the industry, both of which have developed significant ties with other companies and a wide array of subsidiaries and corporate synergies (Rodrique, 2013). The two companies also own numerous subsidiaries and have purchased or driven out of business many of their former competitors. Meanwhile, a number of transnational capitalists and large global investment firms have increased their stakes in these companies. A magnet for investor confidence, the industry has increasingly sought to cut costs of labor, limit regulatory oversight, and manage the passenger experience more precisely. While only a small percentage of the local population gains long-term benefits from the industry and tax
revenues are rather small, environmental damage caused by the industry has been significant and well documented. (Klein, 2009).

The major cruise companies and their owners have come to embody “transnational capital”—that part of capital that traverses borders in transnational production processes, through finance, and among the circuits of capital accumulation. By influencing and benefiting from globally oriented policy changes of national states, circumventing regulatory regimes and penetrating local economies, cruise companies sell “exotic” experiences to privileged sectors while simultaneously exploiting workers and locals. The industry’s expansion, furthermore, has led to a massive expansion in the amount of concentrated sewage sludge that it dumps into the world’s oceans and rising harmful air emissions (Friends of the Earth, 2014; Walker, 2010). In addition to the contradictory nature of the industry’s rise, nations in the Caribbean and other regions have become more organically linked into the global economy. Local elites and officials seek competitive avenues through which to entice global investment (such as with the cruise ship industry), resources upon which these regional actors increasingly rely for their own social reproduction.

Central to changes the cruise industry has undergone in the global era have been the sociological dynamics that undergird the industry, such as the role of laborers and passengers. For example, while wealthy and middle class passengers experience pleasurable vacations they are subsumed within a highly advanced and segmented capitalist society that alienates them from the reality they see and the ability to conceive of or determine the true character of what they temporarily interact with and inhabit (Marx, 1992, p. 163-177). So even while enjoying pleasurable experiences, passengers are still disconnected from understanding the social, economic, political and ecological nature of the phenomenon in
which they partake. We can consider recent changes in the industry that guarantee passengers are channeled into cruise company-controlled or connected service sector zones. In the past, cruise ship passengers could more easily interact with local merchants, but in recent decades passengers have increasingly been channeled into company-controlled markets. This represents an intensified social alienation, where passengers believe they are shopping or taking part in local markets, when in fact they are operating through chains of accumulation controlled by a transnational cruise ship company.

**The Historical Formation of the Cruise Ship Industry**

With the European imperialistic conquest of the Caribbean region and the ethnic cleansing of its indigenous inhabitants, poor European immigrants and African slaves comprised most of the earliest labor imported to the region. Beginning in the 1830s, the use of steamships significantly reduced the time of the journey to the Western Hemisphere, eliminating the reliance upon sailing vessels. By the later part of the century, a trickle of tourists began to visit Caribbean destinations that reflected their nationality, as English tourists predominantly visited the British colonies of Nevis, Barbados, and Jamaica, while French went to Martinique, the Dutch to Curaçao, and North Americans traveled mostly to Cuba and the Bahamas, islands in close proximity to South Florida (Gmelch, 2003).

By the early twentieth century, modern oceanic liner designs debuted, which immediately introduced a rigid class system on board the vessels. As the luxurious first-class experience above decks improved, the cramped unventilated spaces below deck housed the rest of the ship’s passengers and crew. The blockbuster 1997 Hollywood film *Titanic* illustrates this dichotomy quite vividly. Yet, as immigration slowed, shipping liners sought
to provide cheap tickets to people in the United States who wanted to return to visit Europe.

“If the westbound traffic had dried up, the thinking went, perhaps the new prosperity in the U.S. might give rise to a new flow in the other direction” (Garin, 2006, p. 17).

Transatlantic merchant shipping capital went through tough times, especially as luxury travel and mass migration came to a halt during the First World War. As they tried to salvage their investments following the war and throughout the economic boom of the 1920s, some companies began to seek new customers among the U.S. middle class by offering improved accommodations, or “affordable luxury.”

During the winter months of this era, early cruises to the Caribbean became essential to the viability and profitability of many ship companies. Some visitors, for instance, came from Europe and North America to Jamaica aboard steamers of the United Fruit Company or Hamburg-American Line West Indian cruises (Tortello, 2006). Yet a number of factors continued to impede a full-scale tourist industry, not the least of which was the particular geography and climate conditions of the Caribbean.

The [oceanic] ships were simply not built for tropical climates; their small windows, their limited deck space, their recreational facilities (such as they were) deep in the ship had all been conceived with the wind and snow and waves of the North Atlantic in mind. They had no air-conditioning, and the dark paint on their hulls was a magnet for the tropical sun. And then there was the question of outlook. Rather than embracing an exciting new direction for their business, ship-owners saw these tropical sojourns as a distraction, a necessary evil. (Garin, 2006, p. 19)
Transatlantic passenger shipping slowly declined during the first half of the twentieth century and, by the 1950s, had collapsed. This decline is linked to the advent of large passenger jet aircraft in the decades following the Second World War, when intercontinental travel largely shifted from oceanic liners to planes. The antiquated and uncomfortableliners had been designed to maximize passenger number, with stifling cabins that often lacked windows. In addition, the ships suffered from high fuel consumption and had deep hulls that prevented them from entering shallow ports.

Into this scene entered a capitalist entrepreneur, Frank Fraser, who sought to build the first year-round cruise-only business, which would operate out of Miami, Florida. Miami’s proximity to the warm climate and islands of the Caribbean made it an ideal choice. It also signaled the shift in the role of the maritime passenger ship from transatlantic transportation to cruise tourism.¹ During the 1960s, a handful of cruise businesses had formed in Miami, most often operating excursions into the Bahamas utilizing pre-war U.S. coastal passenger ships. In fact, the internationalization of the cruise ship tourist industry in the region grew in part due to the U.S. state's facilitation. After the Second World War, new U.S. government policies seeking to open up international markets helped instigate the flow of U.S. capital and tourists into the Caribbean. Some Caribbean elites (facilitated at times by U.S. policymakers) profited from new construction projects, marketing, and the management of modern resorts.

Similarly, with the transition away from British colonial rule, West Indian governments and economies adjusted policies and practices and sought international cruise ship companies as an important new source of foreign capital. Some Caribbean states began to reduce tariffs and other barriers to travelers entering Caribbean countries, eliminating
taxes on arriving and departing tourists, and providing waivers for visa requirements. The growth of tourism, as Chase (2002) argues, also helped shift a more significant segment of West Indian labor into the service sector. Scholars have also argued that the expansion of the industry impacted the social structure of the Caribbean, such as in the English speaking islands, where the rising hegemony of the U.S. and new interactions associated with tourism impacted locals by “reinforcing or rearticulating conceptions of national, historical, racial, and economic difference” (Hogue, 2013).

The first major cruise corporation was Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, which was owned in large part by wealthy Scandinavian shipping families, the Skaugens and Wilhelmsens, and operated by businessmen in Miami who had experience in the industry. One of these businessmen, Ted Arison, founded Carnival Cruise Lines in 1972. From a long established Israeli shipping family, Arison had invested in Nili, one of the Fraser family’s cruise ships in the mid-1960s. While a number of cruise lines began during the 1960s and 1970s, by the latter decades of the twentieth century, the industry turned out huge profits and became increasingly centralized and monopolized. As cruise vacations were promoted throughout the later decades of the twentieth century, the fledgling industry gained popularity among middle class vacationers and retirees, especially in North America and Europe. It achieved notoriety through media, for instance, with visits by movie stars covered through private radio and television broadcasts.

The Cruise Ship Industry and the Era of Global Capitalism

The closing decades of the twentieth century were a period of growth for the cruise line industry as it became ubiquitous in popular culture. The pampered high consumption of
wealthy and middl-class cruise vacationers occurred alongside the intensifying “culture-ideology of consumerism” promoted by TNCs (Sklair, 2012). The expansion of the cruise ship tourism occurred at a time when nations and local markets around the world became more deeply integrated through a globalized economy (Robinson, 2004). New transnational production networks and global financial systems, functionally linked across borders, allowed for capital to engage in more intensive and extensive operations (Dicken, 2007).

Reflecting the emergent transnationalization of the industry, cruise ship company stocks became traded globally, with Carnival going public in 1987. In the 1990s and 2000s, the industry boomed alongside major organizational and technological advancements, as well as shifting capital-labor relations in the context of a globalizing economy. All the while, larger and larger ships were produced. “A building frenzy during the 1990s produced a continual flow of newer and bigger ships,” explains Klein (2005, p. 14). The Caribbean is where the cruise industry first got its start and the region has continued to be the most profitable throughout the global era, even while other regions have become integrated into the global cruise ship market.

The owners and major stockholders of the cruise ship companies are also tied to myriad other companies and industries worldwide. As transnational capitalists, they have taken advantage of the scale and financial resources at their disposal to acquire or merge with other companies. In 2013, major global investment managements firms controlled more than a third of Carnival’s stocks, such as Thornburg, BlackRock, Schroder, Legal & General, M&G, Artemis Investment, and global asset managers TIAA-CREF, UBS Global Asset, and JPMorgan (Kuehmayer, 2013, p. 16). In turn, TCC fractions from around the world have holdings in these investment and asset firms. Cruise companies have
increasingly sought out cost efficient synergies, forming relations with a variety of other companies (Travel Weekly, 2003; Trade Winds, 2014). With their transnationally oriented investors and owners, these companies have become globally competitive at unparalleled levels.

Cruise ship magnates, few in number, have become some of the wealthiest people on the planet, holding investments in numerous globalized industries and in transnational finance. In 1992, decades after founding the Carnival Cruise Lines, Ted Arison appeared on the Forbes list of America’s top hundred wealthiest, worth an estimated $2.8 billion (Garin, 2006, p. 38). After stepping aside and leaving the company to his son Micky in 1990, Ted went on to own Israel’s largest construction company, as well as massive real estate, technology, and financial holdings. In 1997, he led a corporate buyout of the government of Israel’s largest state bank while he also turned down an offer to become Israel’s finance minister. At the time of his death, his holdings went to his daughter, instantly making her the wealthiest Israeli citizen. Micky Arison, the current chief executive of Carnival (and owner of the Miami Heat basketball team), was said to be the 32nd richest person in the U.S. in 2004 and worth $5.3 billion. Furthermore, in 2009 alone he earned more than $7 million, which included a base salary of $880,000, a cash bonus of $2,206,116, stocks granted of $3,618,481, and other compensation totaling $496,513 (Forbes, 2009). As of 2013, he was said to be worth a total of $5.9 billion, the #211 wealthiest billionaire in the world (Forbes, 2013).

**Fundamental changes to the cruise industry during the era of global capitalism**

The globalization of the cruise industry is reflected in a number of novel dynamics;
from organizational and technological advancements to new economic developments, the industry has grown tremendously in recent decades, earning massive profits for its major stockholders. Yet whereas transnationally oriented elite groups have benefited, many others have been disadvantaged or sidelined by the industry’s changing structures. Reflecting the inequality and dynamism of globalization: some small groups of investors and owners have profited tremendously; upper and middle strata passengers enthralled by global consumer culture achieve brief escapes from their working lives; whereas labor in the industry is increasingly disempowered and exploited; and as local communities at cruise destinations gain little and are increasingly marginalized.

Throughout this unprecedented growth and intensification of the industry, it has undergone fundamental changes. These include the companies becoming highly adept at managing public opinion, the experience of its passengers, and the activities of its labor force. The cruise industry’s links with other economic sectors and the strength of its influence upon state officials has deepened. Its workforce has become more flexible with its time commoditized and managed more precisely. Like many other sectors of global tourism, the cruise ship industry has repatriated more and more value from passenger spending, while at the same time maintaining a web of local and regional alliances and relations that benefit from the industry. As Robinson (2003, p. 197) explains, “The major portion of tourist earnings is captured by transnational capital without entering the host country to begin with, going to the TNCs that control air travel and the tour operators and travel agents that organize and coordinate the global tourist traffic.” Taking these factors into account, there have been several fundamental changes in the cruise industry during its globalization phase:

1) A variety of organizational and technological advancements, and new strategies
have increased profits and streamlined and heightened the exploitation of labor—increasing the structural power of transnational capital over labor. Carnival cruise lines, for example, first developed highly focused onboard revenue strategies, where low ticket prices attracted customers who then became consumers at casinos, bars, stores, and spa services. Yet, as company profits have grown tremendously, workers’ pay has stagnated.

New labor regimes have been established that allow transnational capital to intensify its appropriation of the surplus labor of workers. Meanwhile, these workers face increasingly precarious and competitive relations of the global market. The productive activities of these workers have become geographically diffuse relative to firms and nation-states, so much so that we can consider them as part of a global working class (Mason, 2010; Struna, 2009). In 2005, the monthly minimum wage of workers on board ships—whose shifts often lasted 14 hours, 7 days a week, and from 10 to 12 months out of the year—was just $500 dollars. Even cruise ship entertainers earn depressed wages such that workers can be so socially alienated that they lose track of the day, entering into monotonous cycles of labor (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013).

For the cruise industry, the most important of the new labor regimes, disciplining and controlling its global work force has been advanced through the “flags of convenience,” a practice that allows companies to flag their ships from countries other than the actual location of ownership. In other words, companies are free to employ cheap labor and avoid many state regulations and pressures from labor unions, as well as lower registration fees and taxes, all of which provides cruise companies with significant competitive advantages. The cruise industry has also backed successful lobbying campaigns, such as opposition to U.S. labor laws extending to foreign-flagged vessels operating out of U.S. ports. In regards
to taxes, while much of the Carnival Corporation’s infrastructure is in the U.S., it pays a comparatively small amount in taxes. In 2003, the company paid $29 million in taxes out of $6.7 billion in revenue, or just one-half of 1%.

Before and during the 1960s and 70s, cruise ships and their flags each represented a national line, such as the Greek Line, Italian Line, Cunard Line. As such, most workers were from that country, with possibly a few from a small number of others countries. However, today’s cruise ship companies increasingly hire from a global supply of labor where they face less intrusion from labor laws and regulations. This transition became most visible in the 1970s and 80s, coinciding with the growth of companies such as Carnival. Initially, some companies such as Royal Caribbean and Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) retained some of their national character in terms of officers, primarily because they retained Norwegian flags given their ownership by Norwegians, but even that practice has diminished in recent years. The national and supranational juridical processes enabling this practice (which have been supported by the industry) have seemingly helped to usher in changes to labor practices. A number of small developing countries (such as Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, and the Bahamas), with little to no enforcement measures, have come to provide flags to ships around the world. Some labor organizations and civil society groups have attempted to challenge the supranational law, such as the International Transport workers Federation (ITF) in their campaign against flags of convenience, and the ITF and War on Want's 2002 “Sweatships” campaign (ITF, 2006; War on Want and ITF 2002). However, as the data below shows, the share of foreign-flagged (or “flags of convenience”) ships has expanded massively in recent decades.
A number of other areas show where the cruise industry has become more adept at exploiting workers and appropriating their surplus labor. One example is in the telecommunications industry, a sector on which cruise companies rely for booking cruise ship tickets. Like many other large TNCs, cruise companies utilize highly regimented offshore telephone center labor for its customers’ reservation calls. Royal Caribbean is currently in the process of moving its British call center to Guatemala (McNeil, 2013). Carnival, on the other hand, now has its call center labor work from home, where their
success can be easily surveilled by new telecommunications marketing technology (Heilman 2012). Flexibilized labor relations are also increasingly present in servicing, supplying, maintaining, repairing, and in the construction of cruise ship vessels, as well as heightened forms of precarious labor within the promotion, commercial, and on board entertainment sectors of the industry (Klein, 2009).

2) Industrial innovations have developed much larger cruise ships. For comparison, large ships in the 1970s weighed 20,000 to 30,000 tons; in the 1980s, 50,000 to 70,000 tons; in the 1990s, 100,000 to 140,000 tons; while by the first decade of the twenty-first century they reached 220,000 tons. This has provided further impetus to the creation of new port facilities able to accommodate the larger ships. Larger ship capacities (from less than 1,000 passengers in the 1970s to more than 6,000 in the 2000s) have also meant that fewer vessels are required for the same number of tourists.iii This is reflected by fewer and fewer vessels being required for the same or rising number of tourists. The data below, for example, shows how 907,611 passengers visited Jamaica in 2000 onboard 504 different cruise ship visits, also known as “calls.” In contrast, in 2010 a similar number of passengers visited during just 325 trips.
Figure Four

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<td><strong>D.R./Calls</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Haiti/ Calls</strong></td>
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<td>1,099,773/ 482</td>
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<td><strong>Jamaica/ Calls</strong></td>
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<td>1,179,504/ 435</td>
<td>1,092,263/ 398</td>
<td>922,349/ 334</td>
<td>909,619/ 325</td>
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Sources: Caribbean Tourism Organization, Banco Central de la República Dominicana, and the Secretairerie d'Etat au Tourisme, Haiti. iv

The above data reflects the “boom and bust” crises of capital with its periodical eliminations, reconfigurations, and returns. However, not illustrated in the data is the emerging popularity of other locations in the Caribbean. Cruise destinations such as Mexico,
the Bahamas, Curacao, and Aruba are all growing (Britell, 2013). In recent years, due to rising fuel costs, northern areas of the Caribbean have become more advantageous for the industry (Ibid).

3) Cruise ship companies have also gained unprecedented rights and powers, especially in regions such as the Caribbean where states compete with one another to attract TNCs active in global tourism. According to Carnival chairperson Micky Arison, appreciation for the impact of cruise tourism in the region is “far more so than 10 or 20 years ago. But it varies government to government obviously, and country to country. But I think, generally speaking, yes, it is far more recognized today than it was 10 years ago” (Britell, 2013).

To attract TNCs active in global tourism, state officials in the Caribbean have lowered taxes and regulations and allowed the industry to operate relatively unhindered. In turn, cruise ship tourism has come to provide only minimal tax income to states in the region, with on average $15 per passenger spent per port of call (Rodrigue, 2013). Many states, whose policymakers have become oriented toward the global economy (Robinson, 2012), also increasingly coordinate with organizations that the industry has set up to help facilitate its activities, such as the Florida-Caribbean Cruise Association.

This transition in the industry’s relationship with states has accompanied moves away from traditional ports and their old state-run local port authorities, instead embracing privatized port operations with new enclaves in traditional ports or altogether new installations outside traditional ports. A related trend has led to an increasing number of company-run or highly influenced port authorities. While often leased, some ports have actually become the property of cruise ship companies. Carnival owns ports in the Turks and
Caicos, Cancun, Honduras, and has plans for a port in Belize. Royal Caribbean Cruises Limited owns the Roatán, a port in Belize City as well as Falmouth in Jamaica. A parallel phenomenon has occurred in the Mediterranean, where cruise companies own a number of ports. Meanwhile, there have been protest campaigns launched against cruise ship companies over the environmental damage caused by the construction of their new deep-water ports, such as in Jamaica (Williams-Raynor, 2011).

Even where the companies do not directly own ports, they have considerable influence over port commissions, such as through campaign contributions to local politicians (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). Cruise companies also play countries and ports off one another, demanding better incentives and waterfront overhauls (Klein, 2005, p. 116-117). Presently, cruise companies are no longer at the mercy of local authorities and can more easily capture passenger spending at manufactured tourist sites, revenue that in the past would have more directly benefitted the region’s local economy. The structure of new company-owned ports or enclaves in older ports (with fences and gates) also keep passengers inside “the port,” leaving only on company-controlled bus tours or with approved taxi companies. This is very different from 20 or 30 years ago when cruise ship passengers had far less controlled experiences (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013). Klein describes, “Passengers traditionally wandered around towns more than they do now. However, when they do and spend money, the cruise line still gets its cut (commission). As well, many of the stores in ports are owned by offshore entities that have cozy relationships with the cruise lines” (Ibid). While the industry would previously receive a cut of local profits, today they increasingly directly or indirectly control even the “local” markets that passengers interact with.
4) A growing number of subcontractors, such as local shore excursion providers and taxi companies competing for business, have allowed cruise lines to maximize their profits by squeezing local economies. Where a local company (sometimes affiliated with the port agent) might coordinate the shore excursions of visiting cruise passengers, some companies hired by the cruise lines operate in multiple ports (usually within the same country, state, or province), while still other subcontractors such as concessionaires operate regionally and onboard the ships. Concessionaires manage operations that are less profitable or require an expertise (shops, casinos, photography, spa services, etc.), and these companies in turn pay sizable fees to the cruise ship companies.

Another trend has been the rise of technical, commercial, and crew management services in the cruise ship industry, many of which are outsourced to specialized companies (Kuehmayer, 2013). Competition between subcontractors and companies working in the tourist industry helps contain costs and increase profits for cruise line owners and investors. Importantly, subcontractors and small businesses that link into the industry and depend on it economically have also advocated on its behalf, with tour excursion providers and taxi operators, for example, mobilizing to lobby on the industry’s behalf in the Caribbean (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013).

5) Finely tuned public relations and “corporate responsibility” strategies further polish corporate brands throughout the cruise industry. With slogans such as "Cruising is remarkably safe" and the "Safety of our passengers is the cruise industry's top priority," the industry has become adept at public relations and managing perceptions. As Klein reflects, “They coin the right words and have the ‘right’ labels for what they do, even if these labels are at variance with what they actually do” (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013).
Public perception is very important in the industry. For example, widespread media coverage engulfed the Carnival-operated vessel that sank off the Isola del Giglio in Italy in 2012 that cost the lives of 32 people. While the costs from the accident were likely to be relatively low, as the company is insured, negative media coverage catalyzed by such accidents was deemed a major threat to the company’s reputation.

Amidst mounting criticism and the industry facing some legal actions and fines, cruise companies have, for instance, strategically sought to mitigate their environmental impact and risk therein. While they have put into place new waste treatment mechanisms, every day the industry is believed to release into the world’s oceans between 40 and 120 tons of concentrated sewage sludge that includes beryllium, lead, mercury and other harmful emissions. While there are various "memoranda of understandings" between the industry and the U.S. state over the industry’s environmental impact, these rely only on voluntary compliance without monitoring. Key for the industry is managing public opinion so as not to understand or criticize the harmful impact the industry has on the environment (Klein, 2009).

6) Cruise ship companies have become entwined with global capital flows by opening up to stock markets and outside capital investments. One ship manufacturer explains that there has been a “shift in the ship financing sector” that “uncovers how fast the traditional financiers to the cruise shipping industry fade away” as a new globalized financial system takes hold (Kuehmayer, 2013, p. 2). With deep pockets and financial buffer in difficult times, large cruise companies dominate smaller competitors, becoming deeply linked with the global financial system rather than the smaller banks of the past.

Cruise ship companies have initiated IPOs or have partnered with venture capitalists
and other investors in order to raise needed capital. Transnational capitalist Leon Black (Apollo Management) established Prestige Cruise Holding, which controls NCL, Regent Seven Seas, and Oceania. Industry leader Carnival went public in 1987 by offering 20% of its stock, which was used for new ships and expansion beyond cruises (as with Carnival Airlines, which took over and merged with PanAM, or into the hotel industry). By contrast, Royal Caribbean went public in 1993, a move that was associated with new build initiatives. This, alongside major technological and organizational advancements, has allowed for tremendous growth in the more centralized industry’s revenues: Royal Caribbean annual revenues of $3.4 billion in 2002 grew to nearly $7.7 billion in 2012. Carnival Cruise Lines revenues of $1.25 billion in 1990 swelled to nearly $15.5 billion by 2013. Far from an anomaly, the cruise ship industry’s integration into the global financial system continues unabated until today.

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

7) The industry and its major owners and executives have become increasingly transnationally oriented, seeking out profits and advantages through a global web of partners and subsidiaries. This is not only clear in their economic activities but also in how the businesses are structured. For example, while the Cruise Royal Caribbean Company maintains its official corporate headquarters in Miami, it is officially incorporated in Liberia. Geared toward upper and middle class clientele, it has investors, customers, and employees from around the world. According to Forbes, the company is valued at $9.4 billion (Castillo-Mussot, Sprague, & Lama Garcia, 2013). As the North American and Caribbean markets
became saturated, the cruise industry recently expanded to new markets in Asia (especially in China, Vietnam and Thailand), Australia and New Zealand, the Middle East (Dubai), and in parts of Africa. In a mutually beneficial relationship, the industry’s expansion and its globally competitive nature have developed concurrently with its finely tuned public relations and “corporate responsibility” strategies (Klein, 2009).

Next, I will look at some particular cruise ship destinations in the Caribbean during the global era. I focus on some of the major population and lower income areas of the region, showing how the industry’s development has done little to benefit local communities. Across the region, cruise companies get out of paying many of the land-based taxes and fees that other tourist and hotel companies must pay. As Pattullo (2005: 199) observes: “cruise ships are seen as moveable feasts which sail away into the sunset, their bars and casinos untaxed.” Likewise, construction labor associated with the industry is disconnected from the areas where they visit, unlike the hotel industry that relies much more on local inputs (Ibid). The cruise liners also purchase few supplies in the region, instead buying through global corporate chains (Ibid: 200).

The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica

Cruise ships have long frequented many Caribbean islands, including some of the lower income population centers such as the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. In the 1960s and 1970s, cruise ships traveled between traditional larger ports of call. In recent decades, we have seen rapid development of both private ports and installations in the traditional port cities, a practice that permits the industry to operate and exert control under less scrutiny by local governments. This has occurred as part of a general shift away from
local and traditional models of development toward a developmental model that hinges upon global investment and flows of capital. As Carnival’s transnational capitalist chairman Micky Arison elaborates: the Caribbean region’s economic prospects and the profitability of cruise industry companies have come to become more broadly “related to the general economic situation around the world” (Britell, 2013).

Caribbean states have meanwhile struggled to take a unified regional position towards the industry so that they might gain a larger share of revenue. Attempts by Caribbean countries to cooperate by agreeing on a common head tax in the 1990s and early 2000s failed (Klein, 2005, p. 192). Pattullo has explained the way in which the powerful lobbying arm of the cruise companies defeated this attempt, illustrating how they have a huge sway over Caribbean policymakers (Patullo, 2005: 197-199).

Through its highly competitive global market, the industry has engendered a race to the bottom for labor, local communities, and the environment. State policymakers meanwhile compete with one another in the region and actually help keep the industry’s costs extremely low. Regionally, market shares in the industry have in recent years shifted as more price-competitive areas of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean outpace in growth English-speaking destinations. Similarly, on a global scale, other price-competitive warm and tropical destinations have thriving tourism markets.

In the Dominican Republic, cruise ships have traditionally gone to the old ports of La Romana in the country’s south and, more importantly, Samaná in the north. In recent years, cruise companies have shifted towards new non-traditional private ports of call or new more privately controlled installations within the old ports. Costa Cruises, for example, visits Casa de Camp, a tropical seaside resort with golf courses in the Dominican province of La
Romana. Cruise ship companies that visit the Dominican Republic today include Royal Caribbean (RCL), Norwegian Cruise Line, Seabourn, Holland America (HAL), and Silversea. Not surprisingly, the Dominican state has close ties with the industry and has promoted its development continually over the years. Dominican President Daniel Medina, soon after coming into office, pledged to attract ten million tourists a year to the country and promptly met with executives from Royal Caribbean on one of their ships anchored in Bay of Samaná (Royal Caribbean, 2013). Marking the first time a Dominican president addressed a cruise ship operator in a press-covered event for Dominican audiences, this meeting showcased the importance of the industry (Royal Caribbean, 2013).

In 2011 in the Dominican Republic, tourism generated $4.3 billion in revenues, while 3.7 million foreign visitors traveled through the country’s airports and 430,000 visited the island onboard cruise vessels (accessdr, 2012a, 2012b). Tourists visiting the country had grown to 4.56 million in 2012, becoming the region’s most highly visited country (Luxner, 2013). As most visitors arrive by plane, new mega-projects look set to heavily expand the number of cruise visitors annually to the country (Luxner, 2013).

By contrast, Haiti has served as a laboratory for the privatized cruise port. During the final stages of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Royal Caribbean International began cruises to Labadee, a heavily guarded and fenced off private resort installation in the north of the country.\(^\text{vi}\) Cruise operations to Haiti have run smoothly except for some brief shut downs during political crises in the country. Into the 2010s, Royal Caribbean International ramped up its operations at the port, running a high volume of cruises (Booth, 2010).\(^\text{vii}\) Five beaches and a forested peninsula are leased from the Haitian government. After engaging in watersports, barbecues, and souvenir shopping within the premises, cruise passengers’ return
at night to sleep onboard their cruise vessel (Booth, 2010). Approximately 300 locals work at Labadee and a few hundred more are employed indirectly (Booth, 2010). Despite this idyllic and premium setting, Royal Caribbean pays the Haitian state a miserly $6 per visitor. Since 2009, Labadee has been able to receive Oasis class ships, the world’s largest class of cruise ships with a maximum passenger occupancy of 5,400. Including staff, this raises the capacity of the new vessel to 6,296 (Royal Caribbean, 2009).

Jamaica, another major population center in the region, is one of the most highly visited cruise ship destinations in the Caribbean. Ocho Rios is the most active cruise port, hosting more than 800,000 cruise visitors annually, followed by Montego Bay, which sees between 300,000 and 400,000. Port Antonio boasts a much smaller but increasingly steady cruise presence. Traditional ports of Kingston and Port Antonio are for the most part no longer utilized by the industry. Whereas the traditional ports can accommodate most ships, new ports and installations have and continue to be developed to accommodate the newer, much heavier, ships. This has occurred alongside a trend of cruise lines taking over control of cruise terminals. Presently, cruise companies owe the Jamaican state tens of millions in unpaid taxes, although Jamaica’s government has not moved to collect (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013).

New non-traditional private port installations have been set up in Jamaica, either as new enclaves within the traditional ports or as new installations outside the ports. For instance, allowing for its new “mega ships” to dock in the country, Royal Caribbean has developed Falmouth, a private terminal near Montego Bay. The cruise line has promoted the port as unique because of its close access to local city life, allowing passengers to have a “genuine” Jamaican experience. One press outlet describes, “during a Western Caribbean
one-week cruise, Falmouth is the only opportunity for passengers to get a look at a real
Caribbean island port city. Royal Caribbean and Jamaica have built a modern port facility,
with docks and some local shops. Just two blocks away is a real city where residents seem to
live much as they did 10 or 20 years ago” (Molyneaux, 2012). The Jamaica Gleaner has
pointed out:

The majority of Jamaica's cruise ship visitors come from America although
interest in other parts of the world, particularly Europe, is growing. In fact,
new developments are occurring more and more. In June 2006, Royal
Caribbean's Freedom of the Seas, the world's largest cruise ship which carries
4,300 passengers (not including crew) will begin visiting Montego Bay. Later
in this same year, the Queen Mary, the world's largest cruise liner and part of
Carnival's Cunard Line, will also begin docking in Montego Bay. Today, a
typical cruise ranges from less than US$100/night to more than
US$1,000/night, depending on the type of vessel and services offered. For the
past five years, Jamaica has consistently ranked within the top 10 of
destinations worldwide in terms of passenger numbers. It continues to hold
on to its traditional role as one of the marquee ports of the Caribbean and the
Caribbean itself (the Western Caribbean to be more exact), remains the most
popular cruise shipping region in the world” (Tortello, 2006).

Across the Caribbean, these companies have heavy influence over key contacts in
government as well as connections with companies active across the region or in the
countries where the cruise companies operate. Wealth generated from the industry goes to a small handful of major capitalist investors and owners who in turn have allies in state apparatuses and among the local business community.\textsuperscript{ix} Cruise ship companies, it can be argued, hold enormous sway in the region. State elites have become major promoters of the industry, with state-sponsored tourism advertisement campaigns targeting wealthy and middle class consumers abroad, as well as well as at home to convince locals of the importance of the industry.

Despite exponential financial profits and an ever-increasing popularity as a form of leisure travel, the companies unleash enormous amounts of waste and trash. Caribbean states though have hesitated to implement or enforce stronger environmental regulations for fear of their destinations losing revenue by becoming less globally competitive. Despite this, cruise companies, as Klein concludes, “would lead us to believe that cruise ships are environmentally neutral. The industry projects this image through its lobbyists, public relations campaigns, infiltration of environmental organizations, and advertising . . .” (2005, p. 170). Caribbean government elites disposed toward the mass-tourism development projects of TNCs often point to immediate economic benefits, whereas the environmental damage can take a long time to accumulate and be assessed.

\textbf{Conclusion}

The cruise ship industry, increasingly an oligopoly controlled by groups from the TCC, has transitioned from its previous national and international models to a globally competitive model transfused with transnational capital. While providing services for many millions of customers and with its high profit margins expected to increase for years to
come, cruise companies are on an economically, socially, and environmentally unsustainable trajectory. They operate within the context of a global system and global capitalist economy that faces a dual crisis of ecology and inequality, a structural and civilizational crisis that ensnares the entire planet (Chew, 2006; Robinson, 2014; Sklair, 2001). The changing social relations and productive activities that undergird the industry have meant gains for some involved in the industry, especially transnational capitalists along with some top-tier managerial and professional groups. On the other hand, the majority of laborers and lower income groups connected with the industry increasingly compete and face new globalized labor regimes as they sell their labor power to TNCs.

Annually, millions of tourists from privileged sectors worldwide partake in brief holiday escapes aboard cruise ship vessels. At the same time, the industry has become increasingly monopolized by a handful of large transnational companies, either driving smaller competitors out of business or acquiring them. Meanwhile, only small sectors of the populations in the areas of the Caribbean that I have examined here gained marginally from the industry, whereas local markets interacting with cruise passengers have increasingly come under direct company control or contract as the cruise companies have become proficient in repatriating the onshore spending of passengers. Governments in the Caribbean region have largely handed over control of port authorities or reformed them so as to operate in tandem with the industry.

In addition, aside from the actions of some stronger states, regional and environmental regulations have been stymied in recent decades as the cruise companies—adept at public relations and lobbying and with high priced law-firms—remain largely unaccountable. Reflected in the policies they have promoted, local state officials and elites
in the Caribbean actively encourage transnational capitalist investment, due in part to their social reproduction now depending upon this type of capital accumulation (Robinson, 2012; Sprague 2012). As nodes in a regional and global tourist market, Caribbean nations have come to fit within and become an integrated part of the accumulation chains of transnational cruise corporations. Capital and labor have both undergone novel changes through globalization: local economies have been inserted into global chains of finance, production, and distribution, whereas work has become more subcontracted, outsourced, and flexibilized. We see this within the cruise ship industry, where its globalization has led not only to advancements for some but also to heightening exploitative and contradictory social relations.

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Notes

1. The move to Miami signaled the rise of the cruise industry, where early on North American tourists eagerly bought into packages of exoticism, warm climate, and entertainment. The move also signaled a shift away from earlier maritime industry patterns, as Author Kristoffer A. Garin (2006) explains, “As long as the industry stayed in New York, its leaders would remain doggedly loyal to three centuries of maritime history, even as they watched their enterprises slowly fade away around them.”

Generations prior, Fraser’s own family had immigrated to Jamaica from Scotland, eventually owning slave plantations on the island. Counting Hollywood movie star actors as friends, Fraser, was close with business leaders such as the Bosch family, which operated
the Bacardi Rum Empire in Cuba. He was also sociable with some leaders in the region, such as Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. During the Second World War, as German U-boats carried out a deadly campaign against merchant vessels sailing from Miami to the Caribbean, Fraser subsequently earned a small fortune by hiring out small banana boats, because the kriegsmarine were not willing to waste torpedoes on them. These boats kept up a lively trade with the Dominican Republic and others islands (Garin, 2006, p. 20). Overall, Fraser promptly used Miami’s untapped potential as a tourist port, even purchasing his first cruise ship from the Trujillo regime, named the Nuevo Dominicano.

By the mid-1950s Fraser had purchased two larger vessels that carried 450 people each, tripling the capacity of earlier ships that had plied Caribbean waters. Air conditioning technology was also significant in that it allowed for year round business in the Caribbean with Miami as its epicenter.¹ He launched the first vessel, the Yarmouth, with ten-day cruises to Nassau in the Bahamas, Haiti, and Jamaica. The other ship carried out longer trips to Central and South America. Geared towards older clientele, the voyages exuded luxury and leisure (Garin, 2006, p. 23). By the early 1960s, an industry had taken shape, attracting a handful of international investors especially from among those capitalists who had long profited from earlier forms of passenger shipping.

¹ This is data from the company’s tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

³ Most large ships today have capacities of between 3,000 and 4,500 passengers.
While this figure does not include some of the more highly trafficked islands in the region, the data does focus our attention on lower-income and major population areas of the Caribbean basin.

A port of call is any port being visited by a ship, especially to load or unload cargo or passengers or take on supplies.

On a scandalous side note, in 1991 a journalist revealed that cruise ship passengers were not informed that they were visiting Haiti when spending time at the resort (Farmer 2006: 238).

Other areas on the island have been considered for cruise operations but not yet developed. One right-wing evangelical Christian organization, based in the United States, operates a group called “Cruise with a cause” which is attempting to bring cruise ships into Port-au-Prince. If it succeeds, this will be the first time in a quarter century that cruise ships have visited Haiti’s capital. (Inspiration Cruises 2012). Small yacht cruises are known to visit Jacmel on Haiti’s southern coast, but these bring in less than 100 passengers at a time and are infrequent (Cruise Complete 2013a, 2013b). Some larger ships catering to a few hundred upscale passengers have been known to visit Haitian ports during carnival. (Haiti News 2013)

This is after Royal Caribbean spent US$55 million on improvements in upgrading the port facilities.

As Klein explains: “There are a couple of winners who make out quite well and everyone is part of a model of exploitation” (Dr. R. Klein, personal communication, 2013).
Chapter III

Migrant Remittances, Transnational Integration, and Accumulation in the Caribbean

During the era of globalization there has occurred an unprecedented expansion and cross-border integration of capitalist relations (Dicken, 2015; Robinson, 2014). This has occurred as peoples in regions around the world, such as the Caribbean, have been compelled to export their labor abroad as migrant workers in the global economy. Consequently, diasporic communities have grown tremendously in recent decades and taken part in rising cross-border economic activities (Portes, 1996). Remittance flows (usually, the money sent from an emigrant to her or his family or close relations abroad) now comprise vital revenue for the global poor, whereas labor exportation and the increasing reliance on remittances also reflects desperation and struggles to survive for lower income people. This chapter will examine the undergirding political economy of this process: the way in which remittance flows and the rise of a transnational remittance industry serve as objective routes through which transnational social integration is occurring. As a phenomenon of the global era, of recent decades, and in the context of the Caribbean, I will look at how a part of transnational social integration occurs through emigrant labor and the reverse flow of remittances.

The connection between globalization and transnational migration has been studied in depth by a number of scholars. Lydia Potts (1990) for example has shown how migration has been generated by a confluence of instances of capitalist expansion, industrialization of newly integrated areas, intensive new booms in capital accumulation, and as capital at different points in time gains through new migrant workforces. Others have shown how at a
micro level familial structures often make decisions to migrate linked to hardships in the wake of socioeconomic disruption (Brettell and Hollifield, 2014). Meanwhile on a macro level the so called "push" and "pull" factors have long been examined, but undergirding these is the fact that capital's destructive nature creates surplus populations, that in turn are compelled to seek out new means of survival, whereas a shortage of labor or workers willing to work for low-wages creates an incentive for capital to seek out people displaced from other areas. Swept up into a process of transnational social integration, Portes' (1995, 1996) for examples analyses the rise of transnational migrant and migrant sending communities, where the socioeconomic changes that have allowed for the transnationalization of capital, have also allowed such groups to become objectively and subjectively transnationally oriented. New flexibilized production and commerce of the global era has opened all kinds of new production spaces for transnational migrant communities (Faist and Fauser, 2013), through which capital has sought out new routes to exploit them through the appropriation of their labor. Robinson explains how a fundamental shift has occurred, how migration has become altered from the international to the global phase of capitalism

"In the past, immigrants could not hope to maintain fluid and active ties with the homeland. They became assimilated and set up life anew in a new land. But global communications, transportation networks, and the global economic and financial infrastructure increasingly allow immigrants to maintain active and ongoing exchanges between their home country and their country (or countries) of immigration." (Robinson, 2003: 272)
Emigrant labor and the reverse flow of remittances that they produce have become key structural features of the integrative relations of the global era, especially for lower income communities. Serving as the basis of a hugely profitable transnational industry, remittances now comprise a vital and immediate income source for families around the world, and especially in the Caribbean. Scholars have examined remittances as a source of economic development and income for Caribbean nations (Niimi and Özden, 2008; Martínez, et al, 2008; Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2008; Acosta, et al, 2008; Singh, 2013), and others have looked at remittances as a survival strategy for lower income communities and families (Thai, 2014; Sirkeci, et al, 2012, Nurse, 2006).

Studies have looked at remittances in the context of the global economic crisis of recent years (Sirkeci, et al, 2012) and the governmental and business policy challenges all of this entails. In this chapter I will take a different approach, arguing that the rise of Caribbean migrant labor and the reverse flow of remittance has occurred interconnected with capitalist globalization and the rise of transnational capital. In looking at the formation of the transnational remittance industry and remittance flows, I will seek to illuminate their structural features as an important part of transnational social and material integration and its contradictory nature. I will explain how, through the context of the Caribbean, a globally competitive and dynamic remittance industry has replaced earlier more static money transfer systems; how transnational capital has enveloped more locally oriented business models.

Furthermore, this chapter looks at how the transnational remittance industry has come to function as part and parcel of the super-exploitation (Marini, 1973) of migrant workers in the global era, whose labor has become highly flexibilized and precarious. By super-exploitation I refer to how these workers are not only exploited through the direct
appropriation of the surplus value they create, but also through a further appropriation of the value they have created connected to their migratory and ethnic status in a racialized class system. As I will argue, transnational capital has come to not only profit tremendously off of this relationship, by appropriating the surplus value of super-exploitable emigrant workers, but also through its appropriation of portions of the redistributed value (in the form of remittances and the fees involved) that emigrant laborers send abroad primarily to family members. These relations have formed through the emergence in recent decades of the transnational remittance industry, utilizing new information technology and organizational advancements (such as supranational agreements and new firm structures), tapping into and facilitating the massive increase in recent decades of cross-border money transfers worldwide. This phenomenon has also come to be legitimized and promoted by a wide array of state elites and policymakers as a central plank of development (Rodriguez, 2010).

Reports put out by the World Bank, for instance, often portray remittances as synonymous with foreign aid or financial exchange, as just another new sector of the global economy (Fajnzylber and Lopez, 2008). Garni and Weyher (2006, p. 74) importantly observe that:

…the language of ‘exporting people’ in order to ‘capture remittances’ and ‘leverage development’ while ‘relieving’ an ‘over- burdened’ economy of ‘surplus labor’ (Gammage, 2006, pp. 75-76, 93) obscures the underlying reality that economic elites seek to legitimize the seizure of portions of citizens’ private income, differentiated from ordinary income in that it happens to flow across national borders, and that the maximization of such seizures is justified as a matter of economic and development policy when in
fact it supports elite interests at the expense of [those] wanting a life for themselves and their families ...

So how do contradictory relations that are novel to the global era undergird emigration and the reverse flow of remittances? How do these general trends manifest themselves within a particular regional context, such as the Caribbean? Next, I will provide some context on the unfolding of these dynamics in the region and then look in more detail at the social and material relations therein.

The Caribbean Context

By looking at specific emigrant populations, such as those from the Caribbean region, we can see how working people are often compelled to seek out lives in other countries. As shown in Table 2, the inflow of remittances into the Caribbean has risen exponentially. In the Dominican Republic, for example, in 1970, the inflow of remittances amounted to 25 million USD. By 2013 it was valued at 3.706 billion USD. In Haiti, over the same years, remittances grew from a negligible amount to 1.715 billion. In Jamaica it grew also from a negligible amount to 2.259 billion. This case can be used to generalize out to other contexts. Worldwide remittances to developing countries increased more than thirty-fold, from $2 billion in 1970 ($12 billion if taking into account inflation) to $414 billion in 2013 (Robinson, 2003, p. 204; World Bank, 2013). By 2006, remittances were valued at more than six times that of development assistance and they were believed to have reached 70 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the developing world (World Bank, 2007). They had far surpassed non-FDI flows, such as portfolio investment and bank and trade
related lending (Acosta et al., 2008, p. 25). Remittances did drop some during the recent economic crisis, but they have since rebounded (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 53). As shown below in Figure 1 remittances have continued to grow in importance. With rising out-migration, Latin America and the Caribbean in recent years has become a major sources of emigrant labor and worldwide the largest recipient site for remittances. Robinson (2003, p. 208) describes this as “an arrangement, most likely an emergent structural feature of the global system, whereby the site of labor power and its reproduction have been transnationally dispersed”.

Figure 1: Resource flows to developing countries, 1990-2015 ($ billions)

![Graph showing resource flows to developing countries, 1990-2015](image)


Whereas Table 1 below shows the huge increase in the Caribbean born population living today in the U.S., which is by far the largest destination for labor exportation from the
region. Table 2 shows how the vast majority of Caribbean emigrants living in the U.S. are from the islands of Hispaniola, Jamaica, and Cuba. While Puerto Ricans are not included in this table, they are also among the largest of the diaspora populations. Next I will explain more clearly how a part of the labor-power of migrant workers, and surplus populations more generally, has come to be appropriated through the remittance industry. I will show further how the remittance industry has formed through novel material and social relations of the global economy. Looking how this has taken shape in specific countries of the Caribbean region (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica), it is my argument that the transformations in these particular settings need to be seen through the context of transnational processes.
Table 1: Total and Caribbean Foreign-Born Populations Living in the United States, 1960-2009.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total foreign born</th>
<th>Caribbean born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Share of Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>9,738,091</td>
<td>193,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>9,619,302</td>
<td>675,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>14,079,906</td>
<td>1,258,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>19,767,316</td>
<td>1,938,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>31,107,889</td>
<td>2,953,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>38,517,234</td>
<td>3,465,890</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“Surplus” Populations, Emigration, and the Exportation of Labor

An important facet of global capitalism, has been its production of surplus populations, by which I refer to groups of people who are either structurally unemployed or have only precarious employment (Kalleberg, 2009; Robinson, 2014; Standing, 2011). As numerous studies have shown in recent decades, global inequality has intensified (Bales, 2012; Kloby, 2003; Holt-Giménez and Patel, 2012), as large parts of the world’s population have been reduced to supernumeraries or excess population whose labor is not required for the global economy. While such processes are today occurring on a global level, they are rooted in changes and disruptions caused by the accumulation of capital. Under capitalism, as Marx explained, there was a “constant transformation of a part of the working population into unemployed or semi-employed ‘hands.’” (1992, p. 786) With the upturning of rural populations through the “primitive accumulation” of early agrarian capitalism, there
occurred a growth of surplus labor in towns and cities (Wood, 2002). The existence of unemployed people—living in misery—serves to discipline and check the working class. Marx described this as a “reserve army of labor”, which creates downward pressure on wages and served as a threat to waged laborers, allowing for capital to further exploit labor and grow through the appropriation of labor power. As Robinson (2004) and others have argued, new waves of primitive accumulation (and the mobilization of new reserve armies of labor), with the disruption of rural and poor populations, have continued throughout the history of capitalism.

Whereas during earlier periods of capitalism, higher volumes of workers were often required, in the contemporary period, the rate of constant/variable capital has required fewer and fewer workers (Braveman, 1998). This trend has intensified further through the era of globalization with highly advanced technology and new organizational forms. Mass unemployment and underemployment has been normalized (Standing, 2014). Through the closing decades of the 20th century and into the 21st century, the phenomenon of flexible accumulation has spread around the world. Harvey defines flexible accumulation as “new systems of production and marketing, characterized by the more flexible labour processes and markets, of geographical mobility and rapid shifts in consumption practices” (Harvey, 1991: 124). This phenomenon has intensified as a part of the globalized economy as labor power itself has been reconfigured and incorporated into transnational value chains (Robinson, 2014; Struna, 2009).

In today’s global era, we can see how vast new pools of surplus labor in regions around the world have formed, including within the Caribbean. This has occurred as people from every level of society have become to different degrees interconnected with the global
economy: even the most remote areas in the region, such as impoverished rural communities in Haiti, have been targeted by foreign NGO and donor projects to integrate them into more intensified market relations (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012). One growing trend has been for governments and supranational organizations to facilitate the involvement of lower income populations into marketized relations, such as with remittances, but also through other dynamics such as with land tenure, which, as Howard (2015) points out, has resulted in higher rates of debt.

For those structurally unemployed or underemployed there exists conditions of misery, uncertainty, constant stress, and pressure to search out other possibilities. Undertaking what are often very difficult or dangerous circumstances for themselves and their families, migrants “export” themselves, selling their labor power as a “commodity”. Pools of surplus labor in regions such as the Caribbean have come to be “marketed” worldwide as a commodity. A truly global process: from the Caribbean, to South Asia, to the Philippines, and Central America, elites and their functionaries are promoting the cheapest maquiladora workers, the lowest wage janitors, or the most dedicated and experienced nannies or nurses (Rodriguez, 2010). The exportation of labor has become a transnational process, where labor is compelled to link into the global economy. Emigration has thus grown tremendously in the global phase of capitalism and has become specifically linked to the global economy. A good deal has been written on the rise of the transnational migration, global diasporas, and of the transnational family, with populations dispersed across national borders and living through a web of connections, entailing multiple gendered and racialized class dimensions (Parrenas, 2005; Matthews, 2013; Osuna, 2015; Thai, 2014).
The ways in which poor people are compelled to export their labor must be seen in light of the gendered and racialized nature of class society in the global era (Marable, 2009; Eisenstein, 2005; Mies, 1986). Here it is important furthermore to note that the exportation of labor from the Caribbean has occurred at a volume higher than any other region worldwide, a trend now for several decades (Deere et al., 1990). Faced often with chronic poverty, widespread unemployment, and underemployment, Caribbean peoples – especially women – have engaged in high rates of emigration (Ho, 1999, p. 48). In fact, few Caribbean families have not experienced the departure of friends or family members. Scholars have shown that migratory patterns have varied for different strata of Caribbean society. While elites and upwardly mobile groups tend to migrate as entire family units and usually settle permanently, women from lower-income backgrounds often migrate alone and frequently pave the way for other family members to migrate (Ibid, p. 39). This process entails many contradictions, such as the undermining of traditional forms of child rearing (Ibid, p. 48) or as many emigrants maintain a “sense of loss, displacement, exile, and alienation resulting from the destabilizing effects of capitalism” (Ibid, p. 51).

Migrants from the Caribbean region, such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, and Puerto Rico, make up one of the largest groups of migrants to North America (as Canadian government and U.S. Census Bureau data shows). As Niimi and Özden observe, “Even if Mexico and the Central American countries tend to top the ranking of migrants in absolute terms, the small Caribbean islands clearly dominate the migration charts when we look at migration flows in relation to each country’s population” (Niimi & Özden, 2008, p. 56). Large diaspora communities from the Caribbean have come to exist in Europe and Canada. A Canadian 2001 census, for example, found that the number of
Canadian residents that identified as Jamaicans numbered 211,000, with 82,000 as Haitians, 60,000 as West Indians, 52,000 as Guyanese, and 50,000 as Trinidadians (Monzon & Tudakovic, 2004: 6). Over recent decades there has been an uptick in the number of intra-Caribbean emigration and Caribbean emigration to parts of Latin America (World Bank Databank; Nurse, 2006). These new diaspora populations not only make return visits and communicate with family in their homelands, but they also take part in economic interactions, with remittances as the most important among these.

Transnational Remittances, the Appropriation of Redistributed Value, and Time-Space Compression

In a literal or geographic sense, the remittance industry redistributes value as someone in one part of the planet sends a portion of his or her income to someone living in another area. By controlling chains of the distribution of this value, capitalists then extract value from mostly lower income people who in turn often resist this exploitation by finding alternative uncontrolled or illicit routes for transferring goods and money. We can see this in regard to the remittance industry where TNCs charge fees or commissions to send money transfers to individuals in other countries, and in turn, many people attempt to find alternative routes, such as transferring money across borders through informal channels.

In addition to transnational capital capturing the wealth of workers, the remittance industry also constitutes a separation of the site where wages are earned with the site of wage-generated consumption. Throughout the history of capitalism, as dominant groups have sought to increase the turnover time of capital accumulation, technological changes have been used to speed things up and reduce the friction of distance. The faster the rate of
movement, the faster the rate of capital flow, and the more profit that can be made. Only in recent decades, in the era of global capitalism, has this dynamic existed in such an intensive, rapid, and wide-scale manner. There has been a time-space compression, which Harvey (1991) argues has occurred through the speeding up of the circulation of capital alongside a speeding up of social life in general which together have reduced the significance of place as an absolute limit to social reproduction. Reducing the turnover time of capital thus becomes a crucially important aspect of the global era. However, we must not overemphasize the role of technology in these phenomena, as human agency and changes within society have played a central role. Also, all of this does not mean that “place” no longer matters, but rather that processes that take place across frontiers through new functionally integrated ways alter how space and geography are implicated in material and social production.

The speeding up of material and social life, with an increasing cross-border functional integration of many processes, entails major impacts on how societies are structured and organized, and on how value is produced and distributed. For example, as other scholars have argued, the dependence on the distribution of remittances can fragment local communities and pacify struggle (Garni & Weyher, 2013). Scholars have documented how racial disparities exist in the flow of remittances (Cabezas, 2009, p. 80). Across rural communities and urban centers of the Caribbean, some of the barest essentials have often been purchased through the emigrant remittances sent home. Faced with high unemployment and lack of opportunity, many have become dependent on remittances.

Yet as a dialectical process, this redistribution of value creates objective linkages and networks between people living in different areas. Does this, along with many other processes, create the conditions through which transnational relations among working and
popular classes can form (Struna, 2009)? It remains to be seen how these contradictory dynamics of capitalist globalization will yield new avenues of working class organization and solidarity, or help to build global consciousness. To understand the nature of these contradictory relations and their particular forms I turn now to examine their contours in parts of the Caribbean.

Case Studies: The Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica

The transnational remittance market has spread worldwide, taking up what are often similar market strategies and patterns, though affected by numerous particularities of course. Caribbean nations and their societies have different profiles and background, and economic conditions as well as state policies at different times have greatly impacted migration. Early on it was the 1965 U.S. Immigration Act that began easing barriers to visas and other kinds of restrictions for Caribbean migrants, as well as admitting refugees and asylum seekers (Hernández, 2002).

In the 1980s, Dominican emigration—and to a larger extent Haitian emigration—accelerated due to economic crises on the island and the decline of the sugar industry, and as economic opportunities existed abroad and became more apparent with the rise of globalization and more interconnected diaspora networks. Rising internal emigration within the Caribbean also occurred, as with the rising number of Haitian workers migrating to the Dominican Republic, some of whom therein also partake in the sending remittances. Changing economic conditions also altered the kinds of work and conditions faced by migrant laborers. As one OECD report explained, this period “witnessed a reduction in the importance of sugar production in the Dominican economy, encouraging many Haitian
immigrants to move to other sectors including construction, trade, manufacture and domestic service” (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 234).

In the global era, the population of the Dominican Republic became an important source of emigrant labor in areas of the U.S. and Puerto Rico. Interestingly, the Dominican Republic has had a higher rate of female emigration as compared with some nearby countries (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 85), reflecting the deepening of gendered forms of exported labor within the country (Mies, 1986). A number of scholarly studies in recent years have looked at gendered labor and migration patterns emerging from the Caribbean (Condon, 1998). Just as the out-migration of Dominicans and Haitians intensified, the Caribbean diasporic community grew in its significance, especially in terms of remittances. Seeking to support or remain connected with families and others in their country of origin, it has become common for emigrants sought to send back goods or money transfers. As we have seen, concurrent with this, new technology and organizations have developing that could facilitate and profit off of the rapid transfer these flows.

Similar to many other countries at the time, TNCs began expanding into the Dominican Republic in the 1990s. By the 2000s, money transfers passing through the transnational remittance industry accounted for more than 7% of GDP, with an estimated 10% of families receiving them (Oficina Nacional de Estadísticas de la República Dominicana, 2002). This data suggests that remittances are now fundamental to the nation, as its society and economy are integrated ever deeper into transnational dynamics.

As researchers explain: for lower income populations especially, remittances have become vital for sustaining demand, stabilizing the economy during downturns, and mitigating the effects of low wage levels and weak social safety nets (Ondetti, 2012). The
remittance relation thus has become a key structural feature of the global society. Since 1990, the Dominican Republic has experienced a large growth in remittance inflows reflecting the significant number of Dominican laborers that have moved abroad. Remittances increased from $0.8 billion in 1995 to $3.7 billion in 2013 (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 236). OECD researchers explain, “Following nearly three decades of large-scale emigration to the United States, transnational ties – including but not limited to remittances – have solidified an identity among the Dominicans” through new political, cultural, and social dimensions (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 236).

In the Dominican Republic, the major transnational remittances corporations, Western Union and MoneyGram, largely operate through local agents (Suki, 2004). In addition, as Suki (2004: 17) explains, “Dominican ‘corridor’ specialists such as La Nacional, Quisqueyana, BHD Corp. and Cibao Express exist because of the concentration of the Dominican community in New York City and the tri-state area (New York, New Jersey and Connecticut). In many cases, the same company owns both the remitting side of the transaction and the distributing agent.” While these “Dominican corridor” remittance companies have profited from their special linkages with Dominican diaspora communities in New York and New Jersey, they are also interconnected with global finance and banking interests (Suki, 2004).

The expansion in remittances is reflected in Dominican state policies toward emigrants, with policies favoring the diaspora’s investment and economic interaction in their homeland. Underscoring the importance that Dominican state technocrats assign to economic linkages with the diaspora, in 1994 a constitutional amendment recognized dual nationality, in 1997 the right to vote was extended to overseas Dominicans, and in 2010 the
Dominican constitution created overseas congressional seats. Figure 3 below showcases the importance of remittances also on a local level, documenting the spending patterns of remittance receiving communities in the Dominican Republic (OECD Development Centre, 2009, p. 236).

Figure 3: Principal Use of Remittances in the Dominican Republic, 2004 (Percentage of total current expenditures)


While the Haitian emigrant population grew tremendously in the latter part of the 20th century, especially in the United States, Canada, and France, it was not until the latter part of the 1990s that the reverse flow of remittances sent to Haiti began to grow rapidly. Whereas transnational remittance corporations had permeated the Caribbean region in the early 1990s, they lagged behind in Haiti due in part to the instability caused by the 1991 coup d’etat. After the constitutionally elected government returned in 1995, the country’s economic situation improved slowly (though was soon again plunged into political tumult with another coup in 2004 and then hit by a massive earthquake in 2010). Even under these conditions the remittance market in the country began to expand, going from $108 million in
inflows in 1995, to around $672 million in 2001, to $1 billion in 2006, to nearly $2 billion in 2012 (Orozco, 2006, pp. 5-6; IDB, 2012, p. 20). Compared with other important macro-economic indicators, a large swath of the country’s population has become dependent on remittances for their livelihood. Consequently, newly enforced taxes on remittances are highly unpopular among Haitians (Haiti Support Group, 2013).

The number of Haitian emigrants living in the Dominican Republic has also risen rapidly in recent decades, which by 2005 was estimated to number at least 600,000 (Orozco, 2006). In recent years, Dominican state elites have enacted xenophobic and racist state policies meant to further securitize and contain Haitian emigrants as supra-exploited workers. It is useful here to see recent developments in the context of historical patterns of labor repression in the country. Past authoritarian regimes in the Dominican Republic decades ago developed apparatuses to repress Haitian migrants, even as Dominican policymakers undertook bilateral agreements (convenios) with the Haitian government to allow entrance to Haitian immigrants for specified times. This even occurred during periods when the Dominican Republic faced labor shortages for its large sugar plantations. Yet, as a result of long-term emigration patterns, permanent settlements called bateyes gradually developed. In spite of this, in recent years new repressive state policies have meant to further repress these migrant workers, such as the 2013 ruling of the country’s supreme court that revoked the citizenship of Dominican-born children of unauthorized migrants dating back generations (Garcia, 2013). These new state policies have cast further repression upon and diminished the rights of super-exploited Haitian emigrant workers and their communities.
Scholarly studies have examined the changing networks that have emerged between emigrant communities and their families abroad, linked by family visits, small investments, organizational connections, and communication over the telephone and Internet (Orozco, 2006; Baldassar and Merla, 2013). A variety of cultural connections and hybrid phenomena have come about, all of which necessarily affect class relations. The lack of economic opportunities at home and the lure of economic prosperity abroad, alongside periods of instability and destabilization, have together shaped Haitian emigration trends. Similarly, job opportunities abroad and the increasing communication between domestic and diasporic populations have both promoted emigration.

In this atmosphere, remittances form a vital material linkage that alters social relations, as they objectively link populations together through the cross-border redistribution of income. Yet remittances separate the earning of wages from the sites of wage-generated consumption. As with the cases of other emigrant and emigrant sending communities, this brings into question: how do remittances affect the social and class relations of receivers and senders? Some research suggests that as high as one in five households in Haiti have received remittances, with the average annual amount of these remittances nearing $2,000 (Orozco, 2006, p. 6). Researchers found that Haitians who sent remittances were predominately under the age of 40 and equally divided along the basis of gender. Since more banks and institutions that serve as agents of the major remittance companies are based in Haiti’s cities, rural communities in Haiti have far less access to withdrawing money transfers (Orozco, 2006, p. 1).

Competition between remittance companies in Haiti has become intense. Many companies, as in other parts of the Caribbean, are subsidiaries of formal financial institutions
such as banks and building societies and often operate as local agents for major TNCs such as Western Union (Todoroki, et al, 2009).

In contrast to migratory patterns from Haiti, out-migration from Jamaica was for many decades geared toward Britain, but with Jamaica’s independence, a growing number of Jamaican emigrants exported their labor to North American markets. As of 1990, the U.S. census placed the total number of documented Jamaican-Americans at 435,025. A number of scholarly studies have traced the history and changing patterns of Jamaican migration (Hahamovitch, 2013; Matthews, 2013). Prior to 1990, Jamaica’s formal remittance market entailed the government postal services, commercial banks, and building societies. The penetration of transnational remittance corporations into the country in the early 1990s occurred concurrently with a growing Jamaican diaspora community. For example, Jamaican migrants who live in the U.S. has increased from 27,000 in 1960 to 576,000 in 2000. In turn, this scenario represented an attractive investment opportunity for TNCs such as Western Union and MoneyGram.

Western Union first began to operate in the country through a local agent in late 1990. During this time, the company came to control a significant share of the formal remittance market around the world. Over time, new and older money transfer operators in Jamaica followed suit, seeking to operate as local agents for globally active remittance companies. A flood of transnationally oriented companies now target the diasporic markets. A study by the Bank of Jamaica explains:

The duopolistic dominance of the Grace Kennedy-Western Union alliance [GKRS-WU], resulted in existing Commercial Banks and Building Societies
adopting aspects of their business model. As such, these institutions resorted to acting as agents for the international money transfer companies. By the end of October 2008 there were (12) remittance companies, (2) building societies and (1) commercial bank acting as agents on behalf of thirty (30) international money transfer companies. (McLean, 2008, p. 5)

By the time of the Jamaican bank study, GKRS-WU, the local agent of Western Union, accounted for over 70% of remittance companies’ inflows and approximately 50% of the entire local remittance market in Jamaica. As one study explained, “this rapid increase is largely attributed to Western Union’s increased economies of scale attributable to its worldwide expansion in the number of agent locations as well as the introduction of electronic money transfer system” (McLean, 2008, p. 6).

The other major player in the remittance market in Jamaica has been JNBS, which in 2002 had nearly 9% of the remittance market in Jamaica, but by 2008 had increased to nearly 14%. JNBS’s success has been rooted in the significant growth of remittances sent back to Jamaica from the UK-based diaspora. Both companies have historic roots in the country, which allows transnational capitalist appropriation of a part of migrant workers income to operate under a local appearance. JNBS was originally founded in 1874, just over three decades after the abolition of slavery on the island. As the availability and potential profits from small, uncultivated and abandoned lands were surpassed by the growth of the labor force and larger plantations (Bakan, 1990, p. 18), institutions such as JNBS were important in the process of reconstituting segments of the lower classes as wage dependent.
Regulation of remittances did not begin in Jamaica until the 21st century, following the events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. and the reemphasis of “global best practice” requirements by the financial action task force (FATF). The Jamaican state extended these statutory obligations to the remittance market in 2002. With the passage of amendments to the Bank of Jamaica Act in February 2004, Jamaica then established a regulatory regime that required remittance services to initially be approved by the Minister of Finance. These reforms thus complied with the new standards being pushed by a variety of transnationally oriented elites with the aim of standardizing a part of the accumulation process in different nations. The regulations resulted in a few smaller companies exiting the market or merging their operations with larger counterparts, while the number of global remittance corporations that utilize local agencies increased (McLean, 2008, p. 10). By 2007, remittances were around 15.3% of Jamaica’s GDP (11), approximately equal to earnings from tourism. Remittance flows also averaged more than twice the amount of foreign direct investment inflows. By all accounts, remittances have come to represent a major foreign currency source for Jamaica, as well as for Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and other nations in the Caribbean.

**Advancement of Money Transfers: From Telegram to Telephone to Computer**

Transferring money changed significantly through Internet technology and the formation of TNCs. Agents around the world and instantaneous domestic and cross-border financial services have allowed for immediate and widespread individual access to banking and money transfer. Utilizing computer technology in 1989, Western Union introduced its quick collect system in which creditors could promptly secure transfers both inside and
outside of the U.S. as well. In recent decades, Western Union shifted its business model to become the premier *global* money transfer company. With declining profits and mounting debts, Western Union slowly began to divest itself of telecommunications-based assets beginning in the early 1980s. Backing deregulation in the U.S. and in other countries, Western Union began expanding outside of the U.S. and European markets. Reinventing itself as a global brand, Western Union officials set up agent operations internationally to become “the fastest way to send money worldwide.” By 1980, Western Union’s revenue from domestic money transfers exceeded telegram service revenue for the first time. Then, in 1989, it introduced rapid international money transfers. Already by the late 1980s and into the early 1990s (at the time of a savings and loan crisis and other events in this conjuncture), the company was in dire economic straits, which ultimately led to a declaration of bankruptcy in 1994 and companywide restructuring, after which it dropped its telegram service and became “thoroughly revamped” and geared toward global financial transactions and money transfers. Whereas “The company’s message-sending business had become a part of U.S. culture.. its corporate roots became a thing of the past when all of its telecommunications businesses were divested during the reorganization. Once stripped of these businesses, Western Union was left to concentrate exclusively on financial services…” (Covell, 2003)

In 1995, Western Union was acquired by First Data Corporation, and in 2000 it launched its website, providing “fast, convenient ways to send money online” worldwide. Over these years and into the 21st century, the company grew extraordinarily. In 2006, Western Union became an independent company and began trading on the New York Stock Exchange. Its cross-border business-to-business activities expanded greatly, such as with its
acquisition of Custom House in 2009 and its acquisition of Travelex Global Business Payments in 2011 (Western Union, 2014). Wide arrays of TNCs and global investors are now major stockowners in the company. For example, hedge fund magnate Warren Buffet owns $10 million in shares. Companies with larger shareholdings in Western Union include Schroders, a London-based transnational asset management company; the Los Angeles-based Capital Research Global Investors, one of the largest global investment firms with around $1 trillion under management; Vanguard, which boasts of being the world’s largest mutual fund company; and, the U.S.-based Fidelity Investment which administers and manages trillions in assets (Fidelity website, 2014). The list goes on, with many of the largest stockowners being U.S.- and UK-based financial firms. These firms in turn have stockholders from around the world.

By 2006, Western Union was managing 18% of money transfers globally. By 2013, Western Union was operating over the Internet, telephone, and from more than 115,000 ATMs and over 515,000 agent locations in 200 countries and territories, with around 9,600 employees.1 With its economy of scale stretching worldwide, Western Union has secured a competitive advantage in the industry. As their website states, their business model “aims to move money anytime, anywhere and anyway our customers choose” (Western Union, 2014). The dynamics of Western Union have changed over the course of its history, from the leading U.S. telegraph company in the latter 19th century and much of the 20th century, to a company that repositioned and altered its business model with the emergence of globalization and the associated technological and organizational improvements. As the data below shows, Western union has gone from revenues of $399.5 million in 1970 to $5.664 billion in 2012 (though not adjusted for inflation.)
Figure 4: Revenue and net income (in millions) of Western Union

![Graph showing revenue and net income growth over time.]

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

The largest competitor with Western Union has been MoneyGram International Inc., which was founded in 1940 to process money orders. By the late 1980s, MoneyGram was rapidly expanding its international activities. In 1988, Viad Corp, the parent company of Travelers Express, purchased MoneyGram, only to then spin this off as a publicly traded company (MoneyGram, 2010). As of 2013, MoneyGram had 293,000 agent locations in 197 countries, employing more than 2,350 people around the world. As the below data shows, MoneyGram’s revenues expanded rapidly throughout the final years of the 20th century and early years of the 21st century. Even after declining massively during the period of the global financial crisis less than a decade ago, MoneyGram has again begun to increase its revenues. Substantial restructuring in recent years has not hindered its growth, and as of 2013, the company maintained a strong position – cash and cash equivalents of $2.23 billion and net receivable of $767.7 million. MoneyGram achieved these numbers while it continued to pay
off large loans and even expanded into numerous other geographic areas to operate through “domestic” agents (MGI Analyst Report, 2014).

Figure 5: Revenue and net income (in millions) of MoneyGram, 1997-2012

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

In recent decades, a number of new tech firms have entered the remittance market. The most well known of these is Boom Financial Inc., which was founded in 2008, and the Silicon Valley-based Xoom Corp, which was founded in 2001. These major firms, along with other factors, have caused downward pressure on commissions in the industry (MGI- Analyst Report, 2014). While Xoom has become active in 30 countries, Boom, has grown to reach 130 countries. These corporations operate mainly through local agents, who are not as easily accessible as Western Union or MoneyGram yet often provide lower surcharges. Without as many agent locations, these companies also heavily rely upon Internet technology. Although the revenues of these companies are small compared to Western
Union and MoneyGram, they have good potential to grow, as the data below shows the rise of Xoom’s revenues from $26.2 million in 2009 to $122.2 million in 2013.

Figure 6: Revenue and net income (in thousands) of Xoom, 2009-2013

Source: Company tax records obtained by the author through the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

As tax documents from these companies show, directors and executive officers of these transnational remittance corporations have worked for a host of other TNCs active in finance, remittances, resource extraction, and other major industries. The owners and managers of the transnational remittance corporations, namely Western Union and its major competitors, form part of a tiny capitalist elite that increasingly competes on a transnational level (Peetz & Murray, 2012; Robinson, 2014).
TNC Penetration of Caribbean Money Transfers

Through the era of global capitalism, TNCs and financial institutions have penetrated national markets around the world. These transnational enterprises benefit both from economies of scale, which is the cost advantages they obtain due to size, throughput (the amount of material or items passing through a system), and from the deregulation and privatization of national markets by elites operating through various state apparatuses. They have been successful at incorporating huge populations into new market relations, including within the Caribbean and its diaspora, such as with the remittances services of TNCs instead of traditional banks. Earlier more static, less accessible, and often more state linked banking systems came to conflict with transnational realities. The social standpoints and immigration status of workers using these services also often prevents them from using conventional banking. The exportation of labor and the reverse flow of remittances have thus become fundamental to the Caribbean’s relationship to global capitalism. The cross-border money transfers of the remittance TNCs now surpass the money transfers conducted through bank branches. They are even larger than official development assistance as well as private debt and portfolio equity flows. Remittances represent a third of GDP for many small countries such as Haiti (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 5).

Many state elites, meanwhile, have sought to manage the exportation of emigrant labor in ways that benefit transnational capital and ensure their own social reproduction in a manner that is linked with the global economy (Rodriguez, 2010). Often in concert with transnational capital, policymakers often promote remittances as vital parts of their economies and global integration. As Segovia (2002) has argued, remittances deposited by their receivers in privatized local banks have helped local state elites gain loans from
international financial institutions. As Ho (1999, p. 34) observes, “postcolonial Caribbean governments contribute to the transnational traffic by treating immigration as a safety valve for surplus labor and by emphasizing capital rather than human resources in their development plans.”

While local businesses and banks still play a role in the remittance of money, often serving as a pay-out or pick-up location for the receiver or sender, they essentially serve as agents for the much larger TNCs that carry out the actual cross-border transfer. For instance, in the Caribbean the new transnational remittance industry now dominates the older bank money transfer systems. This contrasts with the years prior to the 1990s, when the transnational remittance industry had not taken shape and traditional banks conducted transfers through a slow and cumbersome process. In the Dominican Republic, for example, only 1% of money transfers go through commercial banks, while 92% of total remittances pass through licensed money transfer companies. These licensed money transfer companies are either TNCs, such as Western Union and MoneyGram, or operate as the local agents of TNCs.

While at first glance, local agents may appear to be locally-oriented, they are in fact deeply integrated with circuits of global capital accumulation. For example, the Jamaica National Building Society (JNBS) has operated as an agent of MoneyGram since 1991 (JNBS, 2010). Originally founded in 1874 with deep colonial connections, JNBS still ranks among Jamaica’s largest financial institutions. In recent decades, the company has realigned itself in the globally interspersed market through various rapid money transactions. JNBS capitalizes on the Jamaican population in the global diaspora, serving as a valuable partner for MoneyGram.
In another example, in the Dominican Republic, the company Caribe Express is the local agent of XOOM. In 2013, as the author found firsthand, Caribe Express charged a 5% commission on remittances sent through Xoom, whereas Western Union charged 8% approximately. Yet the number of Caribe Express locations was far fewer than those of Western Union. Although Western Union usually charges a higher percentage than its competitors, its agents are more accessible. In addition, Western Union far surpasses its competitors in its name recognition and volume of remittances.

Table 2: Migrant Remittance Inflows (US$ million), Caribbean countries, 1970 to 2013

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<tr>
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The above World Bank data shows the massive increase of remittance flows in recent decades. In fact, cultural and social expectations of reciprocity among senders and receivers appear to make the flows resistant to “moral” risk considerations present in other financial flows. So much so that remittances are less volatile in relation to other foreign exchange earnings. World Bank researchers have thus argued they serve as an important cushion for local economies and communities. Sirkeci et al. explain, “At the national level,
remittances help offset current account deficits and shore up international reserves” (2012, p. xv). However, remittances can also add to the depreciation of local currency (Sirkeci et al., 2012, p. 5). Remittances also serve to perpetuate an increasingly unequal and unsustainable global system, with its own novelties and contradictions, as I discuss below in the conclusion.

**Conclusion: Emigrant Remittances and the Accumulation of Transnational Capital through Redistributed Value**

Through the era of globalization, alongside the major technological and organizational advancements and the increased movement of skilled and unskilled emigrants, the remittance industry and the exportation of labor have undergone unparalleled growth. New emigration patterns have resulted in a reverse flow of remittances that have become a major pillar of the global economy, especially for lower income regions. Indeed, the magnitude of money transfers stretches beyond the official remittance market, as official data collected on money transfers does not include other forms of “in-kind” remittances, such as goods or money shipped or brought in person to relatives abroad or by “mules” as people that are paid to transport goods or money. While a variety of survival and supplemental strategies have been utilized by working people in the global era, remittances have been among the most important. Yet this has also led to ensuring a potentially problematic reality, which Cabezas describes as “dependence on outside relationships to generate an extra cash flow for families or for household survival” (2009, p. 66). While occurring as a form of transnational social integration, the objective relation of remittance sender and remittance receiver leads to what Garni and Weyher (2013) describe as a
“mystified” class relationship, where there occurs a separation between the site of waged labor and waged generated consumption. Furthermore, it is through this relation that transnational capital and transnationally oriented state elites appropriate part of the redistributed value of emigrant labor once it is channeled through the remittance industry. As dominant groups profit in this uneven and ferocious cycle, they seek to “capitalize on the alienation of humanity and their primary response to that alienation—migration and the remittances it generates” (Garni & Weyher, 2013, p. 66). State elites meanwhile have come to depend upon such transnational processes for their own social reproduction (Rodriguez, 2010; Sprague, 2012b). In a sense, dominant groups have been able to profit doubly, capitalizing on the surplus labor of emigrant workers as well as the redistributed value through their remittances.

Large swaths of population, especially in regions such as the Caribbean, have become structurally unemployed and face a relative absence of productive relations. In turn, remittances serve an even more important function for individual and community survival. While they gain new objective relations that are transnational in nature, these communities develop new dependencies, which in turn can achieve a pacifying effect (Garni & Weyher, 2013). Although some may skimp by with remittances sent from family members abroad, communities in poor regions such as the Caribbean still suffer from high levels of unemployment and under-employment. Remittance-receiving communities survive yet while increasingly separated from actual processes of material production. As populations undergo disruption brought on by restructuring associated with the global economy, remittance flows reduce the local social costs for adjustment and promote market relations. In an economic sense, states can utilize remittances to ease the state’s disengagement from
social investment. Remittances thus serve as “‘safety nets’ that replace governments and fixed employment in the provision of economic security” (Robinson, 2003, p. 208). Not only does this “free up” the state from its responsibilities, remittance flows also, as Garni and Weyher observe, help to dissipate social tensions as they provide a small lifeline to struggling lower-income populations. Among other regions, the Caribbean has witnessed a complete transformation of the way in which money is transferred across borders. As the Caribbean diaspora increased exponentially over the latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st century, this precipitated significant increases in remittance flows back into the region. Transnational capital has in turn sought to profit from facilitating this phenomenon and appropriating a portion of the redistributed value of remittance flows from the working poor. The contradictory nature of this phenomenon will be undoubtedly bound up in the future ways in which global and Caribbean societies develop.

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Notes

1 This information is from the website: Transnationale, available online at: http://www.transnationale.org/companies/western_union.php


3 This is according to data released by the Dominican agency ENHOGAR (La Encuesta Nacional de Hogares de Propósitos Múltiples).

4 While remittances outflows from these countries were much smaller than inflows, some countries such as Jamaica, Haiti, and the Bahamas all had sizeable outflows in 2012. These were $232 million, $310 million, and $140 million from Haiti, Jamaica, and the Bahamas, respectively.
In Jamaica the term “barrel children” has come into existence, to describe children who “survive on barrels of goodies shipped by migrants parents chiefly from the United States” (Pollard, 2005: 24).
Chapter IV

Export Processing and Globally Competitive Production in the Caribbean

A key part of the globalization process has been the creation of demarcated zones of production for the global market. In the Caribbean by the 1970s and 1980s, these spaces began to serve as platforms for new relations of production associated with the globalizing economy. As one researcher elaborates, these new productive spaces “in recent decades . . . have been used by many developing countries to help manage a larger strategic transition from a highly protected, inward-oriented domestic economic policy, to a liberalized, globally integrated, outward-oriented domestic economy” (Lang, 2010, p. 7). These new productive spaces, which came to be known initially as Free Trade Zones (FTZs) but are now more widely known as Export Processing Zones (EPZs), were formed as specific locations where foreign and local industrial tenants could receive special tax and trade privileges so as to produce competitively for the global market. While capital came to move more freely through these new zones, these locations also served as sites to exploit and take advantage of local pools of underdeveloped labor on a major scale. By promoting low wage compliant labor forces as a “comparative advantage,” transnationally oriented state elites and capitalists have used EPZs as a mechanism to reshape and restructure productive relations as an integrated part of the global economy. Through such dynamics laboring groups around the world have become objectively linked through global chains of production. Horizontally integrated and geographically diffuse global production networks have spread rapidly through EPZs; wherein the labor power of workers is incorporated into
transnational value chains, which in turn are controlled by transnational corporations (TNCs).

EPZs were meant initially (according to policymakers at the time) to help alleviate the problem of unemployment and generate foreign exchange (Lang, 2010, p. 14), but over the proceeding decades they have become part of a deeper developmental model that reshapes societies and economies, orienting them toward globally competitive markets and enriching a small number of capitalists and elites. As spaces within national states linked into global chains of production, they serve as a “form of export promotion, to liberalize and jumpstart their economies and as a way to enter the global economy through international trade” (Virgill, 2009, p. 2). The purpose of the EPZ has been thus to “invigorate economies’ exporting capabilities and capacity” (Virgill, 2009, p. 183), leading to increased TNC power sheltered from local state policies that could potentially uphold labor standards and local constituencies. Business operations within EPZs, for example, are extended preferential tax treatment, preferential duty treatment, a liberal regulatory environment, enhanced physical infrastructure, direct subsidies, as well as other incentives such as export promotion services, and streamlined administration procedures for imports and exports.

While some EPZs in the Caribbean have succeeded in attracting investors during certain periods over recent decades, others have stagnated or lost industrial tenants when labor costs have risen or preferential market access has diluted. According to Moberg (2014, p. 2), some EPZs in the region have faced difficulties such as poor infrastructure quality, bad locations, insufficient zone size, inadequate roads, unreliable power supplies, congestion, inadequate maintenance, lack of effective advertisement to entice companies into the EPZ, poor policy coordination, lack of tax incentives, excessive bureaucracy, and labor
difficulties. EPZs are the production sites of roughly 20% of global trade in recent years (SZ Jug, 2013). As of 1987, there were 175 EPZs in 53 countries, yet, by 1995, there were 500 EPZs in 73 countries (Schrank, 2001, p. 223), and by 2007 there were at least 3,000 EPZs in 135 countries (Boyenge, 2007). Similarly, employment in EPZs grew from 22.5 million people employed in 1997 to 43 million people in 2003 (Sargent & Matthews, 2009). As of 2008, EPZs were believed to account for $200 billion in global exports (FIAS, 2008). Near the turn of the century, furthermore, Mexico and the United States had the most EPZs worldwide, with 107 in the former and 213 in the latter (ILO, 1998). Meanwhile, China has become a center of global capitalist accumulation (Harris, 2009), and is now the largest site of EPZ production, benefiting from its advanced infrastructure and large, disciplined, low-wage workforce (Fu & Gao, 2007). Whereas nearly half of worldwide EPZ production takes place in these three countries, other regions such as the Caribbean have also seen a growth in the number of zones and continued attempts to deepen the export-processing model.

The importance of the industrial sector for Caribbean economies increased throughout the 1970s, 80s, and into the early 90s. Between 1984 and 1990, industrial exports from Caribbean EPZs to the U.S. market grew from 22 to 50 percent of the total Caribbean exports to the U.S. (Klak, 1995, p. 298). Between 1976 and 1988, the per capita U.S. dollar value of industrial exports for eight Caribbean countries grew fourfold. Yet, in recent decades, the region has faced stiff global competition. The Dominican Republic, has been one of the most successful in integrating with the global capitalist economy, as the value added by the industrial sector was 21.92% of GDP in 1965 and by 1991 had grown to 36.36% (Kushnir, 2013). However, with the rising importance of other economic sectors
(such as remittances, finance, tourism, and the service sector), the overall importance of industrial production for the region began to decline during the 1990s and into the new century. In Jamaica, for instance, the value added by the industrial sector was 37.11% of GDP in 1993 but had shrunk to 20.82% in 2012 (Kushnir, 2013). While Dominican EPZ production has grown faster than in Jamaica and much of the rest of the Caribbean, it has undergone difficulties in recent years, with the value added by the Dominican industrial sector dropping from 37.42% of GDP in 1998 to 31.17% in 2012 (Kushnir, 2013). As a reflection of these trends, the number of workers and companies active in Caribbean EPZs has fluctuated over recent decades. In some nations, such as in Jamaica and Haiti, EPZ manufacturing has declined or stagnated in recent years, whereas in other parts of the region, such as in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, EPZ production has gone through up and downs. Despite the earlier rise and more recent shrinkage of the sector, export processing remains a vital part of the region’s economy and policymakers’ plans for the future, as evidenced by the constant initiatives to expand and renew the sector.

Not only large foreign-based TNCs are active in the region’s EPZ production. Locally based capitalists have also profited by operating as contractors, local agents, or distributors for TNCs. This underscores the broader reshaping of class society in recent years as local capitalist sectors integrate into transnational production networks. Through such processes of capitalist class integration across borders, leading Caribbean business leaders have become transnational capitalists themselves with global financial portfolios (and often business chains that stretch across the Caribbean and into other regions as well). As Robinson (2009, p. 103) explains:
These forms of participation have opened up space for local investors and small-scale entrepreneurs to integrate into transnational production chains. The industrial activity of transnational corporations (TNCs) generates demand for a host of suppliers as industrial production is increasingly fragmented and organized through networks of outsourcing and subcontracting.

New regional forums and agreements have been vital for these integrative relations. State policymakers have facilitated these new regional forums in order to allow for industries to take continued advantage of tax breaks and poor labor standards. Heavy investments from national and supranational state apparatuses have sought continuously to stimulate EPZ operations. Throughout the formation of new economic forums, transnational capital has played a decisive role in crafting legislation: lobbying for, and in turn benefiting from, their adoption by state apparatuses. Novel and far-reaching policies have set up investment provision that eliminated many restrictions, performance requirements, and many domestic content laws. (Cox, 2008, p. 1537). In addition to EPZs being promoted by capital through new regional integration policies, they have also been promoted by states. The formation and expansion of EPZs is not only the product of local state elites, but also forms a part of the policies pursued by officials from the U.S., other states, and supranational institutions. Different institutions within national states and other agencies have served to internalize transnational governance patterns, operated by elites who have become transnationally-oriented over recent decades (Jayasuriya, 1999). State policymakers
over recent decades have come more and more to see transnational capital as a foremost source of investment and tax revenue.

For the Caribbean, the first of the major economic forums, meant to deepen the region’s integration with the globalizing economy, was the Caribbean Basin Plan (CBI). Launched in 1982, it was facilitated by U.S. policymakers under the Reagan administration. The CBI sought to stave off alternative and revolutionary tendencies in the Caribbean, while deepening U.S. influence and the region’s integration into the globalizing economy. The CBI injected dollar loans (used largely to meet payments on existing debt), “free trade” regimes for a limited number of Caribbean exports, and a new set of tax breaks that were designed to attract the investment of U.S.-based multinational corporations. Interestingly, Haiti was the first state to accept the CBI, as it had “no genuinely national development program . . . to delay or modify the adoption of the latest U.S. sponsored economic initiative” (Manigat, 1997, p. 87). As other Caribbean states came under pressure, they soon signed onto the new economic forum.

Although a select few have benefitted immensely through capital’s reorganization in the region, the vast majority of workers and communities connected with industries, such as those operating through EPZs, face precarious and low-income conditions. Yet with high levels of unemployment, many working people have few options. Those benefiting meanwhile include major transnational conglomerates as well as local factory owners who contract out with TNCs and the “emerging transnational class of intermediaries running EPZ promotion agencies” (Neveling, 2014, p. 194). By tethering their own social reproduction to global production networks, some such groups directly benefit from maintaining and expanding the export-processing model. Meanwhile, sales and marketing companies push
the “culture-ideology of consumerism” (Sklair, 2012), sustaining a consumer base for corporate branded commodities often produced in these low-wage facilities. It is important to note that these consumer groups no longer exist only in so-called developed nations, but in developing nations as well (Robinson, 2008). All the while, these processes occur alongside a heightened social alienation and exploitation of labor (Robinson, 2003). Next, I will look at how the EPZ model of development has undergone important changes over recent decades and how EPZs serve as a vital mechanism and integrative space for the re-orientation of locally based capitalists toward transnational capitalist flows.

**Evolution of Export Processing in the Globalizing Caribbean**

Throughout the Caribbean’s colonial era, traditional export industries specialized in agricultural products such as sugar and tobacco. In turn, various entry and exit points and warehouses existed where goods were stored and shipped. By the mid-20th century, agricultural output increased thanks to the advent of new industrial technology; this involved the development of high-yielding hybrid crops and new pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers, and railroads that connected inland hubs and major ports. The highly exploitive relations of the rural economies of the Caribbean during this earlier phase of capitalism (the international phase of capitalism) have been well documented, such as in the documentary *Bitter Cane* (Arcelin, 1983). In the post-war period early U.S. attempts to develop low wage manufacturing in Puerto Rico were made by the Truman administration. Facilitated by the U.S. government, Puerto Rico’s political establishment under the Partido Popular Democrático abandoned import substitution policies and instead pushed for export-oriented development. Capital and state policymakers closely oversaw the new initiative (Neveling,
2014). A vast new set of experimental policies developed export manufacturing on the island by appealing to U.S. corporations:

The Puerto Rican development corporation Fomento contracted the US consulting firm Arthur D. Little in order to convince mainland capitalists of the benefits of investments in Puerto Rico. Significant investment packages including tax and customs holidays, low rate leases of purpose built Fomento factories and so forth were advertised with a full-on marketing operation across the US-nationwide. Already in 1947, Textron, a rising giant in the era of mergers after 1945, relocated spinning mills to Puerto Rico and fired thousands of workers in the US northeast. Other US corporations like General Electrics for example would soon follow. The Truman administration used the immediate success of Puerto Rican development policies to advertise its Point Four development programme globally. Throughout the 1950s and even more so under the Alliance for Progress that the Kennedy administration introduced after the failed invasion in Cuba, thousands of officials from Third World countries were flown to Puerto Rico to visit zones of “modern manufacturing“ and learn how similar progress could be achieved. (Neveling, 2014, pp. 8-9)

During the 1960s, similar EPZ models began to develop in US-allied nations in the developing world, such as in Taiwan and in Northern Mexico (Neveling, 2014, p. 9). By the 1970s, the Caribbean was an opportune location for manufacturing with its surplus of cheap
labor and geographic proximity to the North American consumer market. Facilitated largely by U.S.-based multinational corporations, manufacturing in the region began to rapidly expand.

Initially, EPZs took the form of industrial estates that frequently occupied 100 hectares or less. For the most part, other than functioning as a mechanism for exploiting local labor, they were highly isolated from the domestic societies where they operated, specifically in terms of geography, specialized regulations, and sparse linkages to local economies (Lang, 2010, pp. 12-13). During the 1970s and 80s, state officials closely controlled who could operate in the zones. Focused on industrial production, businesses in the EPZs engaged primarily in light manufacturing and processed apparel, textiles, and footwear for export to foreign markets. Lower income populations in developing nations were traditionally excluded from the consumption of EPZ products (Lang, 2010, pp. 12-13).

By the early 1980s, both import substitution industrialization and traditional export industries underwent significant difficulties, as states in the developing world faced rising debts and financial pitfalls. As a response to these economic instabilities, in nations across the developing world there occurred a trend toward expanding non-traditional exports and the development of EPZs. EPZs grew as manufacturing hubs and attracted global investors, through their provision of “low-cost production, easy market access, and a business climate conducive to foreign direct investment” (Long, 1987, p. 64). Suiting both the interests of transnationally-oriented capitalists and transnationally-oriented state elites, EPZs have since become an increasingly central plank of developmental strategy. Not just in the Global South, EPZs are now becoming linked forward and backwards into local national markets. As the data below illustrates, Puerto Rico (closely integrated for more than a Century with
the U.S. market) is by far the most industrialized of the Caribbean islands. The Dominican Republic, which in recent decades has developed a robust network of EPZs, now has the region’s second largest industrial sector.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Industry, billion dollars (total: 90.4)</th>
<th>Share, of 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aruba</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cayman Islands</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Lucia</td>
<td>0.086</td>
<td>0.095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Kitts and Nevis</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Vincent and the Grenadines</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Virgin Islands</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominica</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks and Caicos Islands</td>
<td>0.042</td>
<td>0.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anguilla</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrat</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kushnir, 2013
As low-cost platforms for companies seeking to exploit cheap labor, EPZs have also developed through standardized laws and practices, such as cuts in tariffs and other duties. Export processing has been promoted as boosting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and foreign exchange, encouraging employment, leading to the transfer of technology, the upgrading workforces with new skills, fostering entrepreneurial practices, and encouraging a “demonstration effect” wherein domestic firms learn from foreign firms. Yet history has shown the EPZ model in particular and sweatshop manufacturing in general have not yielded the benefits that proponents have claimed. Although value added manufacturing has grown during certain time periods, it has occurred alongside rising inequality (Bales, 2012; Emersberger, 2015; Kloby, 2004).
The new export-processing model of the global era is vital to understand the transnationalization of capitalist production networks (Jequier, 1988). Businesses based in many different countries—and with investors from around the world—have become active in the Caribbean region through EPZs, often setting up or contracting out operations with other companies both domestically and abroad. The involvement of locally or regionally based businesses is also important because it shows the cross-border integration of capital. A UN report from the mid-1990s illuminates the web of capitalist interests involving Caribbean EPZs:

Export processing has attracted considerable local investment in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica . . . More than a quarter of the free zone companies in the Dominican Republic are owned by nationals of that country; they also employ approximately a quarter of the labour force. Jamaican entrepreneurs own nearly half the export processing establishments in that country, but the locally owned companies are much smaller on average than foreign-owned companies and therefore account for less than a quarter of total employment in the export processing sector. The absence of local ownership of export processing companies in Saint Lucia is due not to discrimination against native investors, but rather to a lack of interest on the part of local entrepreneurs . . . The United States, the main market for products of export processing plants in the subregion, is also the main source of overseas investment. The three countries have also attracted investment from the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong and several European countries.
Only the Dominican Republic is host to investment from Taiwan, province of China. (Willmore, 1996, p. 11)

In Jamaica, EPZ reforms have been promoted in recent years; the country’s half dozen Free Trade Zones (FTZs) expanded in 2015 into a network of 16 Special Economic Zones (SEZ), with a key difference being that the new SEZs no longer have the 15% cap on how much of the zone’s production can be sold within the country (R. Nugent, personal communication, 2014). This means that the zones now seek deeper linkages between transnational capitalists and the local economy, a model that follows the example of other countries, such as the Dominican Republic, where EPZs have established a wider presence and become more integrated into the country’s social fabric. In Haiti’s EPZs meanwhile, companies operate with zero taxes and tariffs, and are facilitated by UN and U.S. state subsidies, including, for example, the South Korean apparel manufacturer Sae-A (IDB, 2011; Shamsie, 2009). In recent decades, political crises and the crises caused by the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti have in fact been leveraged to develop new EPZs. This occurred, for example, in 2002 when Haiti’s hamstrung and undermined government agreed to develop the Ouanaminthe EPZ and, again, with the post-earthquake government in 2010 going along with U.S. and UN’s plans to develop another zone in Caracol.
Table Two: Number of EPZs in Caribbean nations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tob.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Concurrent with the growing number of EPZs, the actual functions of EPZs have also changed. In Jamaica, for example, officials promote EPZs to connect TNCs with local companies in order to produce for global, regional, and local markets. This new trend of producing for local markets in the EPZs is a reverse enclave development model, which fosters capitalist development that both integrates with the global economy and links directly with local consumption. Seeing the emergence of this trend early on, Willmore explained in the mid-1990s how sales to domestic consumers in the region had increased (Willmore, 1996, pp. 16-18). These developments exemplify the trend toward greater local-transnational capitalist integration as the global consumer market establishes a niche among the Caribbean population. The evolving transnational production model has become part and parcel of the shifting flows of global capitalism, with its manufacturing sites (EPZs) representing vital spaces through which global production processes penetrate and transform domestic economies. Next, I will discuss this interactive process in more detail.

**Intensification of Local-Transnational Business Linkages**

Through the context of the transnationalization of material production and the changing social and class relations at its core, we can better understand how national economies are enmeshed with the global economy. We can see such a relationship by looking at Caribbean EPZs and the capital operating through them. In this section, I will
look specifically at the growing interaction between TNCs and subcontractors that operate in Caribbean EPZs. A structural feature of export processing has been both the role of usually foreign based transnational companies and locally based subcontractors who are seeking linkages with large transnational capitalist chains of accumulation. In this way we can see how locally based capitalists are seeking to become transnationally oriented. Increasingly locally based capitalists are seeking to integrate their own class interests with the global economy, meaning that their own social reproduction becomes bound up with transnational capital. As Robinson observes, “the spread of diverse collaborative arrangements and interim partnerships . . . are a major mechanism of class integration across nation borders” (Robinson, 2004, p. 67). From a sociological and class analysis perspective, we can understand how capitalist formation and relations have congealed through processes of export processing.

Some of the largest TNCs in the clothing industry contract out production with companies based in the Caribbean. At a factory run by Genesis, S.A., which is owned by local Haitian industrialists and located near the Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti, operations are contracted out by the Canada based TNC Gildan Activewear. Since the late 1990s, Gildan has become the top distributor of 100% cotton T-shirts in the U.S. and many other countries worldwide. In 2013 Gildan Activewear had total sales of $1.9 billion annually and has been publicly listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1999. Gildan has bought up a number of competitors and older firms in the textile industry, and operates through an expanding network of contractors. In turn, some of the top investors within Gildan include major financial firms and hedge funds such as: Fidelity Investments (a TNC with $48.0 billion under management); Janus Enterprise, a publicly traded “smart growth” hedge fund
that invests mostly in equity securities worldwide; and Vanguard Total International Stock Index, a hedge fund that “tracks stock markets all over the globe” and invests heavily in emerging and developing markets. While Gildan operates and subcontracts with production plants in Bangladesh, Honduras, and other impoverished countries, a growing part of its manufacturing takes place in Haiti and the Caribbean. Violations of workers’ rights at the plants where Gildan’s clothing is produced have been well documented (Porter, 2014). The company has tried to sideline criticism and worker’s voices by rebranding itself and engaging in corporate responsibility publicity campaigns.

As of 2012, 584 companies operated in EPZs within the Dominican Republic. Completely exempt from taxes, duties, charges, and fees affecting production and export activities in the EPZs, slightly more than 40% of the companies were domiciled in the U.S., with many of the other companies active in the zones based in the Netherlands, Canada, Puerto Rico, the United Kingdom, and Korea. Dominican exports, over half of which come from the nation’s EPZs, totaled $4.99 billion in 2012, compared with $4.8 billion in 2011 (U.S. Department of State, 2014). In Haiti, by contrast, there are far fewer EPZs and a smaller number of active companies. Indeed, manufacturing in Haiti has declined since its “heyday” of the 1980s. Even during its “heyday”, with political crisis intensifying, the country’s socioeconomic indicators declined (Emersberger, 2014).

In Quanaminthe, Haiti, the location of an EPZ founded in 2003, the Dominican domiciled company, Grupo M, employs local workers through its CODEVI factory. Clothing produced at the plant is sold to TNCs such as Sara Lee, Nautica, Dockers, Fruit of the Loom, and Levi Strauss. Among some of the largest global clothing brands, these companies are infused with transnational capital. For example, in 2013, the TNC Levi
Strauss had annual sales of $4.68 billion among more than 110 countries. While the company has expanded globally through business relations with companies worldwide, its ownership structure is extremely centralized. 45% of the company’s stock is owned by the Haas family and another 250 relatives own nearly 43%. Family members’ charitable foundations and non-family directors and officers of Levi Strauss hold the remainder of the company’s stock (Forbes Staff, 2014).

Grupo M is just one of the many contractors that Levi Strauss utilizes. Currently, Grupo M employs 3,600 workers in the Dominican Republic and 7,000 workers in Haiti. As of 2004, its workers were paid at a minimum $12 for a six-day, 48-hour work week (Regan, 2004). The main owner of Grupo M, Dominican citizen Fernando Capellán, has explained how the company has undergone fundamental changes over the past three decades and become linked with hi-tech and transnational networks of production:

[His company’s] concerns transcend borders, being the first Dominican investor who settled in the Republic of Haiti, installing the CODEVI industrial park for the operation of manufacturing companies. Over the years it has also ventured into other sectors like real estate, besides being part of the board of the Metropolitan Hospital of Santiago and the Cibao International Airport, among other companies. He is also a member of the executive committee of the National Council of Private Enterprise (CONEP) and leads the Association of Industries of the Dominican Republic (AIRD) . . . In his almost 30 years, the business management model has changed: "We started with factories that, solely, were assemblies. Then we moved to modular
systems, giving way today to technology with more sophisticated management systems and planning programs" . . . [He] highlights the importance of *lean manufacturing*, a production model focused on creating flow to deliver maximum value to clients, using minimal resources . . . "Moreover, as technology progresses, we have to adapt to these models and we have to do things that would never have crossed my mind. For example, until recently our volume we could produce was based on long runs, which increasingly has become shorter [runs] . . . more repetitions of the orders are made. Before we would charge orders six months in advance, [now] we do not know what we will produce in the next three months." (Forbes Staff, 2014)

With new infrastructure and no taxes, EPZs also provide benefits for local Haitian companies, most importantly through the increased access to global investors. At one EPZ, the Caracol Industrial Park, founded after the 2010 earthquake, the U.S. government, UN, and Haitian state have worked to entice potential tenants to set up business operations (CEPR, 2012). So far, these include a Korea based garment company (S&H Global), a Haitian paint manufacturer (Peinture Caraibe), and a number of Dominican and Haitian based textile, candle, door, and construction material companies.

While the textile industry has been less successful in Jamaica, a host of other types of companies are active in Jamaican EPZs, many of which utilize the population’s cultural capital with a large pool of capable, low-wage, English speaking workers. According to a Senior Advisor in Jamaica’s Ministry of Industry, current businesses operating in Jamaica’s
EPZs are in “knowledge oriented businesses, back office, legal, contract, call center, and assembling component parts of printers” (R. Nugent, personal communication, 2014).

Leading transnational capitalists from the region operate factories throughout the EPZs. For example, take one of the most well known TNCs based in Jamaica, GraceKennedy Limited. Grace Kennedy’s EPZ operations comprise only a small portion of its business portfolio. Reflecting the interwoven nature of finance and production capital in the global era, the company is active in banking, remittances, insurance, manufacturing, retail, and distribution. GraceKennedy’s main role in Jamaica’s EPZs has been through the packaging of foodstuffs, such as fruit juices, packaged soups, instant porridges, hams, sausages, and a variety of yogurts and cheeses. In addition to some investors from outside the Caribbean, many of the company’s CEOs and investors have come from the Anglophone Caribbean’s wing of the transnational capitalist class, including some of the wealthiest Jamaican, Trinidadian, and Barbadian families (Gordon, 2006). Many of these elites have transitioned from nationally- and internationally-oriented capitalists to transnationally-oriented capitalists, adapting to changing market conditions as their businesses have become rooted in flows of capital operating functionally across borders.

With a long history in Jamaica, GraceKennedy has transitioned from a small trading establishment to an international importer, and now to a major Caribbean-based TNC. Leading regionally-based transnational capitalists, such as the owners of GraceKennedy, are not interested in operating solely as local agents for foreign-based TNCs. Rather, they are expanding their own operations and intertwining with transnational capital, seeking out new synergies and profits worldwide. In 1995, GraceKennedy developed its “2020 Vision” plan that aimed to “transform the company from a Jamaican trading company to a global
consumer group by 2020” (Jackson, 2014). The company that had been listed on the stock exchanges of Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean is now eyeing the NY Stock Exchange and has more than 60 subsidiaries and divisions in the Caribbean, North America, Central America, and the UK. In 2008, the company advanced into mainland Europe, becoming a “serious player in Europe’s specialist juice market” when it bought the Dutch juice and smoothie manufacturer, Hoogesteger Fresh Specialist BV (Gordon, 2008). In recent years, the company has looked toward expansion into Eastern Europe and Africa. The company has profited greatly through its expansion phase; its market value of $183 million in 2005 had increased by 1500% from its value ten years prior (GraceKennedy Annual Report, 2005). As of 2014, the company continued to grow, achieving an annual revenue of $375 million in Jamaica, $97 million in Europe, $78.5 million in North America, $34 million from other areas of the Caribbean, and $700,000 in Africa (Jackson, 2014).vi

In addition to those major transnational capitalists with domestic backgrounds who operate in EPZs and the TNCs contracting out operations in the EPZs, a number of smaller businesses operate through these settings as well and are attempting to deepen their ties with global capital. This is especially true in the technology and telecommunications sectors. During research in both Kingston and Santo Domingo, I met with some foreign and local businessmen operating such start-ups in the EPZs. New telecommunication technologies have allowed for instant real time communication and coordination. In turn, EPZs connect with new tech-oriented industries, which are often linked to large North American and European markets, such as data entry and processing, data conversion, software programming and development, geographic information services, image processing, indexing, automated mapping, electronic publishing, medical transcription, and video
conferencing (Dunn, 2010, p. 603). The IT sector has taken root in EPZs in the Caribbean, but has also heavily fluctuated over the years, with both foreign based TNCs and smaller contractors operating in Caribbean EPZs; groups that are easily able to relocate their business operations to various locations (depending on labor and market conditions). This trend reflects the expansion of EPZs beyond the traditional light manufacturing sectors (Engman & Farole, 2012; Kaplinsky, 1993). As scholars have documented, many EPZs have come to host “high technology industries, electronics and chemicals companies, financial services firms, IT and software services companies – as well as a range of commercial operators providing services of all kinds to these companies and their employees” (Lang, 2010, pp. 12-13).

Investors in Caribbean EPZ production face the main difficulty that production costs in other parts of the world are often more competitive, with more disciplined labor regimes and/or highly developed production, transportation, and trade infrastructure (such as in China, Mexico, and Vietnam). Yet with large reserve pools of labor, geographic proximity to the North American consumer market, and continued attempts to construct supranational policies that encourage transnational economic integration with the region, the Caribbean will continue to be a site for global capitalist production.

**Transnationally-Oriented Elites, Supranational Economic Forums, and State Apparatuses: Promoting Export Processing Led-Development**

The role of the state in EPZs has shifted over recent decades, from being primarily government-run and-funded operations to zones increasingly directly run by private sector management or highly influenced by transnational capital. As nodes meant to smoothly
facilitate the production and movement of goods, transnationally-oriented policymakers have sought to facilitate “tax holidays, unrestricted repatriation of profits, duty-free imports and exports, special low-cost infrastructure, good communications facilities and access to sea or air ports,” and, in addition, promote “an abundant supply of low-cost” labor that is either non-unionized or represented by compliant union bureaucracies (Dunn, 2010, pp. 601-602). At the same time, faced with intense unemployment and other problems of underdevelopment, many policymakers see EPZs as one of the few tools at their disposal. This result exemplifies how transnational capital has become an internalized logic of Caribbean policymakers aiming to map out the best – and seemingly only – route for economic development.

Furthermore, emphasis on economic development through incorporation with global capital is a strategy that many state elites have pursued to transfer state resources from “program oriented ministries (social services, education, labor, etc.) to central banks, treasuries and finance and economic ministries, and the foreign ministry” (Robinson, 2001, p. 186). Sharing in this overarching project, many state elites have promoted policies in the interest of transnational capital. To entice global investment, especially into regions of the developing world such as the Caribbean, transnationally oriented state technocrats and elites have promoted new integrative economic policies.

The policymakers of major powers, especially the U.S., have played a key role in facilitating regional economic initiatives and frameworks and bilateral agreements (that in turn facilitate EPZ production). For many years, state elites operating through apparatuses of the U.S. have played a vital role pressuring and facilitating institutional support for such measures, leading to shifts in Caribbean production strategies away from traditional exports
and domestic production and instead toward export oriented manufacturing and non-traditional agriculture and other exports. This can be seen in the negotiations and ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), as economic forums crystallizing through the activities of a “transnational interest bloc” of state and business leaders, with U.S. policymakers playing a major role (Cox, 2008, p. 1528). Regulatory frameworks established in one forum often have been integrated into later agreements, for example, with provisions in NAFTA incorporated into rules establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Cox, 2008).

In the Caribbean, during the 1980s, it was the CBI that marked a significant ramping up of the EPZ model for the region. In the Dominican Republic, the CBI achieved the “desired effect of stimulating manufactured exports and reducing dependence on primary commodities (for example, by 1990 agricultural exports accounted for less than 20% of Dominican exports by value),” while it catapulted apparel manufacturing to become the dominant business model for the region (Werner & Bair, 2009, p. 7). Supranational forums thus serve the purpose of further opening up national economies and propelling state apparatuses into line with neoliberal policy prescriptions and a constant enhancement of global competitiveness. Such forums, however, provide neither long-term solutions nor any attempt to deal with the deep problems facing so many poor societies. Even so, policymakers across the region continue to promote EPZs as a central plank of economic development. Although they might be successful in stimulating investment in the EPZs in the short or medium-term, the global spread of the apparel industry has shifted through
different market and regulatory conditions, with Caribbean producers losing their competitive edge as East Asian, Mexican, and Central American production has intensified.

Since the establishment of the CBI, the U.S., Canada, and the European Union have facilitated new and expanding economic forums in the region, a requirement for the region to be globally competitive. Whereas temporary and limited free trade agreements began in the 1980s, into the 21st century policymakers have put in place what are increasingly all-inclusive trade agreements (and which are treaties that in fact expand beyond trade, such as in regard to copy right law). This has been the case with, for example, the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA), which eliminates tariffs and reduces barriers to services. The nations of DR-CAFTA have since become increasingly interconnected with the U.S. market and the global economy, with TCC fractions profiting tremendously. As the Office of the United States Trade Representative (2014) explains: “Total two-way goods trade between the U.S. and our six CAFTA-DR partners has increased over 71% . . . from $35 billion in 2005 to $60 billion in 2013. In 2013, U.S. exports to the DR-CAFTA countries totaled $30 billion; imports totaled $30 billion.” As the only Caribbean basin nation within the agreement, the Dominican Republic has become the leading site of foreign investment among all of the Caribbean islands.

These new forums encouraging cross-border investment and production are not just promoted by government officials, but also lobbied for by capital. For example, leading Dominican “business groups supporting DR–CAFTA are located in the fast-growing export processing zones, which have seen a tenfold growth in employment over two decades” (Cox, 2008: 1537). These included transnationally-oriented Dominican firms, such as Grupo M, Interamerican Products, and D’Clase Corporation, all closely connected with North
American-based corporations as both importers of capital and suppliers of apparel. Transnational banks, financial services, and telecommunications industries utilizing the advantages they have gained through new forums have deepened their penetration of the Caribbean basin’s markets. For instance, banks and insurance firms that are highly active in global finance have actually gained full rights to establish subsidiaries, joint ventures, and branches through forums and new agreements. Long-standing barriers are in the process of being broken down, ranging from limitations on foreign insurance companies, to the regulatory licensing of foreign professionals, to local partner requirements in sectors such as financial services, to many other restrictions and requirements (Cox, 2008, p. 1538). While many small and nationally-oriented businesses have been driven under by the trend toward monopolization, centralization, and transnationalization of capital, some small entrepreneurs from upper class and middle strata backgrounds have been able to tap into niche markets, seeking to tether their business operations to transnational circuits of accumulation. In the Dominican city of Santiago, for instance, I interviewed proprietors of small home business, where a limited number of locals worked behind sewing machines producing specialized clothing for a local firm. In turn, this firm sells the clothing to a transnational conglomerate that then offloads the textiles in nearby Puerto Rico.

Many pharmaceutical TNCs based in the U.S. have also lobbied through supranational forums to strengthen intellectual property rights provisions in order to potentially gain huge profits. In the Caribbean, expanding upon the rights already gained through WTO frameworks, new forums have shielded Big Pharma from many safety tests and other forms of regulatory oversight (Cox, 2008, pp. 1537-1538). Another sector to benefit from new supranational forums and treaties has been the global agribusiness industry.
and commodity producers from across the region and in the U.S. As Cox argues, “... the rise of non-traditional agro-exports has been a trend that has integrated US-based TNCs with suppliers in the region” (2008, p. 1539). The textile industry, also active in lobbying for these treaties and forums, has worked to maintain vital conditions (such as preferential tax and duty treatments) that keep the Caribbean a competitive site for export processing production. With coalitions of large business associations involved in lobbying, TNC representatives have directly crafted legislation of economic forums and trade agreements (Cox, 2008, pp. 1539-1540). The final protocols and legislation of these forums, as Cox observes, make up “a hodgepodge of investment guarantees reflecting the particular interests of those investors closest to the process of negotiation and ratification” (2008, p. 1542).

The interest groups crafting and helping to propel these forums and treaties has privileged the dominant fractions of transnational capital. In the case of DR-CAFTA, for example, TNCs based in the U.S. played a leading role, yet were “complemented by the growth and expansion of transnational firms in Mexico, Central America and the Dominican Republic.” These firms, Cox adds, “have developed extensive ties to the U.S. market and have in turn developed transnational lobbying networks that are part of the transnational blocs that mobilized politically for NAFTA and DR– CAFTA” (2008, p. 1541). A number of other corporate interest groups are active in the Caribbean, linked to other states and power blocs, such as from the European Union, Mercosur, China, and Taiwan, all of which have sought special legislation and investment privileges for fractions of the TCC in recent years. Cox explains how this reflects how globalization has entailed transnational integration and conflict:
Intensified competition among transnational interest blocs to better position themselves within regional markets in ways that give them an often temporary edge over their global competitors. Within this framework sectors of the most competitive transnational capital work with both the USA and the EU to advance their interests in penetrating Latin American markets, and where possible to forge alliances with complementary networks of producers in Latin America. In opposition are often domestic interests and competing fractions of capital, as well as a broad array of civil society groups, whose interests would be harmed by the specific provisions included in these investment agreements. Narrowly economic and narrowly political accounts of this process obfuscate the deep interconnectedness between the power of transnational capital and the process of globalisation, as well as the increasingly contested terrain that has emerged over the terms of globalisation. (2008, pp. 1541-1542)

Often, new legislation and policies intended to foster EPZ manufacturing have not been enough to actually overcome global competition (Werner & Bair, 2009, p. 9), at other times they have been vital for maintaining or expanding EPZ production. Job losses have occurred in countries, sometimes after a certain period of job growth or after the elapsing of certain treaty conditions. Creating a viscous cycle, in turn, business interests have threatened factory flight, and advocated for currency devaluation or reductions in labor protection (Werner & Bair, 2009, pp. 9-10).

The very geographic essence of the EPZ is changing, including its spatial dynamic as
a demarcated special area within a country, as the special benefits and regulations applied to EPZs spread to ever larger areas and factories not within walls and fences of EPZs. As Lang elaborates, “the notion of an EPZ as a physically limited space has been challenged by the development of ‘single factory EPZs’ which provide incentives to individual companies regardless of location, as well as by the establishment of EPZs which cover very large geographical areas” (2010, pp. 12-13). Another scholar explains that where “EPZ legislation enables companies to operate within these production enclaves, there is a growing trend for governments to extend these incentives to companies which produce for export but operate outside the designated zones” (Dunn, 2010, p. 601). As Willmore (1996, p. 23) earlier observed: “Fenced EPZs inevitably become less important once governments provide incentives for companies located outside special export enclaves.” Increasingly the phenomenon of the EPZ is becoming a generalizable phenomenon across Caribbean nations, where the EPZs have “gradually become indistinguishable from the rest of the country – which is, after all, their final (implicit or explicit) goal” (UNCTC, 1991, p. 332). The prediction made by Sklair (1989) that a general transformation would take place of the developing world into a vast export processing plant.

Labor and Caribbean Export Processing Zones

In a race to the bottom for labor, companies control labor costs by employing large numbers of workers in those areas with corporate-friendly regulatory environments. For example, companies with production lines composed of light equipment can easily move to other locations with more exploitive labor conditions that benefit capital.
The labor-capital relationship has undergone novel changes in the age of globalization. As labor power has become inserted into transnational value chains, this creates the objective conditions for globally-oriented proletarian fractions (Lin, 2015; Stuna, 2009). As an important part of this process, capital operating through EPZs have more and more brought labor under the umbrella of ever more flexibilized labor regimes and intensified relations of global competitiveness. Many have examined the specific ways in which abstracted human labor has been objectified through manufacturing and sweatshop factories (Neveling, 2015). Rather than manufacturing goods from start to finish, production processes have also become increasingly divided into multiple parts and different stages, many of which are dispersed geographically. This has heavily impacted labor. Tasks performed by labor have increasingly become broken up and dispersed over geographic areas, so that, for example, a clothing item might have its fabric sewn, its separate parts attached, and embroidering done in different locations and by workers with different backgrounds and cultures. Scholars have shown how this has led to more precarious conditions and situations where workers are more easily replaced and disciplined (Dunn, 2010, p. 604).

Some studies have also begun to look at how these transnational chains create new opportunities for workers to organize and even change the ways in which they interpret the world. New complex and dispersed business networks create difficulties as well as opportunities for labor. While creating the objective conditions for labor to struggle transnationally (Struna, 2009), social alienation deepens as workers become less able to closely interact with and understand the labor process of which they are agents. It remains to be seen how the subjective conditions and institutional structures will form for workers to
successfully organize on a transnational level. Scholars have begun to consider the different structural features of how labor interconnects transnationally with the global capitalist economy, as Struna observes: “To be clear, the fractional determination of workers in the global system is dependent on two primary factors: first, on workers’ physical mobility relative to nation-states and regions, i.e. whether the worker moves to the point of production, or remains fixed relative to a point of production; and second, on the geographic scope of workers’ labor-power expenditure relative to the circuits in which they are engaged, i.e. whether the products move successively to the worker (as in transnational production chains), or the products remain geographically fixed (as with local production chains)” (Ibid).

A number of reports have been published examining the general dynamics of labor in the Caribbean (ILO, 2014). In recent years, the number of companies active in the region’s EPZs has grown. New production technologies though have also often allowed for the reduction of the number of workers required for certain tasks. Governments across the region have carried out rounds of market-oriented “reforms,” as elites seek to improve the global competitiveness of their EPZs (a constant mantra of policymakers). This has resulted in a race to the bottom for labor, as the real wages of workers have declined or stagnated in most sectors. Trinidad and Tobago, a nation considered one of the most globally competitive in the region, recognized early on the importance of the race to the bottom in terms of EPZ labor protections. Indeed, in the 1980s, Trinidad and Tobago eagerly launched “a process that included a wage freeze and accelerated depreciation on equipment imported duty-free for export production” (Gomes, 2013). Research shows how state elites in other Caribbean nations have also worked to keep wages artificially low (Regan, 2013).
As the data below shows, the number of laborers in Caribbean EPZs varies by country, with some boasting more EPZs and larger manufacturing sectors than others. In Jamaica, for instance, overall employment tripled between 1975 and the late 1980s, while during this time in the Dominican Republic employment grew from 6,500 to 112,000 jobs (Schopfle & Perez-Lopez, 1992, p. 142). Yet, at other times, the number of jobs has fallen. Policymakers and business groups have sought to amend labor laws to compete with the repressive conditions that workers face in other locations. The social basis of these chains of production thus revolve around a heightened extraction of surplus labor from workers in the EPZs, where the more debased the condition of labor, the more profitable for transnational capital.

Table Three: Number of workers and firms active in EPZs in 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>Firms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>154,781</td>
<td>556</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rico</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>2,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</td>
<td>19,350</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Boyenge, 2007

These difficult conditions, as well as the successes of organized labor in Caribbean EPZs, have been documented in recent years (Caribbean Newslink, 2014). A number of reports have covered labor protests and ongoing grassroots and union organizing in the region and in the EPZs specifically. With a large base of unemployed and underemployed workers, forming a “reserve army of labor” (Marx, 1990), those with formal employment face numerous difficulties and pressures. Challenges also include the bureaucratization of labor unions, the low percentage of organized workers in the region in general, patriarchy
and the harassment of female workers, an overall lack of resources, sectarian divisions, a
dependence on foreign donors, the constant sacking and repression of militant workers, and
the lack of cooperation between labor with popular and leftist political currents. Caribbean
states also play a role in disciplining labor in the EPZs, mobilizing police and security forces
to surround or suppress labor strikes.

Another problem is the trend toward business unionism promoted by the state,
capital, and important regional and global institutions and forums. This is reflected in the
lack of cross-sector solidarity and the lacking connection to broader political projects to
challenge structures of class power. Many unions have also become involved in particular
and insular agendas, disconnected from broader political and social movements. In my view,
this has often functioned to de-radicalize labor or marginalize it from community and
working class oriented struggles. While there has been some cross-border organizing among
some labor unions in the region (Frundt, 1999) as well as examples of joint community and
labor mobilization, as in many sectors and parts of the world, business unionism has become
dominant. International labor federations and bodies active in the Caribbean tend to focus on
combating the most egregious human rights problems, such as child labor. Yet cross-sector
and cross-border organizing remains underdeveloped. Furthermore, states and corporations
have sought to promote compliant labor union bosses and support non-threatening labor
organizing. Here it is important to recognize, as Scipes (2011) shows, labor agencies
connected with the U.S., Canada, the EU (whose overseas projects depend largely on
funding from these state apparatuses) often privilege unions and union officials that are
unthreatening to the political agenda of transnational elites. A general tendency in many
parts of the world has been the rise of more pro-market labor tendencies winning out over
more populist and left-wing labor, a history with its roots going back to the Cold War. This process played out violently in the Caribbean, such as with the crushing of leftist labor organizing in Jamaica (Post, 1978), the Duvalierist state attack on organized labor in Haiti, or the Trujillo and Balaguer government assaults on militant labor movements in the Dominican Republic.

Managerial developments put into place in the EPZs in recent decades have meant to further regiment and disempower labor. As scholars have documented (Jones, Shrivastava, Selvarajah, & Van Gramberg, 2015), new managerial techniques and processes have promoted more tightly disciplined and monitored labor regimes for workers in the global era. A goal of these new labor regimes has been for capitalists to avoid the responsibilities related to direct employment, while also helping to create labor environments that are more precarious and insecure. While in earlier eras it was common for “local supervisors, technicians and plant managers” (Willmore, 1996, p. 22) to operate plants (and they still do often), a recent trend has been outsourcing to production management companies that specialize in EPZ factories. These companies and their professionals move between different locations both the Caribbean and beyond. This has facilitated more standardized labor regimes and practices for globalized production management (Jones et al., 2015). In this stringent system, the only workers that remain as employed are those that remain uninjured, continually achieve cost, time, and production targets, and display themselves as compliant and loyal to management (Jones et al., 2015).

The exploitation of Caribbean labor, and, for that matter, “third world” labor in general, is also rooted in gendered and racialized dynamics (Ortiz, 1996). The harshest labor conditions of export processing overwhelmingly impact non-European ethnic groups,
spanning areas from the developing and formerly colonized world into the so-called developed world where supra-exploited workers, often migrants, are used for sweatshop labor and manufacturing. Often women—workers in these settings often operate under miserable conditions. A heightened feminization of waged labor in the EPZs has been observed for decades (Gray, 1986). By this I refer to the trend in which women have comprised a growing segment of the labor force within EPZs and are channeled into particular jobs. Research has focused on Caribbean female workers and the gendered division of labor in Caribbean EPZs (Freeman, 2000; Safa, 2002; Thorin, 2001). Disempowered and channeled into low paying and exploitive work, women workers are constantly victims of patriarchal and abusive relations in the workplace.

Downplaying the poor working conditions and the history of popular organizing in the region, policymakers have placed much effort promoting EPZs to both investors and local populations in a positive light. To do so, promotional and advertisement campaigns have been well honed over the years. During visits (sometimes supervised visits) to EPZs in the region, the author was provided numerous advertisement and promotional pamphlets highlighting the advantages of EPZ production. Scholars have shown in fact how advertising campaigns have reframed countries as platforms for global capital, with the EPZ representing a major part of this branding (Tornhill, 2010, pp. 74-75). These efforts aim not only to attract global investors but also to provide a degree of local legitimacy for a developmental strategy in which the main profiteers are transnational capitalists.
Conclusion: Enmeshed in a Dynamic Transnational System of Production, Trade, and Capital Accumulation, Rooted in Inequality and Exploitation

Capitalists seeking to escape the barrier of national frontiers and thus shape a new material, or economic, reality, have come to utilize new spaces for manufacturing and other forms of material production. Likewise state policymakers have supported the creation of these special economic zones, so as to further integrate their local economies with the global economy. Here, new non-traditional export-oriented industries could operate unhindered by local pressures. Expected to expand and diversify industrial production, EPZs continue down this path “designed to facilitate the insertion of a country into the global trading system” (Lang, 2010, p. 15). Many changes are on the horizon that may impact the businesses operating in Caribbean EPZs, such as the new deep-water ports planned or under development in Cuba, Haiti, Jamaica, and the Dominican Republic. In both scope and scale, this will allow Caribbean economies to further integrate with the global trade system. The very spatial nature and role of the EPZs is becoming more pliable, as a wider range of companies become active in EPZs and TNCs seek new consumer markets from among upwardly mobile and middle strata in the region.

The successes and failures of the EPZ model have varied. In some parts of the region, the model has failed or stagnated, but in others areas they have been maintained or expanded production. Attempts to renew and expand the export processing developmental model have remained constant. State policymakers and a host of elites active in the region have come to depend upon the expansion of transnational capitalist networks for their own social reproduction. Trade and investment agreements between Caribbean governments and other states—most importantly, the U.S.—have advanced a host of bilateral as well as
regional economic forums. Different economic forums and state negotiations have thus reflected the power of a “hodgepodge” of powerful interests, from transnationally-oriented elites operating through different state apparatuses to fractions of transnational capital. They have sought to override “outdated laws” that protected certain industries and workforces, which therein hindered cross border investment and synergies between local and offshore companies (Willmore, 1996, p. 2). The future of the EPZ-centered developmental model in the region, while continually promoted by elites, remains unclear as it underlays an unsustainable and crisis prone system.

Notes

i Sometimes incentives are provided unconditionally, while at other times they are conditionally provided based upon criteria such as export-performance, technology transfer requirements, local employment, or local content requirements.

ii EPZs were also initially formed in Ireland in the post-war period (Virgill, 2009, p. 2).

iii This is the authors translation of excerpts from an article that appeared in the Español version of Forbes magazine.

iv Companies, divisions, and subsidiaries within the GraceKennedy group include in banking (First Global Bank Limited, First Global Financial Services Limited, FG Funds Management Limited, First Global Trinidad & Tobago Limited, Signia Financial Group Incorporated); in remittances (with divisions located in Jamaica, the United States, Trinidad & Tobago, and Guyana); in life and general insurance (Allied Insurance Brokers Limited, EC Global Insurance Company Limited, First Global Insurance Brokers Limited, Jamaica

\(^v\) See the GraceKennedy website: http://www.gracekennedy.com

\(^vi\) I converted these numbers (provided by Jackson (2014)) that were originally in Jamaican dollars to the US dollar. I utilized the currency exchange rate of April, 7, 2015 which was 1 USD for 114.390 JMD.

\(^vii\) As Cox writes, in regards to CAFTA-DR, through the “top tier lobbying network for transnational firms in the textile industry, representing more than $100 billion in annual textile production and sales” the “final agreement gave US firms a competitive advantage over their Chinese competitors in the exportation of textiles, cotton, fibre, machinery, carpets and rugs, and fabrics to Central America and the Dominican Republic” (2008, p. 1539).

\(^viii\) See for example the excellent website of Caribbean Labor Solidarity, available at: http://cls-uk.org.uk/

\(^ix\) Different terminology has been used to name (or emphasize) specific kinds of zones that have been spaces through which production has been geared toward the global economy. Though often serving similar roles, these zones have been termed at different points: free trade zones, free zones, free customs zones, international commerce zones, free
ports, free warehouses, export processing zones, special economic zones, industrial free zones, and others. For this chapter I have preferred to use the term “export processing zone,” emphasizing the outward orientation of the zones.
Chapter V
From International to Transnational Mining in the Caribbean

Since the emergence of capitalist globalization, industrial mining has undergone significant changes in many parts of the world (Moody, 2007). The Caribbean is one such region, where transnational corporations (TNCs) have reaped extraordinary profits for their owners and stakeholders by harnessing new technologies and organizational advancements. In contrast, mining companies earlier in the Twentieth Century operated through circuits of international production and were heavily impacted by the internationally and domestically geared policies of state officials. This earlier form of production took place within and sometimes across national frontiers, and within colonies or countries where state elites often closely aligned themselves with the company’s domicile state. Through the context of the Caribbean, this paper examines the historical trajectory through which industrial mining has shifted from nationally and internationally oriented models toward transnational practices. Important studies have emphasized the transnationality of material (economic) relations in the globalist phase of world capitalism (Dicken, 2011), as well as the rising transnationality of many social and class relations (Harris, 2006; Liodakis, 2010; Robinson, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2014; Sprague, 2015a, 2015b). In this paper, I contend that globally competitive mining corporations, entwined with transnational capital and promoted by transnationally oriented state elites, have supplanted earlier international corporate models and statist developmental policies. Whereas workers in the industry have been brought under new more flexible and globalized labor regimes, at the same time, subcontractors seek out inputs
into the globalized industry. These developments occur alongside continued environmental costs and often shrinking benefits for Caribbean states and local communities.

Large-scale industrial mining in the Caribbean began in Suriname and Guyana in the early twentieth century (Jong and Boersema, 2006), with the industry’s early formation in the region dependent upon British capital. Over time, monopolizing capitalists in North America provided the impetus for growth in export-oriented mining and some domestic manufacturing. By the 1950s, North American capital had ramped up mining operations in Jamaica, geared toward the extraction of bauxite, a dry mineral that is converted into aluminum through electrolysis. During the post-war period, U.S. policymakers supported national mining policies in order to build up resources for the U.S. military industrial complex, through which the bauxite industry in the Caribbean would come to supply “nine-tenths of the raw-material needs of the aluminum industry of North America, which in turn produces 50 per cent of world aluminum output” (Girvan, 1967: 1). Resource extraction became a central pillar of development for former British colonies in the region. Whereas labor in the mines came primarily from local communities, there was a heavy reliance on European and North American specialists and engineers. In other areas of the Caribbean, such as the Dominican Republic and Cuba, mining developed at a slower pace during the latter half of the twentieth century but would eventually receive significant foreign capital investment. Despite this growth, local inputs in mining consisted primarily of low wage jobs. Caribbean policymakers wrestled over how to engage with the industry.

By the mid-twentieth century, in many areas of the world, corporate policies developed alongside the national and international policies of state policymakers, often strongest within the nations in which they were domiciled. Powerful states, such as the U.S.,
helped facilitate the international operations of associated capitalists (Panitch and Gindin, 2013). Yet state officials, especially in many “developing nations”, sought at times to manage or control (at least partially) industries operating in their nation. In developing regions such as the Caribbean, many state managers (often pressured by movements from below or influenced by different political currents) began promoting policies meant to incubate domestic production, albeit through limited forms of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and partial state ownership of some industrial sectors, such as mining.

As capital began to transnationalize (Robinson, 2004) during the closing decades of the twentieth century, it sought to break free from national restraints and regulations (Harvey, 1991, 2005). As Robinson (1996) observes, during this period, new political arrangements of polyarchy came about: as segments of local and foreign dominant groups pushed for tightly managed electoral systems in which political contestation was narrowly confined to competing elites. This helped solidify the rise of transnationally oriented state managers and technocrats (Dominguez, 1996; Robinson, 2012). These groups, emerging as a sort of “global power bloc”, have promoted development through the fragmentation of national economies and insertion into global circuits of accumulation. This has been a contradictory process, as transnationally oriented elites attempt to maintain national political legitimacy. As they abandon national forms of development, this leads to crises of legitimacy. Neoliberal restructuring, for example, through privatization and austerity measures, has opened further space for global networks of production (Dicken, 2011) and finance (CARICOM, 2005; Körner & Trautwein, 2014; Watson, 1985). To guarantee their own social reproduction, state managers have promoted deeper integration with the global economy. Meanwhile, transnational capitalists in many industries, including mining, have
developed by operating under new globally competitive conditions. This has been a historical process replete with conflict and crisis, as changing phases of capitalism eventually develop economic crises and stagnation or upsurges from working people and other oppressed communities (as can be seen in the many struggles against mining corporations by labor, activists, and local communities in the Caribbean and worldwide).

Yet consistent with many other global industries, mining has been reorganized along increasingly flexible lines. Capitalist production has become more attuned to fluctuating markets, reflected in the rise of operational intervals, where mines shutter and then reopen at a faster pace. A variety of capitalistic advancements have strengthened the hand of management and created new pressures on state policymakers, labor, and local communities. Major technological and organizational innovations, for example, have allowed capital to lessen labor costs, while at the same time gain new leverage over states (Moody, 2007). Through capitalist globalization, the very labor power of workers has become incorporated into transnational value chains (Struna, 2009), including within industries such as mining. My point here is that while residues of the previous national and international arrangements remain, we need to understand the political economy of mining in light of the changes associated with the cross-border functional integration of global capitalism, and in the context of particular regions.

**Industrial Mining in the Epoch of Global Capitalism**

The history of mining is a history of human displacement, hard labor, and the appropriation of land, from slave labor to the labor-intensive mining of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Since the minerals extracted from mining operations are
vital to an array of goods, mining has long been a socially determined process in which landed property is economically realized (Marx 1981: 756). With the collaboration of powerful states and comprador elites, international monopolies dominated the mining industry during much of the twentieth century (Nwoke 1987; Fine, 1994), including many areas in the so-called developing world. Yet, in the era of globalization, the political economy of mining is increasingly contingent on chains of transnational capitalist accumulation and globally competitive markets.

TNC mining operations are developed through a series of phases. First, transnational mining firms or smaller globally active exploration companies locate and assess mineral deposits. When positive results are obtained, a larger transnational mining conglomerate usually takes over, often buying out or gaining a controlling position over smaller exploratory firms. Once political and contractual guarantees have been secured, the second phase begins—the development and operation of the mine. During this phase, TNCs develop the site by relying on numerous contractors and subcontractors, as explained by Nicomedes Acevedo with the Department of Communication and Pueblo Viejo Dominicana Corporation in the Dominican Republic (personal communication, 2013). In comparison to the world of 20 or 30 years ago, a many more exploratory projects are now underway, including in the Caribbean.

With the rise of capitalist globalization, new waves of mining projects have been spurred for a number of reasons: (1) technological advancements, (2) organizational innovations, (3) the growing concentration of global capital through corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As), (4) the rise of successful smaller mining exploratory companies, (5) the rising value of mineral ores as a finite resource (at times offset by new technologies),
and (6) the role of transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats in promoting policies of global competitiveness and investor confidence to entice new mining projects. Together these factors, in conjunction with various specific local conditions, have resulted in the renewal of old mining sites, the upgrading of existing locations, and the launching of new operations.

Global Indices (rise in value of stocks) of mining companies, 1989-2011.

Earnings in the billions (USD) before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) of global mining industry, 2002-2010.

Sources: Bloomberg and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP Analysis (Xie, 2012)

The volume of cross-border corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the mining industry has increased at unprecedented levels in recent decades, raising capital for new megadeals to smaller buyouts (Ernst & Young, 2012). Cross-border financial integration and the industry’s growing global orientation has led to new “synergies, bolt-on growth and acquisitions that enabled companies to utilize competitive advantages” (Ibid). As the industry transforms into a globally competitive battleground for oligopolies, it is infused with transnational finance capital. Similarly, the role of smaller exploratory
companies and subcontractors in the industry has grown, many becoming increasingly active around the world, filling niches and providing specialized services. Mining expert Dr. Vladimir Pacheco, who has worked as an adjunct research fellow at the University of Queensland's Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) and previously conducted research for One mining expert explains:

Over the recent decades [mining companies] have had a trend toward cross-border investment and monopoly. In gold, for example, just around half a dozen companies now process the vast majority of gold. The amount of capital is just huge, but in many ways it’s like other global industries. They don’t want to get caught up with local peculiarities and problems, so everything is standardized and tightly managed as compared to the past, such as the agreements with states, the operations, the construction. It’s a turnkey, finely tuned process, with lots of subcontractors, hundreds. Some subcontractors are active globally, others regionally, and others only operate locally (Dr. Vladimir Pacheco, personal communication, 2013).

Transnational mining corporations, highly attuned to cyclical processes in the market, are competing over new markets and economies of scale in production. “Economies of scale” refers to the cost advantages that a corporation obtains through expansion. As diversified large companies continue to ramp up mining production through acquisitions and expansion, smaller start-up companies fill a niche by pioneering new deposits. Focused on “frontier” locations, “companies that have traditionally been national champions are globalizing, using
their domestic scale and often privileged access to capital” (Accenture, 2011). As identified in the graph, the industry’s global orientation has occurred through rising values in stocks and earnings, an attractive investment for transnational finance capital. While exhibiting caution after the global economic crisis of the early twenty-first century, TNCs are benefiting from new sources of capital, spanning sovereign wealth funds to strategic partnerships and private wealth (Ernst & Young, 2012).

Investment in production and exploration has also expanded into locations with fragile local economies or with only a marginal history of mining. With rising mineral prices, capital has an incentive to expand or renew mining ventures in the developing world, reassessing areas previously viewed as unprofitable or too risky. Between 2002 and 2012, GDP tripled in the mining industry in Latin America, the industry gaining importance in most of the countries of the region (Bamrud, 2012). Many areas of the Caribbean, such as Hispaniola, are viewed as ripe for growth. Yet at the same time, the industry’s operations in the Caribbean present a stark example of how the modern mining industry exists within the extremely unequal dynamics of the global economy and in a manner disconnected from locally geared development.

While mining companies have shifted toward an ever greater reliance on private contractors, many contractors themselves have become active on a larger scale and integrated with global financial systems. Large amounts of credit and loans are required for contractors, especially when active regionally or globally. Newer mining operations (such as Barrick Gold’s Pueblo Viejo mine in the Dominican Republic) appear to involve a higher number of contractors than the mining operations of past decades. This increasing trend is important because contractors and diverse economic arrangements serve as important spaces
for local capital and small-scale entrepreneurs to integrate into transnational production
chains, which are mechanisms of class integration across national borders.

To varying degrees of success, in recent decades state policymakers in the Caribbean
have sought to craft conditions that promote transnational investment, including in the
mining industry. Regional and supranational bodies, such as institutions of the United
Nations and the World Bank (Moody, 2007: 16-42), or CARICOM and CARIFORUM in
the Caribbean specifically, have pushed for heightened transnational standards and policy
regimes to create conducive climates for investment. As Pacheco (2015) observes, there has
been an increasing reliance by “national governments and private companies on
transnational mining policy regimes in order to secure legitimacy” and “to demonstrate they
are globally competitive.” Transnational juridical frameworks and standards, as other
scholars have examined, have deepened structural disparities where an “increasing
technicisation of decision-making processes” sideline and depoliticize local input (Campbell,
2012: 140).

Transnationally oriented policy makers advocating neoliberal restructuring have
lowered levies on mining companies and abandoned many of the previous statist policy
initiatives. World Bank studies have advocated these neoliberal reforms, a fact that explains
how such policies have been “successful in generating substantial interest in attracting
exploration to the region which, for the first time in 1994 and 1995, was ranked as the first
region in the world in terms of mining exploration expenditures” (World Bank, 1996: viii).
With heavy capital and technological investment involved in mining operations, many
governments in the region have recently changed laws, lowering taxes and levies, and in
general promoted conditions enabling TNC investment. This has resulted in a period of
rapid expansion in mining, as one World Bank publication explains: “Between 1990 and 1997, while global exploration investment went up 90%, it increased fourfold in Latin America” (McMahon & Remy, 2001: 2). In regards to regulation and controls, “the recently diminished role of the state in the mining industry” (ibid) has had far reaching effects, such as in how environmental regulations and negotiations with local communities now feature TNCs in a more central role.\textsuperscript{ii}

In regards to labor, transnational corporate mining has required fewer and fewer labor inputs. In 1990, there were nearly 25 million workers in the mining industry worldwide, but as organizational advancements and mechanization has intensified, there were only 5.5 million working in the industry by 2000 (Moody, 2007: 69). The number of employees in Caribbean mining operations, such as in Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, reflects the global decline of labor inputs into the industry. Although labor unions have traditionally been strong in the region, their power has declined as the industry became increasingly less tethered from state enterprises. Roger Moody explains, “the proportion of ill-paid, disempowered, subcontracted mineworkers has significantly increased” over recent years (Ibid). Thirty years ago, Caribbean miners were often paid directly through state owned enterprises, even when a multinational corporation managed operations. This is almost unheard of today. Contemporary mining workers are paid directly by TNCs or through contractors/subcontractors, forming a more flexibilized labor regime where work is more tightly managed, standardized, and monitored.\textsuperscript{iii}

Below, I examine the historical trajectory and political economy of earlier international models of industrial mining and the role of the state. I consider the recent transnationalization of the industry and the increasingly facilitative role of state elites in this
process. I will discuss how this complex process played out in my case studies, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

**Jamaica: From International to Transnational Mining**

Bound up with specific conditions and historical legacies, industrial mining in the British colonies and ex-colonies developed at a more rapid pace than elsewhere in the Caribbean. With the allied nations during the World War and Post-War periods requiring resources for their military industries, new state-guided investments emerged with a focus in resource extraction industries. The commercial discovery of Bauxite in Jamaica occurred in the early 1940s, and soon thereafter North American investors purchased and leased large areas of land containing deposits of ore (Hughes, 1973: 3). With the defeat of Jamaica’s militant labor and leftwing political forces in 1938, dominant groups solidified their relative hegemony (Post, 1978). In turn, the island’s independence in the mid-twentieth century opened further opportunities for international investment. Jamaica’s situation and experience with a relatively late independence, after a period of political tutelage, contrasted greatly with the historical context of other nearby islands.

Motivated in part by U.S. Cold War policies in the 1950s, North American capital invested heavily in developing bauxite mining in Jamaica (Hughes, 1973: 1). Between 1950 and 1966, the vast majority of foreign capital flowed into bauxite mining, a magnet of economic growth that served as the single largest source of tax revenue for the country. By the beginning of the Korean War, the U.S. sought to double its capacity in aluminum through the auspices of national security. The U.S. Defense Production Act of 1950 provided generous financial support for the program (Ibid). U.S. international corporations,
such as Kaiser and Reynolds, acquired deposits in Jamaica and received a majority of the Act’s money allocated for the U.S. metal capacity (Ibid):

The United States Government had a particular interest in introducing the Jamaican deposits as the chief source of incremental supplies. In the first place, the large size of the reserves made large-scale production over time feasible; secondly, the proximity of Jamaica to the Gulf Coast ports made the strategic route easier to defend. (Girvan, 1971)

Initially it was the strategic requirements of the U.S. government (building up its National Strategic Stockpile) that prompted the creation of the bauxite industry in Jamaica. At the time it was considered by U.S. policymakers that “The development of the West Indies deposits is important as a security measure” (Ibid). By the 1960s the burden of financing the operations had switched to the private sector. Jamaica’s bauxite was near the surface, so it could be mined with conventional mining equipment (Ibid: 26). Low extraction costs, local accessibility, and importantly, the proximity to the U.S., were important features of the endeavor (Ibid: 21). U.S. reliance on Jamaican bauxite grew tremendously during this period; In 1951 imported bauxite from Jamaica supplied 61% of U.S. needs, yet by 1965 the U.S. imported 86% of its bauxite from Jamaica (Ibid: 30).

Growing production in the 1960s included the advent of local mining subsidiary companies. Owned largely by foreign corporations, these subsidiaries allowed for taxation, regulation, and liability benefits for international capital. Their emergence reflected the
growing international-orientation and organizational capacity of mining corporations and their capitalist owners and investors (Ibid: 15).

Similarly, Jamaica’s national independence in 1962, with the conservative Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) first coming to power, signaled a turning point in economic development. Social and political tensions heightened during the 1960s, especially as the popular classes faced increasing hardship while major economic sectors, such as mining, continued to reap extraordinary profits. Jamaica’s independence and the onrushing of North American capital led to shifts within Jamaica’s class structure, with business interests and state elites turning outward toward international financial markets. British finance capital and London’s oversight had dominated Jamaica during the mid-twentieth century, but into the 1960s following the island’s independence, London’s guarantees on financial support began to evaporate. Internationalizing U.S. finance capital, and, to a lesser extent, internationally geared Canadian finance capital, became increasingly present (Ibid: 152-159). Besides the U.S. based Kaiser and Reynolds, Alcoa established Bauxite mining operations in Jamaica as well as in the Dominican Republic.

In 1972, the center-left People’s National Party (PNP) swept the nation’s elections, gaining a majority in Jamaica’s parliament. In order to fund social programs and facilitate national production, a major plank of the PNP’s political platform was to increase revenues from the bauxite sector. This meant higher taxes on mining operations and partial state ownership of the sector. Under Prime Minister Michael Manley, the PNP government acquired a sizable stake of local mining subsidiaries, with the government purchasing 51% of the local subsidiary of Kaiser and Reynolds, as well as 6% of Alcoa’s and 7% of Alcan’s operations. The government also repurchased most of the ore reserve lands owned by the
companies. Mining companies, in return, received forty-year mining leases. By 1974, Jamaica became the world's fourth largest producer and second biggest exporter of alumina. That same year, following the dramatic rise of worldwide oil prices, the state increased bauxite taxes through a production levy. In effect, the levy indexed the price of bauxite to the price at which the aluminum companies sold aluminum ingots.

The Manley administration developed new agencies to manage the state’s enlarged role in the industry. The Jamaica Bauxite Institute began operating in 1976 to monitor, regulate, conduct research and advise the government on all aspects of the industry. Yet local and international conditions and the structural contradictions therein made it extremely difficult for the PNP’s project to succeed. International capital and the U.S. strongly opposed statist developmental policies. To assuage its opponents, Manley’s government sought to position itself as non-aligned during the Cold War. Yet exaggerating Jamaica’s relations with Cuba and the Soviet Union, hardline militarists in Washington sought to undermine Manley’s government. Evidence suggests (Blum, 2004: 263-267) that U.S. intelligence apparatuses and various business interests—including those connected with the mining industry—engaged in a campaign to destabilize Manley’s first administration. The defeat of the PNP’s initial platform was symbolized by its loss in the violence-marred elections held in late 1980. The smaller, Marxist oriented Workers Party of Jamaica (WPJ), which had played a role in pulling the PNP to the left during the 1970s, later collapsed. The hollowing out of Jamaica’s political landscape was made easier by the fact that the communist and socialist left within Jamaica’s labor movement had been marginalized and brutally crushed since the late 1930s (Post, 1978).

Throughout the 1980s and 90s under the JLP and then under a reconstituted PNP,
earlier statist mining policies were largely dismantled. Alongside an economic restructuring of Jamaica during the global era, policy and ideological differences have diminished over the years between the two major parties (Sprague, 2013). Foreign investment in mining has grown somewhat, which industry experts estimated resulted in increased output of 1.5 million metric tons of Bauxite production per annum. Over recent decades the Jamaican state’s macro-economic policies have increasingly run in line with the “Washington consensus” promoted by international financial institutions (IFIs), encouraging state budgetary austerity alongside borrowing to boost capital investment and local consumption. As observed by Johnston (2013), this has led to a multilateral debt trap, in which the country’s long-term economic development has stagnated and social inequality has increased.

Neoliberal policies have reflected the withdrawal of the Jamaican state from its former role in domestic mining operations. In 1999, the government agreed to a further reduction of the bauxite levy. Since then, the levy has been eliminated altogether, bringing Jamaica in line with pro-industry conditions in many other parts of the world. Transnational capital clearly has held powerful influence over policymakers in Jamaica’s state apparatus, who have sought to accommodate global investors by opening up local markets and eliminating barriers to capital mobility. Barclay and Girvan document how Jamaica’s state apparatus has almost entirely dropped its previous mining policies, even abandoning taxation of the industry:

Since the late 1970s, the Jamaican government has progressively changed its policy stance vis-à-vis the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) operating in its
bauxite industry from relatively confrontational to relatively accommodating. A controversial bauxite production levy was replaced by a fiscal regime based on corporate profits taxes and royalties. The changes were due to a steep decline in the government’s bargaining power in relation to the traditional TNCs players and to the new players in the global industry; manifested in a dramatic fall in Jamaica’s global bauxite and alumina market share and the perceived need to restore international competitiveness. Also playing a part were the deteriorating economic situation of the country and the changing ideological climate associated with the Washington Consensus. The policy changes, in the context of the global restructuring of the aluminum industry; resulted in new investment with increases in plant capacity and production; but aggregate returns from the industry have not grown significantly as per unit returns have declined; and the recent global economic slowdown has resulted in plant closures. (2008: 1)

To be clear, mining has become a more globally competitive industry. By the early 1970s, bauxite production in Australia had overtaken Jamaica, with some 27 million tons a year produced as opposed to Jamaica's 11 to 12 million tons. By 2010, bauxite mining in Jamaica was producing 9 million tons per annum, in comparison to 70 million tons produced in Australia and with the mining of bauxite expanding worldwide. In total, mining and quarrying contributed 8.6% to Jamaica’s GDP in 1995, with 98% of that coming from bauxite and alumina. Bauxite has remained among the country’s leading industries well into the twenty-first century. Alumina and bauxite have remained the two leading export
commodities, accounting for more than 50% of the total value of exports in 2000. Yet as bauxite mines in other regions have become more cost effective, since 2000 there has been a steep decline in Jamaican production. Even still a rise in the minerals’ value has resulted in continual private sector interest in maintaining operations.

Bauxite mining (though in decline) appears set to continue for many more decades on the island. There are at present four bauxite mining and refining operations in Jamaica. Half of the mined bauxite is processed on the island in the four alumina refineries, which have a combined capacity of some 2.7 million tons a year. The alumina is exported mainly to Europe and North America, but in recent decades exports have expanded to other non-traditional locations.

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<td>Aluminum oxide &amp; hydroxide</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bauxite &amp; concentrates of alum</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
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Source: ECLAC-CEPALSTAT

Whereas mining companies in the mid-twentieth century were closely identified with their home nation, in recent years, mining companies have become more transnationally oriented, operating through global chains of production and through financial systems functionally integrated across borders. For instance, the TNC United Company Rusal, now the largest alumina producer globally, recently acquired the Jamaica operations of WINDALCO and ALPART. The company with operations around the world, is headquarteried in Moscow, but is incorporated on the island of Jersey, a British crown dependency and tax haven in the Channel Islands. The company initially formed in 2007 through a merger of Glencore’s alumina assets and the Russian companies RUSAL and
SUAL. Major transnational capitalists hold large shares in the company, such as the American tycoon Nathaniel Rothschild and Chinese billionaire Robert Kuok (Kuok Hock Nien), while its hedge funds are managed by U.S. billionaire John Paulson and the Moscow-based state bank Vneschekonombank (Gopalan, 2009).

Jamaica’s mining industry, like mining operations around the world, has become integrated with transnational circuits of production and finance. In the 1980s and 1990s, as circuits of production and finance transnationalized through new organizational and technological advancements, corporations around the world shifted from a national or international orientation towards a transnational one. These companies no longer operate in Jamaica as an extension of U.S. state policies or subsidies; rather, they thrive in a globally competitive and integrated market.

Transnational mining firms, like earlier multinational firms, have often operated through subsidiaries. In Jamaica these have included: Alumina Partners of Jamaica, Noranda Jamaica Bauxite Partners, URS Jamaica Ltd, Lydford Mining Co., and Windalco’s West Indies Alumina Company. As a case study, Alumina Partners operates a bauxite refinery in the southern part of Jamaica. As of 2007, the company exported 1.65 million tons of alumina overseas per year, and earned gross revenues of $1.3 billion. In 2011, however, Rusal bought out others in the company to assume a 100% stake. Russal also has gained majority shareholder status in the Windalco West Indies Alumina Company. Windalco produces 1.2 million tons of alumina annually at its two plants, Kirkvine and Ewarton (pictured above).

Another TNC, Noranda Aluminum, previously based out of Quebec, Canada, also operated bauxite mining in Jamaica. In 2006, Xstrata purchased Noranda. Headquartered in
Zug, Switzerland, Xstrata is registered in London, and holds operations in 19 countries across Africa, Asia, Australia, Europe, North America and South America. Among the numerous shareholders of Xstrata, the largest is Glencore International PLC (with a stake of approximately 34%). In turn, Glencore, a transnational commodity trading and mining company, with shareholders from around the world, is headquartered in Baar, Switzerland but registered on the island of Jersey. The world's largest commodities trading company, Glencore, had a 2010 global market share of 60% in the internationally tradable zinc market, 50% in the internationally tradable copper market, 9% in the internationally tradable grain market and 3% in the internationally tradable oil market. Glencore has production facilities around the world and supplies metals, minerals, crude oil, oil products, coal, natural gas and agricultural products to global customers in the automotive, power generation, steel production and food processing industries.

A number of other transnational enterprises have large holdings in Xstrata. The Qatari sovereign wealth fund, Qatar Holding, has a 12% stake in Xstrata. Glencore also has ties with the U.S.-based Century Aluminum Co. and it has a 70.5% stake in one of the top three nickel producers based in Australia (Minara Resources Ltd), and a 8.8% share in Rusal. Another transnational mining firm, the Australian headquartered Ausjam Mining, began the first recorded gold-mining operation in Jamaica in 2000, in Pennants. Subsumed in a global whirlpool of finance capital, many long-standing industrial operations, such as mining in Jamaica, have actually continued into the contemporary era but as part of the global strategies and accumulation platforms of TNCs.

Local Jamaican elites have become deeply interconnected with the global economy through the sale of imports, export processing, tourism inputs, and financial integration.
Despite this local involvement, economic activity around mining has remained largely within the sphere of leading transnational conglomerates. Local subcontracting ties with the industry have remained primarily through port logistic services and transportation (Jamaican Ministry of Trade official, personal communication, 2014). While the operations of mining corporations have shifted over recent decades, one long-standing dynamic persists: the lack of local inputs. This can be seen also in the continued lack of technological transfers, with Jamaica still lacking local aluminum smelters.

As discussed further below, transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats operating through state apparatuses have played a significant role in ushering along TNC mining projects in recent decades. In Jamaica, officials from both major political parties, the JLP and the PNP, have promoted the dismantling of the state’s direct role in mining while undertaking policies conducive to transnational mining capital. In one ongoing project that encourages future TNC mining operations, the Jamaican state’s mining agency collaborates with the mining agency of the Government of the Czech Republic to identify local non-metallic mineral deposits “for rapid economic development” as well as other projects focused on new and continuing mining operations. Yet, while attempts to promote mining in Jamaica continue, taxation levels are dropping and repatriation of local earnings continues unabated. It now appears that the last remaining “national goal” is to maintain a minimal level of low waged jobs in the sector so as not to exacerbate the high level of unemployment in the country. In late 2014, the Jamaican state agreed to cease for two years the last remaining levies on companies active in mining bauxite within the country. With levies dropped and local operations almost completely privatized, the number of jobs (albeit shrinking over recent decades) appears to be one of the few “benefits” left for the local
population. As the host government and local business interests benefit now only marginally from the industry, the more important overarching concerns of elites and policymakers in Jamaica appear to be in maintaining a globally competitive, investor friendly climate.

The Dominican Republic and Transnational Mining: The New El Dorado?

By the late nineteenth century, the Dominican and Haitian states had passed mining laws, yet the industry remained essentially non-existent on the island (Aitkens, 1931: 1-2). With the U.S. occupations of the Dominican Republic (1916-1924) and Haiti (1915-1934), (Schmidt, 1995; Sprague, 2012), U.S. policymakers, and eventually, the regimes they put in place, assumed the task of expanding private property rights, improving road networks, managing the money supply, and fostering development of credit institutions. By 1930, the dictatorship of Rafael Leónidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic had consolidated power through the local military and state, strengthened by U.S. largess. Yet suffering from fragmentation and economic fragility, few local mechanisms existed through which political negotiations and a legalistic distribution of power could occur. With a weak and repressed civil society, the Trujillo regime consolidated power, in turn reproducing exclusion and inequality. As foreign capital controlled the country’s most dynamic sectors, the regime monopolized the role of local counterpart to foreign capital. As Trujillo and his coterie owned many of the largest businesses in the country, slowing the formation of local productive capital (Espinal, 1986). Buying out some of the most profitable local monopolies, and excluding foreign capital, Trujillo promoted a particular brand of ISI policies.

Not only did the island lack the infrastructure and social and political cohesion best suited for the mining industry’s development, international mining companies focused on
easier to reach mineral deposits in more developed countries. With limited success, local officials enticed foreign capital to invest, offering sweetheart deals to potential foreign investors that required mines pay as little as 2% of the gross product to the public treasury. During the decades after World War II, international corporate investment in the “imperial frontier” expanded. Though to a much lesser extent than in Jamaica, U.S. state policies helped the Alcoa mining corporation begin mining bauxite in the Dominican Republic by 1959.

Deepening international economic activity occurred alongside transformative political and social processes in the Dominican Republic. Soon after the death of Trujillo in 1961, a short-lived democratically elected center-left government came to power under Juan Bosch. When a right-wing coup soon overthrew Bosch, though, the ensuing armed conflict between constitutionalist and putchist factions prompted U.S. policymakers to occupy the country and back the local conservative forces. Ultimately, the Trujillista leader Joaquín Balaguer came to power, strengthened by the force of U.S. bayonets. Eventually, the Balaguer regime offered space for foreign and local business, especially those linked to productive industry, construction and finance (Espinal, 1986), while continuing to repress labor and grassroots movements.

The early 1970s saw the construction of large-scale dams on the island, such as the Péligre Dam in Haiti in 1971 and the Yaque del Norte in the Dominican Republic in 1973. These infrastructure projects were important steps for capitalist development, permitting the expansion of the electrical grids and incremental improvements to the overall quality of life. With new export processing initiatives, economic relations strengthened between certain
local and foreign capitalists, especially with the influx of private investment promoted by the U.S. state.

A tightly managed democratic opening occurred in the late 1970s with the election of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano (PRD), the party founded by Bosch. Fractions of the business community, once excluded from the paternalistic system of business-government relations under Balaguer, built alliances and collaborated with PRD politicians. As the political system modernized and enshrined more basic rights, the socioeconomic conditions of the poor remained backward and labor’s power was minimal. Espinal explains: “despite the democratic opening, which has largely consisted of holding freer and more competitive elections and more protection of basic human and political rights, the working class continues to be highly excluded from power and a fair share of the wealth produced in society” (1986: 228). In turn, segments of the local bourgeoisie became increasingly linked with foreign investors, and helped to foster local conditions conducive to the expanding global economy.

During this period, the mining industry began to expand in the Dominican Republic. One study explains: “Mining in particular took on a greater role, as that sector's share of exports grew from an insignificant level in 1970 to 38% by 1980” (Library of Congress, 1986). As mining ramped up in the 1970s, shifting political dynamics led the PRD government to seek a greater role facilitating and taxing operations, in order to assure greater revenues for the state. By the early 1980s the Dominican state levied a 5% export tax, and charged a 40% annual income tax on the net profits of private mining operations (with, however, various exemptions).
In time, international pressure urged the state to drop its official ownership role in various industries, including mining. Neoliberal policies called for leveraging local assets, such as mineral resources, to entice investment from abroad. Policies began to percolate during the 1980s and 1990s, as the Dominican state relied on the mining expertise of corporations abroad while maintaining ownership and a partial role in management (S. A. Ramirez Beltne, personal communication, 2013). In the 1990s, as capitalist globalization intensified, a new administration under the rightist Partido Reformista Social Cristiano (PRSC), headed by Joaquin Balaguer, issued new mining decrees, bringing the country’s mining laws in step with pro-investment regimes such as in Mexico (Gobierno de Republica Dominicana, 1997), an important step toward deepening the confidence of capitalist investors in local mineral extraction. Under the subsequent Partido de la Liberación Dominicana (PLD) and PRD administrations, officials negotiated new contracts with transnational mining companies, though only some reached full-scale production. By the late 1990s and into the 2000s, structural dynamics developed, turning the nation into an easily accessible node for transnational capital.

To understand the novel role of mining TNCs in the country, it is especially useful to look at the development of the Pueblo Viejo mine, founded in 1972 as a concession from the Dominican state. Between 1975 and 1999 the New York- and Honduras-based Rosario Mining Company, with support from the Dominican state authorities, initiated operations on what would become a vast 7.5 million square meter open-pit mine which contains gold, silver, zinc, and cooper. Open-pit mining is a surface mining technique for extracting rock or minerals through their removal from an open pit, rather than through a shaft into the ground. Grullón and Antares (2012) observe, “The operations of Rosario Dominicana were
disastrous in environmental, social and financial terms.” They add, “At least four rivers of the area were polluted with Acid Mine Drainage (AMD) and with discharges from the tailings of dams, one of which overflowed in 1979 during a hurricane; and more than 600 families were displaced” to make way for the project. It is estimated that hundreds of millions of dollars would be required to clean up the environmental damage (Ibid: 27-28).

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<tr>
<td>Gold/kg</td>
<td>4,350</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>4,106</td>
<td>23,019</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silver/kg</td>
<td>21,600</td>
<td>7,409</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>20,300</td>
<td>18,300</td>
<td>27,296</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Copper</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>11,700</td>
<td>11,737</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nickel</td>
<td>28,700</td>
<td>40,300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,143,000</td>
<td>1,301,694</td>
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Despite the mine’s closure at the turn of the century, production resumed nearly ten years later, with new operations greatly benefiting from advancing technology and techniques. In 2002, a Vancouver-based transnational mining company, Placer Dome, signed mining contracts with the Dominican government, including a 25-year lease (extendable to 75 years) for the Pueblo Viejo mining area (Austen, 2005). However, in 2006 Placer Dome was acquired for $10.4 billion by another Canadian based transnational mining corporation, Barrick Gold, the largest gold mining company in the world. vii Placer Dome’s interests in the gold and silver mines of La Coipa and Pueblo Viejo were passed to Barrick Gold, potentially growing Barrick’s output of gold tremendously. viii That same year, another transnational mining corporation, Goldcorp, acquired 40% of the Pueblo Viejo venture from
Barrick. Despite these corporate maneuvers, Barrick remained the sole operator, through its local subsidiary, the Pueblo Viejo Dominicana Corporation (PVDC).

Consistent with its unparalleled presence in mining gold worldwide, Barrick Gold Corporation has investors from around the world. Headquartered in Toronto and founded by Canadian real estate magnate Peter Munk, it has four regional business units located in Australia, Africa, North America and South America, with mining and exploratory projects span the globe, from Papua New Guinea, to the United States, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Australia, Peru, Chile, Russia, South Africa, Pakistan, Colombia, Argentina and Tanzania. Major investors in the company include Van Eck Associates Corp (a U.S. based investment firm with global coverage, including much of the “developing world”), the Bank of Montreal (one of the largest banks in Canada, with investments around the world), First Eagle Investment Management (a U.S. based investment management firm whose global fund has assets totaling almost $50.92 billion invested in 172 different holdings), Allianz Asset Management (a financial assets company based in Munich, Germany with $624.95 billion in total assets and with investors from around the world), and the Bank of New York Mellon (the largest deposit bank in the world, with $27.9 trillion in worldwide assets under custody or administration).

Barrick Gold’s mining operation at Pueblo Viejo began in 2011, with the extraction of gold and other minerals and production has grown since that time. According to Barrick and Goldcorp, the proven reserves of the Pueblo Viejo mine numbered 20 million ounces of gold, 117 million ounces of silver, and 424 million pounds of copper. All told, however, the total output of the mine will likely be much higher than this initial assessment.
Heightened contractor and subcontractor arrangements can also be seen in at Pueblo Viejo. Whereas earlier state connected mining operations at Pueblo Viejo involved very few private subcontractors, this has changed in recent years. Barrick Gold Employee Nicomedes Acevedo explains, “We’ve had a huge expansion in the volume of relations with subcontractors. We’ve worked with around thirty subcontractors here in the Dominican Republic, but we have five main subcontractors that have around 3,000 permanent employees” (Nicomedes Acevedo, personal communication, 2013). One of the subcontractors operating at Barrick Gold’s Pueblo Viejo facilities is Fluor, employing not just Dominicans but also workers from Colombia, Peru, the Philippines, and other countries. Fluor, a FORTUNE 500 company with 60 office locations on 6 different continents, serves a variety of industries for engineering, procurement, construction, maintenance, and project management for “governments and clients in diverse industries around the world.” “A global company,” as Fluor’s website describes, it boasts “… core strengths in strategic sourcing, material management, and contract management” that enable it to “effectively manage supplier and subcontractor information on a global basis for both . . . commercial and government clients.”

Another globally active subcontractor at the Pueblo Viejo mine is Sodexo, a company that provides meals for labor and management. As with Fluor, investor shares in Sodexo are publicly traded in the New York Stock Exchange, among other exchanges. Headquartered in Paris, the TNC Sodexo is one of the largest employers in the world with 380,000 employees, representing 130 nationalities, present on 34,000 sites in 80 countries. Reflecting the changing sociological dynamics of the workforce, Sodexo workers at Pueblo Viejo are overwhelmingly female. As Barrick officials explain, they take pride in their
increased use of female labor in comparison to past operations in which few women were employed. Changes in regards to gender dynamics have occurred alongside a heightened monetization of the lives of workers. Whereas in the past, for example, “workers ate lunches at the mine that their wives packed for them at home,” today workers all eat the same lunch, cooked on site by Sodexo employees and provided to workers in plastic containers. The standardization of the industry and the expanding role of subcontractors is reflected in these changing sociological dynamics.

Many smaller local subcontractors active at Pueblo Viejo are based in towns nearby, exemplifying how a growing number of local businesses have direct, albeit limited, connections with transnational mining capital. One contractor, Presecon, is based in the small town of Cotui. With the company’s owners seeking to expand across the country, leveraging the global investment they have tapped into, its website states that it aspires to “become one of the most important and recognized nationwide, seeking to be the leader in the area of sub-contracting human resource services…” Another local subcontractor, Adesco, is also based in the nearby town of Couti and has approximately 80 local employees doing seasonal work reforesting former mining sites. Another Cotui based subcontractor, Agencia Navarro, provides surveying resources and equipment—such as chain saws and compactors—providing transportation services for workers and management at the mine.

State elites and technocrats operating through Dominican state apparatuses have worked to stimulate the global mining industry. For instance, as companies seek mining rights, they must first gain concessions for extraction, which requires approval from the National Assembly. State officials in the Assembly and other government bodies have thereby served as vital conduits through which TNCs secure concessions. Industry insiders
regularly hold important government posts and vice versa (Dominican Today, 2012a).\textsuperscript{XV} One social justice activist in the Dominican Republic, commenting on the Pueblo Viejo contract, writes, “This was actually a rubber stamp exercise by the neoliberal deputies, most of which were from the corrupt PLD of President Leonel Fernandez. There were some votes against the contract, but few in comparison to the yes votes” (local anti-mining activist who requested anonymity, personal communication, 2013). Similar processes were undertaken during the preceding PRD administration of Hipólito Mejía, which oversaw the construction of a deep-water mega-port and facilitated the ramping up of the global mining industry (Gregory, 2006).

Beyond Pueblo Viejo, Barrick is slated to open other operations in the country (such La Coipa). Furthermore, it is important to note that other mining companies are active on the island. Whereas Barrick owns 60% of the Pueblo Viejo, another company, Goldcorp, owns the rest. This is also significant given that Goldcorp had its mining operations in Guatemala suspended by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in 2010, shuttering for a period its Marlin mine due to human rights violations and extensive environmental damage (Guatemala Times, 2010). In addition to these operations, nickel has been another prominent mineral mined in the Dominican Republic. From the 1970s, industrial scale nickel mining has taken place, a process known for its legacy of environmental damage. By the mid-2000s the Dominican Republic ranked eleventh in the world in nickel production (Wacaster, 2010).

New mining operations are on the horizon, aimed largely at the mineral belt that stretches from northern Haiti down into the Dominican Republic. In mid-2012, the TNC GoldQuest Mining, operating in the western Dominican Republic, released results of a new
massive gold-copper exploratory operation (Ibid; Keen, 2012). Another transnational mining emporium based out of Canada, Everton Resources, INC, holds the concessions in the perimeter areas adjoining the Barrick Gold/Goldcorp Pueblo Viejo operation. In addition, two other transnational companies, Novus Gold and Unigold, hold lucrative concessions in western areas of the Dominican Republic, closer to the border with Haiti, generally in the northwestern area of the country (Keen, 2012). One of these concessions is nearly 1,000 square kilometers, including areas within the J. Armando Bermudez reserve (a protected tropical forest). In 2012, a mining TNC based out of Australia, Perilya Limited, acquired the exploitation and exploration rights to a number of copper, silver, and gold mines in the Maimón area of the Dominican Republic. The mining TNC, Xstrata Nickel, also continues to be active in the country. As one mining expert explains, the “…Dominican Republic is shaping up to be a new mining district that should not be underestimated” (Bassteam, 2012).

On the other hand, the global growth of industrial mining has led to the temporary shuttering of some operations and the reopening of others. The transnational mining company, Xstrata Nickel (based in the UK), after shutting down its Falconbride Dominicana C operation, which accounted for much of the nickel mining in the country, has begun new nickel mining operations near Bonao (Wacaster, 2010). Another TNC, GlobeStar Mining Corp, in 2009 began producing copper, gold, and silver from open pit mining at its wholly owned Cerro de Maimón operations, also located near Bonao (Ibid).

The overall importance of mining has fluctuated, especially as other economic sectors have grown in recent decades. Community and social movements in the Dominican Republic have repeatedly launched protests over the environmental damage and the high profits that transnational corporations make off of mineral extraction in the country (local
anti-mining activist who requested anonymity, personal communication, 2013). Yet most indications suggest that the industry in the region will continue to expand. Incentives for continued growth include heightening values of minerals, growing investment in the industry worldwide, and the continued drive toward global competitiveness by transnationally oriented elites insulated from popular pressures. Over the next decade, the share of the Dominican Republic’s GDP from mining will likely surpass 3% (Bamrud, 2012). Reports suggest that Barrick’s recently renegotiated Pueblo Viejo contract will pay out to the Dominican State $377 million from the $8 billion of gross revenue between 2012 and 2016 (Herasme, 2014).

Declared by one commentator as the “investment jewel of the Caribbean,” mining operations in the Dominican Republic are rapidly becoming a major spigot for transnational capitalist entry into the country. As will be discussed below, moreover, mining contracts pushed through after the 2010 earthquake in Haiti have been aimed at a similar outcome. Junior mining exploratory companies active in the Dominican Republic have seen their values rise, as have large mining TNCs such as Barrick. As one industry watcher explained, “Their new high-grade gold (and copper) discoveries in the Dominican Republic have caught the attention of investors, both retail and institutional” (Bassteam, 2012). Today, the Dominican Republic is the largest site of foreign direct investment in the Caribbean, as companies from around the world have set up shop, including companies based in the U.S., the E.U., Canada, Australia, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela (Pellerano, 2012). As the Dominican case illustrates, mining increasingly reflects the speculation, demands and capabilities of the global economy, rather than statist developmental projects or long-term state driven trade policies.
Haiti and the New Disaster Mining

Mining has long remained underdeveloped in Haiti, as U.S. government researchers explained in the late 1940s (U.S. Tariff Commission, 1949: 4). Since the early twentieth century the island of Hispaniola was increasingly intervened in by the United States. Eventually with the end of the U.S. occupation in 1934, the military force armed and trained by the U.S. played an important role in the country, crushing labor movements and carrying out coup d'états. In addition, simmering beneath the surface was the persistent divide between the grandon (the rural elite landowning class) and the urban bourgeoisie. In 1959, the Cold War-era dictatorship of Francois ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier came to office, monopolizing power with the aid of the military and a nationwide paramilitary force created by the regime (and trained and armed early on by a U.S. Marine expedition). Duvalier’s rule propped up a political system that maintained the country’s severe inequality and was continued under his son, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier. Foreign investment intensified under Jean-Claude, elites close to the regime profited tremendously. During the first four years of Papa Doc’s dictatorship, the Reynolds Mining Company, a U.S. corporation, held a monopoly on bauxite mining in the country, paying a mere 7% of its earnings to the Haitian state. Similarly, in the 1970s under “Baby Doc,” a small amount of copper mining was undertaken by a U.S. company. xvii

By the last quarter of the twentieth century, supranational agencies and state agencies increasingly conducted mineral exploratory operations around the world, especially where local investors or governments were unable. In Haiti, for example, the UN Development Program carried out exploratory drilling in the northwest of the country in the 1970s. During
the 1980s, Germany’s Bundesanstalt fur Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe ran feasibility studies of mining in Haiti’s northeast. That same decade, the area was explored again by the UNDP and also surveyed by the French Bureau de Recherches Géologiques et Minière. In the 1990s, a Canadian exploratory mining venture also conducted drilling in Haiti’s north (Niles, 2012). For a number of reasons—lack of infrastructure, political instability, and a mineral market that did not yet justify the costs—the findings of these projects were not pursued at the time. Rural communities in Haiti’s north have also protested mining operations, viewing them as providing little to the local population (Sprague, 2006).

With the end of the Duvalier dynasty in 1986, the failure of successive attempts by the military and elites to crush popular protests led to democratic elections at the behest of the U.S. and other powerful international interests. Whereas elites and their foreign backers attempted to manipulate the electoral process, their plans backfired when the popular-left government of former priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected with wide support. Yet only seven months into his term in office, in September of 1991, Aristide was overthrown by a military junta. The military regime, heavily involved in narcotics trafficking and death-squad repression, quickly faced international isolation. Rooted in the country’s traditional power structure, the regime received support from those sectors of the elite and army who rejected the democratic transition.

Attempting to gain foreign investors, the de facto regime granted some mining concessions (Prepetit, 2000), but only after the restitution of the constitutional government in 1994 were new mineral exploratory operations begun. In 1995, a Canadian mining company, St. Genevieve Resources, began prospecting in the north of the country (Ibid). The following year, the U.S. based company Newmont Mineral Exploration gained
prospecting licenses for areas of north and central Haiti (Ibid). A number of small-scale exploration operations continued on throughout the late-1990s and early-2000s (Wacaster, 2010). However, renewed efforts to undermine Haiti’s government by sectors of the upper class, their allies abroad and former members of the disbanded military led to another coup d'état and ultimately a UN military occupation in 2004.6 Dominant groups working with and through various state and supranational agencies have since sought to press forward with the country’s economic restructuring, while blocking free and fair elections.

Haiti’s fragility creates a risk that any new mining operations will result in few tangible benefits for the Haitian people, such as investment in the country’s public infrastructure. In mid-2005, new mining concessions were granted by the post-coup regime, such as with the mineral rights to the SOMINE area, leased through a Mining Convention (valid until 2020) for Majescor, a Canadian based transnational mining company. As one researcher explains, after the 2004 coup, “it did not take long for Haiti’s mountains to start to glitter. For example, an exploration of the Faille-B prospect in 2007 found a gold vein that averaged 42.7 grams of gold per ton of ore (g/t) over 6 meters, including values of 107.5 g/t of gold over one meter” (Chery, 2012). Leopoldo Espaillat Nanita, former head of the Dominican Petroleum Refinery (REFIDOMSA) explains bluntly that: “there is a multinational conspiracy to illegally take the mineral resources of the Haitian people. Haiti’s mineral wealth is immense, with gold, valuable strategic metals such as iridium and other minerals as well” (Espacinsular, 2009).
The immensity of this resource wealth came into view following the earthquake of 2010, when a new wave of donor-facilitated exploratory operations began. Heightened penetration by global capital has thus gone hand in hand with disaster relief, deepening the country’s structural inequalities alongside so few immediate options for economic development. One commentator explains:

Mining companies appear to know that now is likely the best time in years to move into Haiti: the country has a low royalty rate, there are peacekeepers stationed throughout the country, a giant free trade zone and new deep-water port are being built in the north, minimum wage is the lowest in the hemisphere, and all signs indicate that the new government will write business-friendly laws. (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012a)
With the ramping up of capitalist globalization and the earthquake of 2010, the mining industry began to show signs of major expansion in Haiti. Global corporations and their allies in governments have become adept at taking advantage of situations in which natural disasters have thrown societies and their political systems into disarray. In such situations, corporate planners have learned to skirt long-standing laws, renegotiate various contracts, and remake property relations (Klein, 2008). Economic development in post-quake Haiti has been intentionally channeled through transnational capitalist chains of accumulation. One group of researchers found, “If geologists’ calculations are correct, Haiti’s northern mountains contain hundreds of millions of ounces of gold. With gold prices currently topping $1,600 an ounce, one estimate puts the eventual take at $20 billion” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012b).

Shifting political dynamics in the country, furthermore, are reflected in the recent push to create large mining zones across the country. Following the controversial and poorly attended presidential primary and runoff election win of Duvalierist ally Michel Martelly, the country’s rightwing bloc has had a political comeback (Weisbrot, 2011). The new rightwing government has violated the country’s constitutional process in order to set into motion new mining concessions (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012c). Here it is important to note the close ties between government officials with the industry. As one researcher explains: “Haiti’s new prime minister – Laurent Lamothe – is very pro-business. A telecommunications and real estate entrepreneur with companies in Africa and Latin America, he has pledged to push through business-friendly legislation in all sectors, including mining” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012a). In another case, former Haitian finance minister Ronald Baudin, instrumental in approving the Martelly government’s new mining
convention, became a consultant for the transnational mining firm Newmont immediately after leaving office. This was one of the companies for which he had helped to get the convention enacted while in office (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012c).

Two mining companies, Majescor and Eurasian/Newmont have looked to fast-track mining operations in the years following the earthquake. In April 2012, the Eurasian/Newmont venture and the Haitian government agreed for exploratory drilling to take place as a new mining convention was being ratified to permit the company’s new projects. Under a memorandum of understanding, the Savane La Place gold prospect is the first project slated for drilling. The convention will cover a huge amount of land, 1,350 square kilometers (Ibid). Already allegations of government-mining collusion in illegality has surfaced.xx The Eurasian/Newmont operation, through its local partner Marien Mining, is believed to hold more mining licenses in Haiti than any other company, so much so that their holdings amount to one-tenth of the country’s landmass. Looking to stimulate mining operations after the earthquake, the World Bank’s private sector agency, the International Finance Corporation, has invested $5 million in the Eurasian/Newmont operation (Ibid).

Another mining company, the Canada based transnational, Majescor, is pursuing mining at the copper-silver-gold rich mountain ridge in the north of the country.\textsuperscript{xxi} Specializing in mineral surveys, Majescor’s investments could potentially lead to huge profits.\textsuperscript{xxii} Majescor and its Haitian partners, hold licenses for at least 450 square kilometers. As one investigative report explains, “Taken together, foreign companies are sitting on research or exploration permits for one-third of Haiti’s north, 15% of the country’s territory” (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012b). The same report observes:
Majescor is ahead of its rivals, having recently moved to the “exploitation” phase for one if its licenses. But VCS and Newmont/Eurasian are close on its heels. All of the companies recognize Haiti’s potential. “Haiti is the sleeping giant of the Caribbean!” a Majescor partner said recently, while Eurasian president David Cole boasted on a radio show: “We control over 1,100 square miles of real estate.” . . . Because in most locations the copper, silver and gold deposits are mostly spread out as tiny specks in the dirt and rock – what is sometimes called “invisible gold” – expensive pit mining will often be the only option, but Eurasian’s partner Newmont knows its pits. The gold giant opened the world’s first pit mine in Nevada in 1962 and later dug in Ghana, New Zealand, Indonesia, and other countries. (Ibid)xxiii

Majescor operates in Haiti through a local affiliate, SOMINE (Société Minière du Nord-Est S.A.), which is 66.4% owned by Majescor, while the rest of the company is owned by Haitian business interests. In one example of the Haitian and diasporic elite involvement in local mining ventures, a former Haitian prime minister (Jean Max Bellerive) and a president of the Haitian Diaspora Federation (Joseph Baptiste) sit on the advisory committee of VCS Mining, a company based out of the U.S. that currently holds (with its partner Delta Mining) licenses for over 300 square kilometers in the north of Haiti.

One clear indicator of how little the state and general population will gain from the mining can be seen in through the country’s new mining convention. Christian Aid researcher, Claire Kumar, observes that Haiti’s two previous conventions on mining appeared to have been positive, since they aimed to secure a 50/50 split of profits and put a
cap on expenses. Yet the problem with the new convention is that it places Haiti’s royalty rate at an extremely low 2.5% (Haiti Grassroots Watch, 2012d; Kumar, 2009).

Mining capital is focused on three main prospects in Hispaniola, at Douvray, Blondin and Faille B; all located in the mountains of the Massif du Nord Metallogenic (the northern mineralization belt) that stretches from Haiti’s north through to the southeast of the Dominican Republic. Major components of the post-earthquake development strategy in Haiti have been centered on drawing in global investors, a practice seen in the U.S. and World Bank facilitation of textile ventures, the new deep-water port, and the new mining developments discussed above. Policymakers and investors view Haiti as an emergency situation for which the solution is to deepen the country’s integration with the global economy. However, the political corollary to this economic restructuring, alongside the natural and man-made disasters that have occurred over recent decades, has been a UN occupation and a deepening political exclusion of the poor. Yet even the most well laid plans of policymakers have faced difficulties, with political instability continuing to slow the long-term development of mining in the country (Fox, 2015). Fragile economic, social, and political conditions will continue to pose significant difficulties for the future of mining operations in Haiti.

Conclusion: Mining and Capitalist Globalization in the Caribbean

The mining industry’s structure during the era of global capitalism has developed unevenly and in conjunction with novel transnational processes. The very nature in which landed property is economically realized has been modified: from statist oriented policies of development and international corporate models to a globalized industry of transnational
capitalists, new labor regimes, and a host of subcontractors and exploratory firms. State interaction with the industry has changed from directing or maintaining partial control of local operations toward policies of global competitiveness and the seeking out of transnational capitalist investors. The newest rounds of mining in turn have benefited from major technological advancements, rising mineral prices, and the global scope of transnational corporations (in both finance and production).

Whereas top dominant groups connected with the industry have profited tremendously, management has worked to push mineworkers into more globally standardized operations. They have sought to enforce flexibilized labor regimes, even as labor inputs overall have declined (Moody, 2007). In some parts of the region, such as in the Dominican Republic, there have been a number of anti-mining protests in recent years by labor and local community groups (Diaz, 2010). Criticism is also growing over the Haitian government’s role in pushing through mining contracts that violated the nation’s constitution.

Meanwhile, the industry has come to utilize a rising number of subcontractors, from globally oriented corporations to small local contractors. Yet, these contracting relations, which are more intensive than in earlier decades, do not appear to be a major source of value for leading capitalists based in Caribbean nations or the wider Caribbean diaspora. In Jamaica, for instance, leading dominant groups of capital are profiting mostly through the service sector, finance, tourism, and through the sale of imported goods (Sprague, 2015b). Meanwhile, transnational capitalists and global investors have maintained and expanded their dominance over mining. At times in recent decades, production in the Dominican Republic and Jamaica has received infusions of transnational capital. In Haiti and the Dominican Republic, a number of mining excavation firms and larger TNCs have proposed
new projects and received the backing of top state officials. Indeed, recently in Jamaica, mining corporations received a tax holiday so as to maintain and motivate further investment in the sector.

From the 1980s and especially into the 1990s, Caribbean states undertook policies to contract out and privatize state mining operations, which by the twenty-first century resulted in local conditions highly conducive for exploratory firms and transnational mining conglomerates. Even as state apparatuses have increasingly disengaged from a direct role in mining, resource extraction remains a major “developmental strategy” for transnationally oriented policymakers in the Caribbean region and a major source of transnational capital. State apparatus and supranational agency officials are seeking now to jumpstart mining in more economically fragile areas, even if it means violating domestic constitutional law, as in Haiti. On both sides of the Dominican-Haitian border, resource extraction zones are being cordoned off for mining TNCs and exploration companies. A number of untapped mineral deposits remain in the region. Gold and silver are so highly valued and rare that some state policymakers, facing protests and demands from local populations, might renegotiate contracts for these most resource rich zones, such as has occurred recently in the Dominican Republic (Jimenez, 2013). In general, however, transnationally oriented state elites and technocrats, bypassing input from local communities and overlooking issues of sustainability, have promoted more accessible juridical and regulatory frameworks to entice transnational capitalist investors. Across the Caribbean, transnational corporations have come to dominate mining operations. Mining in the region will continue and in some locations intensify over the coming decades, whereas in some areas (such as in Haiti) local peculiarities will likely slow its expansion. It remains to be seen how local communities,
labor and social movements, and environmentalist campaigns will impact the processes through which mines, as landed property, are economically realized.

Notes

i As one industry report observes: “By the end of the second half of 2011, the mining and metals sector had successfully ridden the storm of global economic uncertainty, emerging financially stronger and poised for growth. Balance sheets are stronger, with many companies faced with the challenging but positive decision of how best to utilize their capital — the dilemma of buy, build or return is back on many boardroom tables” (Ernst & Young, 2012).

ii Unable in this paper to discuss the ecological impact of industrial mining and the new contradictory protocols that have been developed to regulate environmental impacts, readers should view other studies that discuss this, for example: Moody, 2007.

iii One former miner from the town of Maimón, who worked at Pueblo Viejo between 1973 and 1993 when mining operations were owned by the state, spoke to me about his career and the changes that have taken place in the mining industry. In contrast to workers at the Pueblo Viejo mine now being paid directly by Barrick Gold, he explained how the Rosario Dominicana state enterprise directly paid their workers' salaries during the earlier period of the mine’s operations (S. A. Ramirez Beltne, personal communication, 2013). He explained further to me how workers, as they have come to work directly for TNCs, have faced more flexibilized duties, such as being required more often to adapt to fluctuations and changes in production.
Such as its 7% share in 2011 in the West Indies Alumina Co. (Wacaster, 2012).

In the case of mines situated on land owned by others, companies were required to pay an additional 2% to owners of the topsoil. Officially all land beneath topsoil was owned by the government, so mining companies (domestic or foreign) had to obtain a permit from the government to undertake mining operations and excavate. Laws on the ownership of land beneath topsoil can be traced back to the legal codes of the European monarchies that colonized the Caribbean (Aitkens, 1931: 2-3, 7).

Dominican mining laws previously required that 10% of profits be distributed among the permanent employees and workers, and some very minimal laws existed in regards to water running through mining companies property. Thought it appears highly unlikely these laws were well enforced (General Secretariat of the Organization of American States, 1984: 20-22).


Placer Dome at the time of being acquired was the world’s sixth largest producer of gold, with many of its most successful operations in Australia, South Africa, and North America. Prior to the merger, around 60% of Placer Dome’s production came from mines in North America. Other top gold mining TNCs include Newmont mining of Denver, and AngloGold Ashanti of Johannesburg.


xiii Adesco stands for Agencia de Empleo y Servicios Cotúa.


xv Illustrating well the revolving door between elites operating through government and global industry, former U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic (nominated by President George W. Bush), Hans Hertell, a Puerto Rican and member of the U.S. Republican party, while the sitting ambassador lobbied extensively for Barrick Gold and Goldcorp during the companies negotiations over Pueblo Viejo with the Dominican state. After he finished his ambassadorship in Santo Domingo, a law firm representing Barrick Gold in the Dominican Republic hired Hertell.

xvi See the Everton Resources website here: http://www.evertonresources.com.

xvii Also in the mid-1980s a marble quarry briefly operated. Ibid.

xviii See for example Prepetit’s (2000) discussion on Société minière Citadelle’s silver deposit concessions in the Grand-Bois and Morne Bossa.

xix It is also interesting to note that ancillary evidence suggests that at least one mining interest provided financial support to anti-democratic ex-army paramilitaries. In his investigation into Haiti’s 2004 coup, Hallward explained: “In Cap-Haïtien I spoke to people
who say they were party to meetings of leading local businessmen, for instance at the Hotel Saint Christophe, which served to raise funds on [Guy Philippe and the FLRN’s] behalf. I was also told that some international companies, for instance the Québec-based mining firm Saint Geneviève Resources (with gold-mining interests in northeastern Haiti), contributed money to [the paramilitaries] cause.” See: Hallward, 2007.

xx The authors add that: “Eurasian and Newmont Mining, its partner and the world’s Number 2 gold producer, are also drilling illegally in one area – La Miel, in the northeast – in collusion with certain government members.”

xxi Observing the property’s underdevelopment, Dady Chery explains: “The official story is that an abundance of copper had until recently obscured the fact that the area’s ore is also rich in silver and gold, and this was discovered from Majescor’s recent prospects of Douvray, Blondin and Faille-B. However, the story could just as well be that the mining executives were biding their time and waiting for a “stable” non-nationalistic government to take effect before initiating their projects.” See: Chery, “Poor little rich Haiti to be fleeced of Copper-Silver-Gold via caracol deep-water port.”

xxii Chery (2012) explains: The SOMINE property is surrounded by other mining properties owned jointly by Majescor and much larger concerns like Eurasian Minerals and Newmont Mining. Once Majescor’s surveys are complete, it plans to find a big partner, like Eurasian, Newmont or Barrick (or some partnership of these like EMX-Newmont), to handle the extractive part of the project.

xxiii Haiti Grassroots Watch lists some of the recent allegations made against Newmont: “In Peru, Newmont runs one of the world’s largest open pit gold mines: the 251-square kilometer Yanacocha mine. Not long ago, Newmont was accused of influence
peddling there when it was linked to former Peruvian spymaster Vladimiro Montesinos. After allegedly assisting Newmont negotiate favorable terms, a former US State Department employee ended up on the Newmont payroll. The company was also accused of mercury and cyanide spills.”

For my brief perspective on the current political and social struggles in Hispaniola and Jamaica, see my recent pieces (Sprague, 2013, 2014).
Conclusion

Transnational Processes and the Restructuring of the Caribbean’s Political Economy

This dissertation focuses on the Caribbean region’s contradictory integration into global capitalism in recent decades, through its historical and contemporary particularities. I have explored the structural processes bound up with its transition to the new globalist stage of world capitalism by examining the transnationalization of four major economic sectors—tourism, export processing industry, mining, and the export of labor and reverse flow of remittances—as national economies have fragmented and integrated into new global circuits of accumulation.

At the core of this transition is the altering of production relations. Whereas earlier groups of social classes, class fractions, and social groups were rooted largely within nation-states and inter-state relations (made up, for instance, of national and international capitalists and domestic working classes), we now see the rise of transnational capitalists as well as workers whose labor power has been inserted into transnational chains of accumulation. Many policymakers and officials operating through state apparatuses, for their own legitimization and self-reproduction, have had a decisive role in shifting developmental patterns. Promoting the breakup of earlier ISI, nationally oriented, and traditional international economic systems (Robinson, 1996, 2003), state elites have helped to facilitate economic projects that are transnational in nature and less anchored to local peculiarities, supplanting previous models with projects of global competitiveness and transnational engagement. This historical process has entailed many contradictions,
such as: (1) social polarization, with transnational capitalists obtaining unimaginable levels of wealth while working and lower income peoples face new exploitive relations, and (2) a crisis of political legitimacy as state policymakers seek to maintain local legitimacy even as they deepen policies meant to benefit transnational capital.

**Globalization of the Caribbean: Summation of findings**

This dissertation has been rooted in a historical materialist approach, as discussed in the introduction, but one that calls into question the state-centrism inherent in many interpretations of production relations. Taking up a “global capitalism school” approach, and specifically the theory of transnational processes (Robinson, 2003: 10-27), this dissertation rests on the idea that global capitalism is a new stage in the ongoing evolution of world capitalism characterized by the transnational reorganization of production and finance and the transnationalization of class. This dissertation breaks from reams of studies focusing on the interstate system and nation-state competition as the core organizing principle of the world economy, and as the institutional framework through which global social forces operate. Rather than view social and material relations as boxed into territorialized nation-state and interstate frameworks, it is the “global capitalism school” argument that we need to consider how production relations are transnationalizing in the global era, as transnational capital subsumes laborers and societies into its logic. Deep structural shifts occurring in regions such as the Caribbean are cutting across traditional frontiers and barriers in novel ways.

The case studies in this dissertation have supported the proposition that we are moving from nationally and internationally oriented class relations toward transnationally
oriented class relations. I have shown how capital has reorganized accumulation in the region into new transnational circuits. For example, Chapter V explained how in the decades following the Second World War, companies domiciled in the U.S., owned by U.S. investors, and subsidized by the U.S. government, began mining operations in the Caribbean. Local state policymakers, especially during the 1970s, attempted often to manage and control portions of these operations. Yet with the onset of the global era, U.S. government subsidies for mining in the region ended and over time Caribbean governments were compelled to privatize their mining assets. This fragmentation of the earlier model gave way to the rise of transnational mining corporations in the region, who operate globally and are cross-invested with TNCs and transnational capitalists worldwide.

These changes have occurred not just through capital and the state recalibrating and establishing transnational forms of accumulation, but also through workers compelled to incorporate their labor power into transnational value chains. Chapter II, for instance, discussed the problematic socio-economic transformation of the cruise ship industry over recent decades and in the context of the Caribbean region. The industry’s new era of cross-border integration and global competitiveness has occurred alongside new exploitative labor regimes, a standardization of the passenger experience, and new business strategies seeking to marginalize and finely manage local inputs. The owners and executives of major cruise companies have come to epitomize transnational capitalists—implicated functionally across borders in transnational production process, of finance, and of circuits of capital accumulation. Also looking at the transition from earlier international corporate models to a transnational oligopoly, Chapter V, examined
flexibilized labor and the rising role of subcontractors with regards to the mining industry in the region.

Chapter III explained how Caribbean migrant sending and receiving communities have become objectively linked in a new manner through transnational remittances. Yet, this objective relation takes place through circuits of capital that are controlled by TNCs. These corporations operate by appropriating in a new way a portion of the surplus labor of migrant workers. Here again we see a qualitative shift in the region's political economy: the replacement of national and international circuits of accumulations by global circuits of accumulation. Previously, during the international phase of world capitalism, small levels of money transfers occurred through brick and mortar banks. This has now exploded into a transnational phenomenon. Moreover migration has come to serve as a mechanism for lower income communities to export their labor from “underdeveloped countries”, with the remittances they send home serving as part of a new developmental model linking local business interests, state elites, and wide swaths of the population in the region to transnational finance capital.

Chapter IV looked at the novel export processing model of the global era and emphasized how dynamic new production networks have come about in the region. This chapter demonstrated how capital is no longer motivated by or conducive to contributing to national economic development, national job creation, or transforming the productive powers of labor as a “national objective”, as argued by Karagiannis and Polychroniou (2015). Instead, capital and state policymakers promote globalized production mechanisms through which the interests of labor and local communities are sidelined. Even still, as I point out in Chapter IV, transnational capital and elites
promoting export processing in the Caribbean, face significant difficulties—as built economic environments in the region remain vastly underdeveloped in comparison to other areas more conducive to capitalist production and trade (such as in parts of East Asia and Latin America).

It has been my argument here, similar to that of Robinson (2002, 2003), Harris (2006), Liodakis (2010), and Watson (2013), that there has been a gradual disembedding of social classes, structures, and institutions from the nation-state context. My argument is not that national states, frontiers, uneven development, and built environments are unimportant. Rather, I suggest that the social configuration of space is shifting as production relations become transnationalized. With in-depth research on three countries (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica) I illustrated the unevenness and particularities of this new configuration. This is not a uniform or complete process but it is a novel, dynamic, and contradictory one, riven with crises. Regions such as the Caribbean, and nations and particular areas within them, have accrued their own profiles in the global era, with their own special niches in the global economy. This dissertation suggests we need to reconsider political economy in light of a qualitative shift in social reproduction, but without disregarding continuities and differentiations.

The tensions and contradictions of global capitalism in the region are apparent, aggravating new class tensions as well as leading to state policies that are increasingly disconnected from the interests of local communities and locally oriented development. Another key contradiction is the trend toward growing social polarization, as wealth becomes concentrated in the hands of the global “1%”, a sector of global society that includes a small but rising number of Caribbean-born multi-millionaires. Yet the
nationally aggregated data we have for understanding social polarization, such as GDP, presents an indication of “national wealth”. The problem here is that this deemphasizes the interconnected nature of a nation’s population with the global economy. It does not take into account, for instance, the transnational spread of capital flows and many segments of the global investment portfolios of local and diasporic capitalists or foreign based capitalists active in the region.

Even still, nationally aggregated data is one of the few indicators we have to examine social polarization empirically. According to World Bank data, for instance, in the Dominican Republic as of 2013, the poorest quintile of the population had a 3.8% share of the nation’s GDP, whereas the richest quintile had 53.5% share (ECLAC, 2014). In Jamaica over a third of the population lives under the poverty line and in lower income neighborhoods of Kingston unemployment reaches between forty and sixty percent. The population of Haiti exhibits the highest inequality in the Americas and Caribbean, with 6.3 million of the country’s 10 million people unable to meet their basic food needs (ONPES and World Bank, 2014). “Only 2 percent of the population consumes the equivalent of $10 a day which is the region’s income threshold for joining the middle class” (Ibid: 6). Looking at social polarization through the scope of nationally aggregated data ignores how these “national populations” have become entwined with the global economy. An accurate picture of global wealth, with, for example, the complex transnational spread of investments and use of tax havens by the transnational capitalist class (TCC), would emphasize even more so the dramatic nature of inequality, skewed in favor of the planet’s top quintile. In addition to the many studies on the TCC that I have cited in this dissertation, recent studies of the wealth and power of the “super class” show
the extreme concentration of capital among the highest echelons of global society (Rothkopf, 2009).

Another major contradiction associated with capitalist globalization is the crisis of legitimacy, which in part stems from the abandonment by state managers of national development as they seek transnational integration. Their growing detachment from locally oriented development has been made possible as a restructuring of the world economy has occurred alongside political restructuring. Emphasizing economic development through incorporation with global capital, state functionaries increasingly have come to work to transfer state resources from “program oriented ministries (social services, education, labor, etc.) to central banks, treasuries and finance and economic ministries, and the foreign ministry” (Robinson 2001: 186). Over recent decades, more and more state elites have shared in this overarching project, which is ultimately in the interest of the TCC. While state functionaries still engage in long established functions (taxation, public works, etc.), at the same time their own social reproduction has come to depend upon transnational, rather than national or international, circuits of capitalist accumulation (Robinson, 20014). Increasingly, state technocrats believe that to develop they must insert their national states and institutions into global circuits of accumulation (Robinson 2010; Dominguez 1996). They need access to capital, and capital is in the hands of the TCC. However, state elites must still appeal to their home audiences. They still interact with a variety of locally based communities. Because of this, even as ties with the TCC deepen, national rhetoric and national state policies occur that are in apparent contradiction with TCC interests. In this problematic manner, state officials attempt to maintain national political legitimacy while deepening practices of a global
nature.

**Future Research**

The Caribbean and regions around the world are now entangled in the novel production relations of capitalist globalization. Beyond the case studies in this dissertation, what other economic sectors in the Caribbean do we need to examine in light of the new class relations? Future research could look at banking, real-estate, and import sales industries. Each of these are major sites of transnational penetration, undergoing major changes in the global phase of world capitalism, and of prime import for the lives of many people. Studies of these sectors through the “global capitalism school” approach would greatly enrich our understanding of the structural features of transnationalization in the region. An ongoing research agenda into global capitalism in the Caribbean should look also at additional data on capital flows and inequality.

While I am unable to discuss it here, research also needs to examine the connection of transnational capitalism to environmental crisis and in the context of the Caribbean. Though this dissertation does not have the space for the proper study of the political, labor, and social movements and their struggles in the Caribbean during the transition to globalization, examining these in detail would prove imperative for further understanding of the phenomena examined in this dissertation. These research topics are central for understanding a way out of the crises of legitimization, social polarization and other crises facing human civilization and the planet, and for thinking about *what can be* and *what needs to be* done. Ultimately, class struggle, along with democratic socialist, environmentalist, feminist, and anti-racist struggles bring forward the role of human
agency in the context of the global era, and lead us to consider how global consciousness can be brought about. It forces us to consider the linkages and forms of solidarity between working and popular classes that need to come about. Just as the TCC has increasingly come to see itself as a self-conscious class, how too can working and popular classes achieve a transnational or global class-consciousness?

In this dissertation I have applied the theory of transnational processes to the Caribbean in an original way, and in so doing help to advance the theory. My empirical study is of course open to distinct interpretations. My case studies have been largely based on a structural analysis but have also engaged in a relational analysis of historical processes. I have found that bringing these forms of analysis together useful for understanding the underlying causality of the processes we are examining. While a number of critical political economy studies have examined nations in the Caribbean, no broad studies of the region’s macro socio-economic structure as of yet have utilized the theory of transnational processes. Here, I have aimed to look critically at how transnational dynamics have formed and taken root in the region.
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